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CHAPTER 
CHAPTER 1: General Introduction 
 
General introduction 
 
“Feeling is not free of thought, nor is thought free of feeling” (Zajonc, 1980). Consistent 
with this famous quote, mounting evidence suggests that affective evaluations are not simply 
by-products of our mental life, but instead they appear to be essential and play a causal role in 
a broad range of psychological phenomena, including attitudes formation (Ito & Cacioppo, 
2001), prejudice (Forgas & Fiedler, 1996), moral judgment (Greene & Haidt, 2002), 
personality (Watson, 2000), and psychopathology (Davidson, 2000). In this context, it is not 
surprising to see that what was in the past known as “cold cognition” (i.e., devoid of any 
affective connotation) has recently been shown to be profoundly shaped by affective 
processes (Dolan, 2002; Mesulam, 1998; Schwarz, 2000), including in the domain of memory 
(Bower, 1981; Dolcos & Denkova, 2008), decision-making (Damasio, 1996), or selective 
attention (Vuilleumier, 2005; Vuilleumier & Huang, 2009). The goal of this thesis was to 
highlight and better characterize the extent to which affective processes could dynamically 
influence early visual processes and hence guide the content of visual cognition. 
In this general introduction, I will first situate the complex construct of emotion in 
psychophysiology and psychology, and delineate a number of key mental processes 
classically involved in the rapid and efficient processing of basic emotional stimuli or 
complex visual scenes. Next, I will review evidence for the interplay between emotion and 
perceptual brain processes via attention mechanisms, focusing on the classical experimental 
paradigms commonly used in the literature to disclose these puzzling cognition-emotion 
interaction effects. In addition, I will describe an alternative task (temporal order judgment) 
better suited to gain insight into the putative exogenous capture of attention by motivationally 
salient stimuli, and which I have extensively used in the first empirical part of this 
dissertation (see Chapter 2). As will appear more clearly here below, however, an intrinsic 
1 
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limitation of these paradigms is that effects of emotion on visual perception are essentially 
deemed “reactive” and “bottom-up”. The underlying assumption is that motivationally 
significant (in particular threat-related) stimuli exert “automatic” gating effects on early 
visual perception, these effects being typically measured following the onset of the full-
blown emotional stimulus. However, emotion processes may also dynamically and 
proactively change perception before stimulus onset, presumably via top-down expectation 
and associative brain mechanisms (Bar, 2009b; Gosselin & Schyns, 2003; Niemi & 
Näätänen, 1981). Accordingly, I will move on to “proactive” effects of emotion on vision, 
focusing on predictive models of visual perception (Friston, 2005; Friston & Kiebel, 2009) 
and accumulator models of perceptual decision making (Gold & Shadlen, 2007; Heekeren, 
Marrett, & Ungerleider, 2008). I will then present a new experimental paradigm based on the 
progressive revelation of the stimulus content, which is suited to timely delineate how 
expectations (here primarily related to emotion) may bias “online” visual scene recognition 
processes. The validation of this new experimental paradigm forms the core of the second 
section of the experimental part of this dissertation (Chapters 3-5). Finally, I will briefly 
describe the methods used in this thesis, namely the specific statistical analyses used to model 
the behavioral data collected in several samples of adult healthy participants (Chapters 2-5), 
as well as the ERP topographic mapping analyses employed in Chapters 3-4 to delineate the 
rapidly evolving spatio-temporal dynamics of visual perceptual processes, and their 
modulation by top-down expectations regarding the emotional vs. non-emotional content of 
the retinal input. 
1. Emotion as motivational drive 
1.1. The Evaluative Space Model (ESM) 
Many theoretical models of emotion have been proposed in the literature, including 
discrete or basic emotion theories (assuming a limited number of innate, hard-wired affect 
reactions; Ekman, 1992; Izard, 1993), neo-constructivist theories (emotions are primarily 
described in relation to valence and arousal dimensions, as categorized by each person’s 
memory and cultural concepts; Barrett, 2006a; Russell, 2003, 2009), and appraisal theories 
(emotion is a dynamic process based on an individual's subjective appraisal of significant 
events, which in turn determines action; Fontaine, Scherer, Roesch, & Ellsworth, 2007; 
Frijda, 1987; Scherer, 2009). Throughout this dissertation, emotion will be referred to as a 
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general response of the body meant to act in reaction to stimuli that either threaten or sustain 
life (Damasio, 1994; Frijda, 1987; Lang, 1985) via the concurrent activation of either a 
defensive or appetitive motivational system (Bradley, 2009; Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999; 
Lang & Bradley, 2010). The defensive system is activated in threatening contexts, and mainly 
elicits “fight-or-flight” behavior such as withdrawal, escape, and attack (Cannon, 1932; Lang 
& Bradley, 2010). On the other hand, the appetitive system promotes survival (and, 
phylogenetically, the continuation of the species) in non-dangerous situations through search 
for nourishment and opportunities for procreation (Bradley, 2009). These two systems allow 
the organism to constantly appraise stimuli or situations on the basis of common motivational 
parameters, such as valence and arousal (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994; Cacioppo & Gardner, 
1999; Lang, 1995; Öhman, Hamm, & Hugdahl, 2000). Valence refers to the categorization of 
stimuli in terms of the degree of pleasantness or unpleasantness (Barrett, 2006b; Russell, 
2003): the appetitive system prompts positive affect, whereas negative affect originates from 
the defensive system (Lang & Bradley, 2010). Arousal reflects the intensity of activation of 
these motivational systems (Russell, 1980), and can be conceptualized as the extent to which 
a stimulus elicits an individual sensation of energy, an “experience of feeling active” (Barrett, 
Mesquita, Ochsner, & Gross, 2007; Gerber, et al., 2008). 
The ability to categorize and discriminate stimuli in the environment in terms of valence 
and arousal is fundamental for the organism’s survival (Brosch, Pourtois, & Sander, 2010), 
because it sparks off fast behavioral responses (approach or withdrawal) that could turn out to 
be crucial, particularly in situations of danger (Bradley, 2009; Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999; 
Lang & Bradley, 2010). Moreover, valence and arousal are relevant concepts from a practical 
perspective, because the visual stimuli usually employed in research on the interplay between 
vision and emotion are usually categorized along these two fundamental and independent 
dimensions (including the complex scenes used in the second part of this doctoral thesis, i.e., 
IAPS database; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008). However, this bipolar structural 
organization of the affect system may not be sufficient to explain the immense complexity 
and richness of all the possible emotional repertoire (Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1997; 
Fontaine, et al., 2007; Norris, Gollan, Berntson, & Cacioppo, 2010; Scherer, 2009). Theories 
that emphasize the categorical or dimensional organization of affective experience have 
usually based their observations on (self-)reported feeling states (Ekman, Friesen, & 
Ellsworth, 1972; Russell & Carroll, 1999; Watson, Wiese, Vaidya, & Tellegen, 1999), often 
overlooking the fact that many cognitive processes occur outside of awareness and therefore 
are not prone to introspection (Norris, et al., 2010; Wilson & Bar-Anan, 2008). Moreover, 
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although behavioral output may perhaps be operationalized through a single dimension with 
two opposite anchors (approach vs. withdrawal), this does not necessarily imply that the 
underlying structure of the affective system follows such a relatively simple organization 
(Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999; Cacioppo, et al., 1997; Norris, et al., 2010). To overcome these 
limitations, the Evaluative Space Model (ESM; Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994, 1999; Cacioppo 
& Gardner, 1999; Cacioppo, et al., 1997; Norris, et al., 2010) postulates that the affective 
system receives inputs from (at least) two specialized evaluative channels that process 
information in parallel: one processes threat-related (negative) inputs, while the other one 
simultaneously analyzes appetitive (positive) information (Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999; 
Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1999; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1990). Given these two 
(partially) segregated evaluative channels, the range of possible behaviors of the affective 
system is larger (Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999). The main advantage of this approach over 
other theories of emotion (e.g., Barrett, 2006a; Ekman, 1992; Russell, 1980) is that positivity 
and negativity serve as driving motivational forces that concur to directly shape behavior: 
separate (but synergistic) evaluative channels may explain how individuals enjoy both the 
benefits of exploration and the self-preservative advantages of a predisposition to avoid 
threatening situations (Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999; Cacioppo, et al., 1997, 1999). This 
architecture of the affective system further enables to model and predict different “activation 
functions” or motivational drives during the online evaluation of (and subsequent response 
to) emotion-laden stimuli, as described here below. 
1.2. Positivity offset 
Positivity offset refers to the fact that, when inputs to the affective system are low and 
minimal, the output of positivity is higher than negativity or, in other words, positive affect 
outweighs negative affect (Ito, Cacioppo, & Lang, 1998; Norris, et al., 2010). As a direct 
consequence, at low levels of activation (e.g., in non-threatening or goal-conducive 
situations) the general motivation to approach is usually stronger than the motivation to avoid 
or protect. From an evolutionary perspective, this activation function enables organisms to 
approach neutral or unfamiliar stimuli as well as explore novel environments, with the 
ultimate goal to find new or additional sources of nourishment and protection, eventually 
promoting mating and reproduction (Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999). 
Several lines of research provide evidence for positivity offset effects under specific 
circumstances. For instance, participants tend to have a positive first impression of unknown 
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individuals (positivity bias; Klar & Giladi, 1997; Sears, 1983). Moreover, they are usually too 
optimistic (Sharot, Riccardi, Raio, & Phelps, 2007), and hence tend to overestimate the 
number of positive events they will experience in the near future (Pulford & Colman, 1996), 
as well as attribute lower (health) risks to themselves than others (Hoorens & Buunk, 1993). 
Also, when individuals are requested to evaluate objects or other people, positive words are 
generally used more frequently and easily than negative words (Pollyanna hypothesis; 
Boucher & Osgood, 1969). 
1.3. Negativity bias 
Negativity bias reflects heightened sensitivity to negative information: due to their 
enhanced motivational value (it is more difficult to reverse the consequences of an injury than 
those of a missed opportunity), aversive stimuli usually elicit stronger bodily responses 
compared to neutral or appetitive ones (Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999; Cacioppo & Ito, 1999; 
Ito, Larsen, Smith, & Cacioppo, 1998). Thus, negative events usually have a greater impact 
on individuals and longer lasting effects than positively valenced experiences (Baumeister, 
Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Cacioppo, Berntson, Larsen, Poehlmann, & Ito, 
2000; Sheldon, Ryan, & Reis, 1996). A large number of studies have extensively 
demonstrated that negative (particularly threat-related) stimuli receive prioritized access to 
awareness by biasing perceptual and attentional processes (Bradley, 2009; Compton, 2003; 
Öhman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001; Pourtois, Schettino, & Vuilleumier, 2012; Vuilleumier, 
2005). In the next section, I will provide a general presentation of cognitive processes (and 
brain mechanisms) through which (negative) emotion can profoundly bias visual perception 
and (selective) attention. 
2. How emotion colors visual perception: the role of 
attention 
2.1. General mechanisms of attention control 
Due to the limited processing capacity of the sensory systems, which cannot 
simultaneously process multiple objects at a given moment in time (Broadbent, 1957; Marois 
& Ivanoff, 2005; Neisser, 1967; Posner, 1980), attention selection mechanisms operate as 
strong and efficient filters during stimulus processing in order to focus on the most relevant 
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information in an overwhelmingly rich environment (Driver, 2001; Kastner & Ungerleider, 
2000). Which stimulus eventually “wins” this competition and receives priority for further 
processing (as well as access to awareness) is determined by both bottom-up, stimulus-driven 
factors that reflect changes in salient perceptual properties, and top-down factors, such as 
prior knowledge, expectations and current goals (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Egeth & Yantis, 
1997; Posner, 1980; Serences, et al., 2005; Theeuwes, 1994; Yantis, 2000). More specifically, 
task-irrelevant stimuli or features (if they carry novelty or perceptual salience, such as 
motion, contrast, or luminance) may draw attention in a bottom-up, exogenous way, in the 
sense that attention is reflexively and automatically captured by these events (or features), 
even though current goals may actually concern other properties (Kastner & Ungerleider, 
2000; Theeuwes, 1994, 2005; Wolfe & Horowitz, 2004). Alternatively, the processing of a 
perceptually weak or hidden stimulus may be prioritized via top-down, endogenous attention 
mechanisms, when it matches with current (exploration) goals, expectations, or intentions 
(Bacon & Egeth, 1994; Folk, Remington, & Johnston, 1992; Vogt, De Houwer, Moors, Van 
Damme, & Crombez, 2010). Importantly, exogenous and endogenous attention mechanisms 
are not mutually exclusive, but they may show reciprocal interaction effects at various levels 
along the processing hierarchy (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Hopfinger & West, 2006; 
McMains & Kastner, 2011). Exogenous attention, although reflexive, rapid and automatic 
(Mulckhuyse & Theeuwes, 2010; Posner, Snyder, & Davidson, 1980), can in fact be 
modulated by top-down attentional factors, related to expectations and task demands (Folk, et 
al., 1992). Symmetrically, endogenous attention, which is usually assumed to depend on 
effortful and voluntary control mechanisms (Kastner & Ungerleider, 2000), can be influenced 
by both conscious (Vogt, et al., 2010) and unconscious (Moskowitz, 2002) activation of 
goals. This dynamic interplay between exogenous and endogenous attention control 
mechanisms is further supported by a number of neuroimaging studies showing largely 
overlapping brain networks for these two attention control mechanisms, particularly 
involving frontoparietal areas (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Kim, et al., 1999; Mayer, 
Dorflinger, Rao, & Seidenberg, 2004; McMains & Kastner, 2011; Peelen, Heslenfeld, & 
Theeuwes, 2004; Rosen, et al., 1999). Even though they show overlapping activations, they 
can also be dissociated at the neural level. Endogenous attention control is typically mediated 
by the intraparietal sulcus and frontal eye fields, while exogenous orienting of the attentional 
focus is controlled by more ventral frontal and parietal regions (with a right hemispheric 
preference), i.e., the ventral frontal cortex and the temporoparietal junction (Brosch, Pourtois, 
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Sander, & Vuilleumier, 2011; Corbetta, Patel, & Shulman, 2008; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; 
Peelen, et al., 2004). 
Most of the evidence for the existence of top-down (endogenous) and bottom-up 
(exogenous) attention control mechanisms reviewed here above has been obtained with 
stimuli or situations devoid of emotion. However, a large body of behavioral and 
neuroimaging studies have shown that the rapid and efficient selection of sensory information 
for further perceptual analysis is not only determined by physical (bottom-up) or goal-related 
(top-down) factors, but also by the emotional or motivational significance of the stimulus (or 
situation) for the individual (Bradley, 2009; Compton, 2003; Öhman, 2001; Pourtois, et al., 
2012; Storbeck & Clore, 2007; Vuilleumier, 2005; Yiend, 2010). 
2.2. Emotional attention 
Recent models emphasize that emotion could influence (visual) perception via brain 
mechanisms that do not overlap with those involved in the exogenous or endogenous control 
of attention (Pourtois, et al., 2012; Todd, Cunningham, Anderson, & Thompson, 2012; 
Vuilleumier, 2005). Hence, besides these two fundamental mechanisms, attention control 
could also be initiated by a third category of stimuli or events, namely emotional stimuli. In 
this view, effects of emotion on attention can be dissociated from “pure” exogenous or 
endogenous factors (Brosch, et al., 2011; Keil, Moratti, Sabatinelli, Bradley, & Lang, 2005). 
More specifically, emotion is thought to influence attentional control processes via specific 
neural mechanisms and brain pathways (Pourtois, et al., 2012). First, emotional stimuli 
usually lead to an enhanced sensory processing (and hence neural responses in the visual 
cortex) compared to neutral stimuli, similarly to classical attention gain control mechanism 
(Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Hillyard, 1985; Kastner & Ungerleider, 2000; Luck, Woodman, 
& Vogel, 2000). This effect includes signal-to-noise ratio changes in category-selective 
regions (e.g., fusiform gyrus in response to emotional vs. neutral faces; Vuilleumier, Armony, 
Driver, & Dolan, 2001) as well as in earlier visual areas, including V1 (Damaraju, Huang, 
Barrett, & Pessoa, 2009; Halgren, Raij, Marinkovic, Jousmaki, & Hari, 2000; Pourtois, 
Grandjean, Sander, & Vuilleumier, 2004). Second, emotional stimuli can influence, early on 
following stimulus onset, activation of limbic brain areas implicated in the processing of the 
relevance or affective significance of these stimuli (LeDoux, 1996), such as the amygdala or 
the orbitofrontal cortex (Kawasaki, et al., 2001; Luo, Holroyd, Jones, Hendler, & Blair, 2007; 
Luo, et al., 2010; Pourtois, Spinelli, Seeck, & Vuilleumier, 2010b). Thanks to the reciprocal 
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anatomical connections between these limbic structures and the occipital/temporal visual 
cortex (Amaral, Behniea, & Kelly, 2003; Catani, Jones, Donato, & ffytche, 2003; Gschwind, 
Pourtois, Schwartz, de Ville, & Vuilleumier, 2012; Vuilleumier, Richardson, Armony, 
Driver, & Dolan, 2004), these early effects following stimulus onset taking place in the 
amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex can in turn “gate” emotional stimulus processing in distant 
regions of the visual cortex at a later latency (Keil, et al., 2009; Pourtois, Spinelli, Seeck, & 
Vuilleumier, 2010a; Sabatinelli, Lang, Bradley, Costa, & Keil, 2009). Hence, given this 
specific neural pathway, effects of emotion on attention appear to occur in parallel to other 
attentional gating effects mediated by the classical dorsal frontoparietal networks involved in 
the endogenous and exogenous control of attention (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Peelen, et 
al., 2004). 
At the behavioral level, several experimental paradigms have been used in order to 
substantiate how emotional -- particularly threatening -- stimuli may bias early visual 
perceptual processes more readily than neutral stimuli, via the putative mediation of 
enhanced attention control mechanisms (Anderson, 2005; Öhman, 2001; Öhman, Lundqvist, 
& Esteves, 2001; Phelps, 2006). However, as will appear more clearly here below, each of 
these paradigms does not provide a direct, unique or pure measure of early attentional capture 
by emotion, but multiple (attention) processes are presumably operating in parallel such that 
it remains difficult to tease apart a specific contribution of emotion on visual perception by 
means of these specific tasks (Horstmann, 2007; West, Anderson, & Pratt, 2009). To 
overcome these problems, after a brief overview of the main experimental paradigms most 
frequently used in the literature to investigate emotional attention effects on perception, I will 
outline an alternative experimental paradigm (namely the temporal order judgment task) that 
appears better suited to explore early emotion-dependent orienting effects of attention and 
influences on (temporal) perception. This experimental paradigm has been extensively used 
in the first empirical section of this thesis (Chapter 2) in order to corroborate the assumption 
of early, reflexive effects of (negative) emotion on (temporal) perception. 
2.3. Emotional Stroop task 
In the classical Stroop task, participants have to name as quickly as possible the color of 
the ink in which words are printed. The (semantic) meaning of the word itself is thus 
irrelevant for the task at hand, but it is “automatically” processed nonetheless and hence it 
slows down color naming, particularly when the meaning and the ink of the word mismatch 
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(Macleod, 1991; Stroop, 1935). Similarly, in the emotional Stroop task, naming the color or 
simply counting emotion-laden (particularly negative) words is typically slower compared to 
naming neutral words, even though the word meaning is task-irrelevant and should be 
ignored (Algom, Chajut, & Lev, 2004; Phaf & Kan, 2007). For example, response latencies to 
naming the color of the ink of the word cancer are generally slower than naming the color of 
the ink of the word flower. These results are interpreted as reflecting enhanced attentional 
orienting towards the content of these motivationally relevant stimuli (Yiend, 2010). This 
effect has been observed in non-preselected adult healthy participants (Pratto & John, 1991; 
Wentura, Rothermund, & Bak, 2000), but is usually exacerbated in subclinical anxiety (Fox, 
1993; Salters-Pedneault, Gentes, & Roemer, 2007) as well as in specific psychopathological 
conditions, including generalized anxiety disorder (Mogg, Mathews, & Weinman, 1989), 
phobias (Watts, McKenna, Sharrock, & Trezise, 1986), post-traumatic stress disorder (Cisler, 
et al., 2011), obsessive-compulsive disorder (Moritz, et al., 2004), and depression (Epp, 
Dobson, Dozois, & Frewen, 2012; Gotlib & McCann, 1984). 
Despite its broad use in the literature and value to reveal effects of emotion on attention, 
however, the emotional Stroop task suffers from a number of theoretical and methodological 
limitations, which overall complicate the interpretation of the results. First, it is unclear 
whether the emotional Stroop task actually measures a standard Stroop effect or something 
else (Algom, et al., 2004). Specifically, in the classical Stroop effect the contrast is between 
congruent (e.g., the word yellow presented in yellow ink) and incongruent trials (e.g., the 
word red presented in green ink). Thus, a clear one-to-one relationship between the color of 
the ink and the word meaning is always present, creating interference when these two 
mismatch. Such a clear contrast is not evident for the stimuli used in emotional Stroop tasks: 
following the example outlined above, no direct relationship can be inferred between the 
word cancer and the color of the ink. Therefore, standard incongruency effects cannot be 
calculated with the emotional Stroop task (Algom, et al., 2004). Moreover, the reported 
delayed response latencies for negative vs. neutral stimuli may very well stem from post-
attentional processes (Algom, et al., 2004; Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-
Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 2007): when the task is administered to sub-clinical or 
clinical (e.g., anxious) populations, threat-related words might inherently increase the current 
negative affect state of participants, thus slowing down reaction times at the response level 
(MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986). Alternatively, responses might be delayed as a 
consequence of participants’ active effort in avoiding (or diverting attention away from) 
threat-related information (Cisler & Koster, 2010; De Ruiter & Brosschot, 1994; Koster, 
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Verschuere, Crombez, & Van Damme, 2005). Also, participants might develop a generalized 
sensitivity for negative information only because they are presented with an increasing 
number of negative words throughout several experimental blocks, thus leading to an 
enhanced perception of threat (Bar-Haim, et al., 2007; McKenna & Sharma, 2004; Phaf & 
Kan, 2007). In light of these limitations, other experimental paradigms have been devised and 
used in the literature in order to highlight interaction effects between attentional and 
emotional processes. At any rate, it is also clear that the emotional Stroop task cannot be used 
to make strong, unequivocal inferences regarding a rapid bias during attention allocation 
towards motivationally relevant stimuli. 
2.4. Attentional blink task 
In the attentional blink (AB) paradigm, a series of stimuli (usually letters or words, 
sometimes faces) is rapidly presented on the screen at a rate of ~10 stimuli per second (rapid 
serial visual presentation; RSVP), and participants have to identify one or more (usually two) 
pre-defined targets based on their diagnostic color (Broadbent & Broadbent, 1987; Raymond, 
Shapiro, & Arnell, 1992). Although any single target (presented for only 100 ms) can be 
accurately reported, the second of two consecutive targets often fails to be reported when the 
temporal gap between the onset of the first (T1) and second (T2) stimulus is kept short, i.e., 
200-500 ms (Reeves & Sperling, 1986; Shapiro, Arnell, & Raymond, 1997). Interestingly, 
when emotional stimuli -- e.g., words (Anderson, 2005; Ihssen & Keil, 2009; Keil & Ihssen, 
2004; Tibboel, Van Bockstaele, & De Houwer, 2011) or pictures (Most, Chun, Widders, & 
Zald, 2005) -- are embedded in a RSVP, two different emotional attention effects have been 
observed: (i) AB is reduced when T2 carries a (negative) emotional meaning or is highly 
arousing (Anderson, 2005; Keil & Ihssen, 2004; Keil, Ihssen, & Heim, 2006; Schwabe, et al., 
2011); (ii) AB is prolonged if T1 is highly arousing (Anderson, 2005; Arnell, Killman, & 
Fijavz, 2007; Maratos, 2011; Mathewson, Arnell, & Mansfield, 2008). 
Several theoretical accounts have been proposed to explain the classical AB effect 
(notably, the debate is still ongoing; for a detailed review, see Dux & Marois, 2009) that can 
also be borrowed to interpret changes in the profile of the AB created by emotional stimuli. 
One of the most influential theories, the interference account (Shapiro, Raymond, & Arnell, 
1994), postulates that the perceptual representation of each and every stimulus of the RSVP 
sequence is compared with selection templates stored in working memory, and the stimuli 
that most closely match with these templates are registered and assigned a weight based on 
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the available space. Due to the limited capacity of working memory, the processing of T2 is 
impaired because the system is still busy storing, processing, and retaining T1, thereby 
leading to an AB effect (see also Chun & Potter, 1995; Giesbrecht & Di Lollo, 1998). 
Similarly, because of the intrinsic motivational relevance of (negative) emotional stimuli 
(e.g., arousing or taboo words; Mathewson, et al., 2008; Tibboel, De Houwer, & Crombez, 
2008), attending to an emotion-laden T1 reduces the attentional resources required to encode 
a non-emotional T2 in working memory, thereby impairing performance (Arnell, et al., 2007; 
Mathewson, et al., 2008). Likewise, the processing of arousing T2 could still be enhanced 
(following neutral T1) because these stimuli “automatically” attract attention given their 
intrinsic motivational relevance, eventually resulting in a diminished AB (Ihssen & Keil, 
2009; Keil & Ihssen, 2004; Schwabe, et al., 2011). Alternative accounts posit that the AB 
mostly stems from an inefficient allocation of temporal attention (a consequence of the 
RSVP), which can somehow be restored “paradoxically”, when central attentional resources 
are occupied by a concurrent, distracting secondary task (see Olivers & Nieuwenhuis, 2006). 
The AB paradigm has proven to be extremely effective and valuable to highlight and 
decompose key features of attention selection and their likely modulation by emotion 
processes. However, it does not enable to pinpoint whether an early attentional capture by 
emotion occurs during the processing of the successive (verbal) stimuli or not. Multiple 
parallel attention and memory processes are likely contributing to the AB effect, including 
the active inhibition of physical features of T1 that impairs the subsequent identification of 
T2 (Raymond, et al., 1992), the switching between the semantic category of T1 and T2 (Di 
Lollo, Kawahara, Ghorashi, & Enns, 2005), the prolonged attentional re-engagement towards 
T2 (Nieuwenstein, Potter, & Theeuwes, 2009), and the overall working memory capacity 
(Chun & Potter, 1995; Shapiro, et al., 1994). Therefore, it remains difficult, based on the use 
of the AB exclusively, to decide whether emotional (unlike neutral) stimuli reflexively attract 
attention and in turn impact on visual perception. 
2.5. Visual search task 
In visual search tasks, participants are instructed to look for a specific target embedded in 
an array of perceptually similar distracters. Attention selection and search can be guided 
either by automatic processes in the case of singletons (e.g., a red “5” among several blue 
“5”s) or by more controlled processes in the case of a conjunction of features (e.g., a red “5” 
among several blue “5”s, red “6”s, and blue “6”s) (Treisman & Gelade, 1980; Wolfe & 
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Horowitz, 2004). Interestingly, emotional (particularly threatening) faces have been found to 
capture attention quicker and more effectively relative to neutral faces, serving as evidence 
for the “face in the crowd” effect (Eastwood, Smilek, & Merikle, 2003; Fox, Russo, Bowles, 
& Dutton, 2001; Hansen & Hansen, 1988; Lucas & Vuilleumier, 2008; Öhman, Flykt, et al., 
2001). However, these findings have been disputed by many authors given the equivocal 
nature of the effect (see Wolfe & Horowitz, 2004 for a review). Among the well-known 
limitations, with visual search tasks it remains somewhat difficult to disentangle the impact of 
emotion or semantic property of the stimulus from other low-level, perceptual or physical 
features that can potentially bias visual attention very rapidly, independently from a deep 
processing of the stimulus at the emotional or semantic level (e.g., mouth or eyes; Calvo & 
Nummenmaa, 2011; Fox & Damjanovic, 2006; Horstmann & Bauland, 2006; VanRullen, 
2006). Moreover, this paradigm alike does not exclusively titrate a genuine early spatial 
orienting effect of attention towards the location of motivationally significant objects. In fact, 
according to some authors in vision research (e.g., Horstmann, 2007; Wolfe, 2001; but see 
Joseph, Chun, & Nakayama, 1997), efficient visual search occurs when a target stimulus is 
detected regardless of the number of distracter items. If an angry face is detected within 500 
ms when embedded in an array of happy faces regardless of the number of these distracters, it 
means that search for this target is efficient, and some specific features of the angry face (not 
present, or at least not to the same extent, in happy faces) may actively capture attention. 
Conversely, if the detection latency of a happy face among angry faces is slower as a function 
of the increasing number of these distracters, search is non-efficient and attention is assumed 
to be deployed serially on each and every item in the array until the target is detected (Wolfe, 
2001; Wolfe & Horowitz, 2004). Many results in literature support a serial search hypothesis 
for emotional relative to neutral face stimuli (e.g., Eastwood, Smilek, & Merikle, 2001; Fox, 
et al., 2000; Öhman, Lundqvist, et al., 2001). One reason that could potentially account for 
this outcome is the fact that emotional faces are usually rather complex stimuli (even when 
schematic faces are used), whose identification is the result of a composite process requiring 
the rapid identification of distinct visual features (such as a specific curvature of the mouth or 
the first order configuration regarding the position of the eyes relative to the mouth; see 
Maurer, Le Grand, & Mondloch, 2002). Because early attention orienting has been found to 
be driven mostly by changes in basic perceptual features (i.e., color, orientation, size, 
luminance, and spatial frequency; Egeth & Yantis, 1997; Theeuwes, 1994; Wolfe & 
Horowitz, 2004), it is unclear, based on visual search tasks alone, whether the negative 
emotional face expression per se can capture attention early on following stimulus onset, or 
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other (confounding) low-level perceptual variables can account for this effect (Horstmann, 
2007). 
2.6. (Spatial) cueing and dot probe tasks 
In dot probe tasks (Fox, et al., 2001; MacLeod, et al., 1986; Mogg & Bradley, 1999; 
Posner, 1980), two cues (e.g., faces or pictures) are simultaneously presented on the left and 
right side or fixation (or above vs. below fixation), and participants have to either detect or 
discriminate the content of a subsequent target stimulus replacing one of the cues after a short 
time interval. Usually the cueing is non-predictive, such that the target appears regardless of 
the position of the preceding cues. Cueing tasks are a variant of the dot probe tasks, where 
only one cue is typically used. Importantly, one cue is emotionally significant (e.g., 
threatening) and the other one is neutral. Participants are usually better (as reflected by faster 
reaction times or higher accuracy) at processing the (non-emotional) target stimulus if it 
appears at the location previously occupied by the emotional cue (valid trials) (Bocanegra & 
Zeelenberg, 2009, 2011b; Brosch, et al., 2011; Fox, et al., 2001; Phelps, Ling, & Carrasco, 
2006; Pourtois, et al., 2004). Sometimes, in particular for high anxious or dysphoric 
participants, a disengagement effect rather than a facilitated orienting towards emotional 
stimuli is seen with (exogenous) cueing tasks, corresponding to a prolonged latency to 
process the target for invalid compared to valid or neutral trials. This observation is 
consistent with the idea of a holding rather than a capture effect (i.e., attention is held on the 
spatial location of an emotion-laden stimulus; Fox, et al., 2001; Koster, Crombez, 
Verschuere, Van Damme, & Wiersema, 2006). Whether being expressed by faster RTs for 
valid trials or slower RTs for invalid trials, the underlying logic is shared in these two cases 
and one usually concludes that attention is “automatically” captured by the task-irrelevant, 
motivationally salient stimuli (Bradley, 2009), an effect which in turn leads to an enhanced 
processing of the subsequent (task-relevant) target (Fox, et al., 2001). 
Despite the value of these cueing paradigms to study effects of emotion on the rapid 
deployment or reorienting of attention, alternative interpretations of these findings are also 
proposed, which do not postulate any direct mediation by emotional processes. Most of the 
time, results are solely based on RTs (or discrimination accuracy) corresponding to the 
processing of the non-emotional target as opposed to the emotional cue (which is typically 
task-irrelevant). Therefore, only indirect inferences on how (spatial) attention is differentially 
allocated during the presentation of the emotional cue can be made (Fox, et al., 2001; West, 
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et al., 2009). Presumably, RTs likely reflect the end-product of many distinct but interactive 
attentional processes (e.g., orienting, disengagement, shifting, and re-engagement), and in 
these conditions it remains difficult to know which of them is selectively modulated by 
affective processes (Posner, 1980). 
2.7. Temporal Order Judgment 
So far, I have reviewed four classical experimental paradigms used in the literature in 
order to gain insight into effects of emotion on attention control processes. Although each of 
them rests on specific assumptions and provides useful hints on the interplay between 
emotion and attention processes, they all have specific limitations. In particular, none of them 
appears suited to measure and explore the early and initial differential allocation of attention 
towards emotional (as opposed to neutral) stimuli exclusively (Horstmann, 2007; West, et al., 
2009). By contrast, temporal order judgment (TOJ) tasks provide a direct, sensitive and 
accurate measure of attentional capture (Jaskowski, 1993; Stelmach, Herdman, & Mcneil, 
1994; Titchener, 1908). Surprisingly, very few studies (Fecica & Stolz, 2008; West, et al., 
2009) have actually capitalized on the strengths of this specific experimental paradigm in 
order to corroborate the assumption of an early differential orienting effect triggered by 
emotion on attention control processes and, in turn, low-level visual perception. Therefore, 
one of the goals of my dissertation was to explore whether (negative) emotional stimuli had 
the propensity to capture “reflexively” attention and hence bias TOJs. 
In a typical TOJ task, attention is oriented (using symbolic cues) either to the left or the 
right side of fixation, and participants have to judge which of two subsequent and competing 
visual stimuli, displayed on the left and right at various stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs), 
was presented first. Because attention “accelerates” sensory processing (Desimone & 
Duncan, 1995; Serences & Yantis, 2006), stimuli appearing on the attended location are 
processed faster and, as a consequence, perceived as appearing first (an effect termed visual 
prior entry; Schneider & Bavelier, 2003; Spence & Parise, 2010; Spence, Shore, & Klein, 
2001). Due to their intrinsic motivational relevance, (negative) emotional facial expressions 
(i.e., angry or fearful faces) could capture attention in an automatic fashion (Esteves, 
Dimberg, & Öhman, 1994; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1997; Vuilleumier, et al., 2001; 
Vuilleumier & Pourtois, 2007) and, as a consequence, a prior entry effect for this class of 
stimuli could be observed. More specifically, emotion (similarly to attention) is thought to 
“accelerate” sensory processing (see also Droit-Volet & Meck, 2007). This prediction was at 
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the core of the experimental work reported in the first empirical part of this thesis (Chapter 
2). 
In a series of five successive experiments, I sought to investigate whether negative 
emotional facial expressions (i.e., angry or fearful faces), when competing for attention 
selection with neutral faces, readily capture attention control processes in a genuine 
bottom-up way or not, as revealed by a prior entry effect for these former face stimuli 
during a standard TOJ. I used standard face stimuli previously validated in the literature 
(Ekman & Friesen, 1976) and that were consistently shown to bias, in a bottom-up fashion, 
attention control brain processes in previous studies based on different tasks (Esteves, et al., 
1994; Pourtois, et al., 2012; Vuilleumier, 2005; Vuilleumier, et al., 2001). To ascertain that 
the emotional content of the stimuli was the main factor influencing perceptual judgments, on 
each trial I presented pairs of faces that were always visually dissimilar, both in terms of 
identity and facial expression. The idea behind this experimental manipulation was that visual 
dissimilarity between the two faces was randomized across trials, thereby making it unlikely 
that dissimilarity alone could strategically be used by participants to perform the task 
(Duncan & Humphreys, 1989). In addition, at the end of each experiment I asked participants 
to rate the emotional intensity of the face stimuli, to provide evidence that the (negative and 
neutral) facial expressions were recognized “explicitly” in accordance with the normative 
ratings (Ekman & Friesen, 1976). The five experiments reported in Chapter 2 were aimed at: 
(i) corroborating and extending previous results (Fecica & Stolz, 2008; West, et al., 2009) 
showing prior entry effects for emotional relative to neutral faces, indicating early attentional 
capture for this class of stimuli; (ii) comparing the magnitude of the prior entry effect for 
fearful vs. angry faces, given that early attention allocation could likely be influenced by the 
perceived threat value conveyed by the face (Anderson, Christoff, Panitz, De Rosa, & 
Gabrieli, 2003; Cristinzio, N'Diaye, Seeck, Vuilleumier, & Sander, 2010); (iii) disentangling 
engagement vs. disengagement effects during the “automatic” orienting of attention towards 
negative emotional stimuli (Koster, Crombez, Van Damme, Verschuere, & De Houwer, 
2004; Salemink, van den Hout, & Kindt, 2007) by means of a variant of the of the TOJ task 
where the processing of the offset of the two faces was emphasized, as opposed to their onset 
(see Chapter 2 for details). 
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3. Expectation-driven influences on visual perception: 
the role of emotion 
A vast majority of studies and models reviewed above has primarily focused on “magical” 
(in the sense of “automatic”, “irrepressible”, “compelling”) bottom-up influences of emotion 
on (visual) perception, with the key assumption that specific attention processes somehow 
reflexively mediate these influences. However, the evidence for such an assumption is rather 
mixed (see Pourtois, et al., 2012, for a recent review). As outlined above, attention is 
essentially multifaceted and it comprises not only bottom-up guidance mechanisms, but also 
top-down factors, including prior knowledge, expectations and current goals, which also 
substantially contribute to selection and allocation processes during (early) stimulus 
processing (Bar, 2009b; Summerfield & Egner, 2009). In the second part of my dissertation, I 
concentrated on these elements and designed studies aimed at addressing the question 
whether emotion could reliably bias expectation processes generated “proactively” during 
visual perception, with a focus on emotional scene perception (see Chapters 3-5). Before I 
turn to the short presentation of these studies (and the link to emotion), I will first review 
existing models which have dealt with proactive effects of expectations on visual object (and 
scene) recognition, when these stimuli were primarily “neutral” (i.e., devoid of any 
motivational or emotional value for the participant). In this framework, a key assumption has 
been made regarding the contribution of diagnostic low spatial frequency information during 
the proactive generation of guesses or predictions regarding the actual content of the visual 
stimulus. 
3.1. Beyond bottom-up hierarchical visual processing during 
object and scene recognition 
Visual object recognition has classically been conceived as a serial process in which visual 
stimuli, detected by the eye’s retina and conveyed through the lateral geniculate nuclei, are 
processed in the primary visual cortex (V1) and, from there, undergo further processing in 
hierarchically higher cortical regions located primarily in the infero-temporal cortex 
(Felleman & Van Essen, 1991; Marr, 1982; Palmer, 1999). During visual processing, two 
main bottom-up pathways have been identified (Biederman, 1987; Milner & Goodale, 1995; 
Ungerleider & Mishkin, 1982): (i) a dorsal pathway (from V1 to posterior parietal regions, 
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such as motion-sensitive V5/MT) concerned with spatial properties of vision (answering the 
question “where?”); (ii) a ventral pathway (from V1 to color-sensitive V4 within the infero-
temporal cortex) dedicated to the identification of visual objects (answering the question 
“what?”) (Farivar, 2009; Goodale & Milner, 1992). These hierarchical models, however, 
mainly emphasize the predominant role of bottom-up processes leading to visual object (or 
scene) recognition, while they typically do not emphasize top-down modulatory influences on 
these bottom-up processing streams, including attention (Blair, Watson, Walshe, & Maj, 
2009; Treisman & Kanwisher, 1998), task-relevance of specific visual features (Egner & 
Hirsch, 2005), the prior probability of the occurrence of an event (Summerfield & Egner, 
2009), image storage and retrieval in working memory (Ranganath, Cohen, Dam, & 
D'Esposito, 2004), the proactive use of contextual information (Bar, 2004; Oliva & Torralba, 
2007), and the online monitoring of the outcome of a decision (Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, 
Crone, & Nieuwenhuiss, 2004; Ullsperger, Volz, & von Cramon, 2004). Evidence had 
accumulated during the last decade to show that each of these top-down sources could 
substantially bias sensory processing either in the “what” or “where” brain pathway, 
sometimes at very early latencies following stimulus onset (Thorpe, Fize, & Marlot, 1996), 
and in early visual areas, including V1 (Alink, Schwiedrzik, Kohler, Singer, & Muckli, 2010; 
Smith & Muckli, 2010). Thus, the rapid and “effortful” bottom-up processing of visual input 
in low-level cortical areas can be assisted by the use of abstract information extracted in 
frontal or anterior temporal brain regions during stimulus processing (or even prior to its 
onset), which eventually constrains the number and magnitude of computations made in these 
early visual areas (Bar, et al., 2006; Ganis, Schendan, & Kosslyn, 2007). 
3.2. Predictive coding models of visual perception 
Recent theoretical accounts try to better model the role of expectations in visual object (or 
scene) recognition (Bar, 2009b; Kersten, Mamassian, & Yuille, 2004; Summerfield & Egner, 
2009; Summerfield & Koechlin, 2008; Yuille & Kersten, 2006). In contrast to a 
phenomenology mainly based on reactive brain events time-locked to the bottom-up 
processing of specific features, these models highlight the proactive nature of human visual 
perception: the analysis of the surrounding environment is not only based on incoming 
perceptual input, but it is linked to previously encountered, familiar information (Bar, 2007; 
Kourtzi & Connor, 2011). In other words, while the visual input travels through feedforward 
routes from lower to higher level cortical regions, high level areas are not silent, but they 
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quickly extract and evaluate the gist of the scene based on a coarse analysis of the stimulus, 
eventually integrating the outputs of bottom-up “hierarchies” and top-down “reverse 
hierarchies” to achieve recognition (Hochstein & Ahissar, 2002). 
Recently, many theoretical efforts have been made in the literature in order to best 
describe how the visual input may quickly propagate through successive stages of a 
hierarchically organized cortical architecture to eventually be processed and reach (visual) 
awareness (Mumford, 1992; Ullman, 1995). According to these predictive coding models 
(Enns & Lleras, 2008; Friston, 2003, 2005; Grossberg, 2009; Rao & Ballard, 1999; Spratling, 
2008), predictions based on prior experience are projected from higher level to lower lever 
brain areas, with the aim to facilitate recognition by limiting the number of candidate 
representations of an object that need to be considered (see also Bar, 2003). When a 
discrepancy between such top-down predictions and the visual input is detected, an error 
signal is generated and propagated back to higher-level regions, where a new prediction, 
updated by the error signal, is produced (Friston, 2005; Rao & Ballard, 1999). Expected 
information and bottom-up sensory input are thus dynamically and iteratively compared in 
recursive, interacting loops of activity, such that sensory input is interpreted at each cortical 
stage within the context of prior expectations until the visual system is able to decide on a 
single (or unequivocal) perceptual interpretation (Clark, 2012; Friston, 2002; Summerfield & 
Koechlin, 2008). From a quantitative standpoint, these expectations translate into empirical 
priors for a Bayesian inference process that dynamically takes place at each hierarchical level 
of the visual system (Friston, 2005), following the assumption that visual perception is 
essentially a probabilistic, inferential process (Kersten, et al., 2004; Yuille & Kersten, 2006). 
3.3. Prediction-based visual perception through magnocellular 
vision 
Interestingly, asymmetries in speed of processing and visual pathways between low spatial 
frequency (LSF) and high spatial frequency (HSF) information could provide a mechanistic 
account to explain predictive coding effects during early stages of visual object recognition. 
Several pioneering studies have already ascertained the differential contribution of LSF and 
HSF information during the processing of faces (Goffaux, et al., 2011; Pourtois, Dan, 
Grandjean, Sander, & Vuilleumier, 2005; Winston, Vuilleumier, & Dolan, 2003) as well as 
complex visual scenes (Oliva & Schyns, 1997; Schyns & Oliva, 1994; Torralba & Oliva, 
2003). For example, visual perception relies on LSF information when presentation time is 
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brief (30 ms), but when presentation time is prolonged (150 ms) HSF information is 
prioritized (Schyns & Oliva, 1994). In a recent study (Peyrin, et al., 2010), the authors 
combined functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and event-related potentials (ERPs) 
to characterize the brain correlates of the prioritization of LSF over HSF information during 
the processing of visual input (Bullier, 2001; Hegdé, 2008). For each trial, two images were 
displayed for 100 ms in rapid succession, with either an LSF image followed by an HSF 
image (LtH sequence) or vice versa (HtL sequence), and participants had to judge whether 
the two scenes were from the same category (indoor, beach or city) or not. FMRI results 
revealed selective increases during LtH sequences in a broad network comprising occipital, 
frontal and temporo-parietal areas. The analysis of the electrophysiological data further 
specified that higher order areas in frontal and temporo-parietal regions responded more to 
LSF stimuli when presented first, corresponding to a “coarse-to-fine” decomposition of the 
stimulus, whereas occipital visual cortex responded more to HSF presented after LSF. Thus, 
the combination of different imaging methods revealed that the quick processing of LSF in 
higher order (frontal) brain regions influenced scene recognition by enhancing the processing 
of diagnostic HSF information in early visual cortex (Peyrin, et al., 2010). 
As indirectly suggested by this study (Peyrin, et al., 2010), the differential sensory 
processing of LSF and HSF information could very well underlie reciprocal interaction 
effects between (bottom-up) sensory processing and (top-down) predictions (Bullier, 2001; 
Hegdé, 2008). Specifically, the coarse analysis of the visual input based on fast 
magnocellular vision might actually serve to generate, rapidly following stimulus onset, a 
restricted number of guesses or predictions about its actual content, as recently put forward 
by Moshe Bar (Bar, 2003, 2004, 2007, 2009b). According to this dominant model (see Figure 
1), an impoverished (blurry) version of the input image, mainly composed of LSF 
information, is rapidly projected (via a fast dorsal magnocellular route) from early visual 
cortex to orbitofrontal (OFC) and parahippocampal (PHC) areas (see also Dolan, et al., 1997; 
George, et al., 1999). In the OFC, this coarse visual information would be sufficient to 
activate the most likely interpretations of the main objects in the scene, which are then 
“transferred” to the infero-temporal cortex for further verification (see also Gamond, et al., 
2011). At the same time, in the PHC, this blurred image activates the most probable 
(experience-driven) guesses about the context in which the main objects are embedded, which 
are subsequently projected to the infero-temporal cortex for further sensory processing, 
including category-selective responses in the fusiform gyrus and posterior parahippocampal 
gyrus. The integration of the representations of the specific context and the candidate 
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interpretations of the target object, gradually refined with details conveyed by HSF 
information, would eventually occur in the infero-temporal cortex, thus leading to overt 
recognition (Bar, 2004, 2007). A pioneering study using magnetoencephalography (MEG) 
and fMRI confirmed an early activation in the OFC, beginning at approximately 80 ms after 
stimulus onset, during the presentation of familiar objects that were presented for 63 ms and 
interposed between two masks (Bar, et al., 2006). Crucially, activity in this frontal region 
preceded the activation of brain areas in the fusiform gyrus classically involved in object 
recognition, lending support to the idea that the OFC might generate online predictions that 
were subsequently projected back to hierarchically lower areas, with the aim to limit the 
number of possible candidates for recognition (Bar, 2003). 
 
 
Figure 1. Moshe Bar’s model for object and scene recognition (from Bar, 2009). In parallel to the bottom-up, 
serial analysis of the stimulus content based on the extraction of HSF information (corresponding to the fine 
details of the stimulus, travelling via parvocellular pathways), LSF information (corresponding to the overall 
shape of the stimulus), processed via magnocellular pathways, rapidly reaches specific regions located in the 
medial frontal and ventral temporal areas. This coarse information serves to generate an initial prediction (“early 
guess”) about (i) the main object content in the scene (in MPFC and OFC), and (ii) the context in which it is 
likely embedded (in RSC and PHC). These predictions are later validated and refined in the IT during the 
processing of diagnostic HSF information. MPFC: medial prefrontal cortex; OFC: orbitofrontal cortex; RSC: 
retrosplenial complex; PHC: parahippocampal cortex; IT: inferior temporal cortex. 
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3.4. Computational modeling of visual perception guided by 
predictions 
From a computational perspective, expectations may actually lower the threshold that 
needs to be overcome to make a decision in favor of one option, similar to what accumulator 
models of decision making propose (Gold & Shadlen, 2007; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008). A 
higher probability of encountering a particular object embedded in a given context, in fact, 
could bias the visual system towards a more rapid and accurate accumulation of evidence in 
favor of a specific response, thereby resolving more quickly the conflict between similar 
options generated by the ambiguous visual input (Heekeren, et al., 2008; Melloni, 
Schwiedrzik, Muller, Rodriguez, & Singer, 2011; Philiastides, Auksztulewicz, Heekeren, & 
Blankenburg, 2011). According to these computational models, when a choice has to be made 
between two competing alternatives, two separate evidence accumulators collect sensory 
evidence for each response. When the amount of evidence in favor of one option reaches the 
response threshold, the decision corresponding to that accumulator is elicited (Figure 2) 
(Gold & Shadlen, 2007; Heekeren, et al., 2008). Crucially, this accumulation of evidence 
obeys to non-linear principles, and the competition between the two alternatives results in a 
progressive decay of perceptual evidence over time for the more unlikely alternative (Usher 
& McClelland, 2001). Importantly, the evidence accumulation process is stochastic. These 
random, moment-to-moment fluctuations in the amount of evidence supporting each response 
alternative may ultimately explain the variability in reaction times as well as the production 
of errors during perceptual decision making (Brown & Heathcote, 2008; Niemi & Näätänen, 
1981). In addition to the accumulation of evidence process per se, two additional random 
factors need to be taken into account in these models: the start points and the drift rates. The 
start points refer to the different initial amount of evidence in favor of each response 
(potentially influenced by prior knowledge and expectations), whereas the drift rates 
parameterize the (fluctuating) average speed of evidence accumulation for each response 
(Gold & Shadlen, 2007; Usher & McClelland, 2001). This framework has initially been 
applied to model neurophysiological data collected in nonhuman primates (Hanes & Schall, 
1996; Kim & Shadlen, 1999; Shadlen & Newsome, 2001), and later it has proven highly 
effective in describing human performance during recognition memory (Ratcliff, 1978), 
economic decisions (Sanfey, Loewenstein, McClure, & Cohen, 2006), as well as semantic 
and lexical tasks (Ratcliff & McKoon, 1982; Ratcliff, Thapar, Gomez, & McKoon, 2004). 
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Figure 2. Usher & McClelland’s model for perceptual 
decision making between two alternatives (adapted from 
Brown & Heathcote, 2008). When a choice has to be made 
between two competing alternatives, two separate evidence 
accumulators (A and B in the figure) collect sensory 
evidence for each response. Response A is chosen when the 
evidence in its favor surpasses the threshold (dotted 
horizontal line). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An increasing number of behavioral and neuroimaging studies have attempted to better 
characterize the processes and identify the neural correlates of perceptual evidence 
accumulation during a wide range of perceptual decision making tasks (Heekeren, Marrett, 
Bandettini, & Ungerleider, 2004; Melloni, et al., 2011; Philiastides, et al., 2011; Philiastides 
& Sajda, 2007)1. In one of these earlier studies, Heekeren and colleagues (2004) used fMRI 
to investigate perceptual decision making using a face-house categorization task. Participants 
were presented with images that were either difficult (i.e., perceptual noise was added in 
order to make the recognition more demanding) or easy, and the task was to identify whether 
the compound object was a face or a house. Results showed greater BOLD response in the 
fusiform face area (FFA) during trials showing clear images of faces compared to their 
degraded (noisy) version, in accordance with the notion that this region preferentially 
responds to face stimuli than other visual objects or categories (Kanwisher, McDermott, & 
Chun, 1997; Kanwisher & Yovel, 2006). A similar pattern was observed in the 
parahippocampal place area (PPA) during the processing of houses, confirming the pivotal 
role of this region in the perception and analysis of buildings and other objects (or scenes) 
that can serve as landmarks (Aguirre, Zarahn, & D'Esposito, 1998; Epstein & Kanwisher, 
1998). This result is also consistent with the idea that, in these category-selective infero-
                                                 
1
 These tasks include, for instance, the identification of an object identity based on the processing of fragmented 
outlines (e.g., Torfs, Panis, & Wagemans, 2010), decreased perceptual noise (e.g., James, Humphrey, Gati, 
Menon, & Goodale, 2000), or increased high spatial frequency information (e.g., Pourtois, Dan, et al., 2005). 
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temporal brain areas, the evidence for the two object categories accrues differently as a 
function of the signal-to-noise ratio of the stimuli: the processing of degraded objects took 
longer to reach the response threshold and, as a consequence, reaction times increased. More 
interestingly, however, the left posterior dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) responded 
more to clear compared to degraded stimuli, and its activity correlated with the difference 
between the output signals of FFA and PPA. Thus, the left DLPFC could serve as an 
“integration hub”, where sensory information coming from low-level areas is analyzed and 
compared in order to compute a perceptual decision (see also Heekeren, et al., 2008). 
Other fMRI studies using paradigms based on a progressive and gradual revelation of the 
stimulus content have also shed light on brain systems involved in the online generation of 
predictions during perceptual decision making (Carlson, Grol, & Verstraten, 2006; James, et 
al., 2000; Ploran, et al., 2007; Ploran, Tremel, Nelson, & Wheeler, 2011; Wheeler, Petersen, 
Nelson, Ploran, & Velanova, 2008). Among them, Ploran, et al. (2007) devised a task in 
which masked picture stimuli were gradually revealed over eight discrete steps in a maximum 
revelation time of 14 seconds, and participants had to press a button as soon as they could 
identify the picture with a reasonable degree of confidence. Different brain areas showed 
distinct patterns of neural response. In several posterior occipital regions, activity increased 
monotonically as a function of the amount of visual information aggregated by the visual 
system (sensory processors). Conversely, in inferior temporal, frontal and parietal regions 
(including the bilateral fusiform gyrus and the DLPFC), a gradual increase in activity peaking 
at the time of recognition was compatible with the assumption of a genuine accumulation of 
evidence process taking place in these regions, that was presumably necessary to recognize 
the identity of the target object (accumulators). Finally, in several regions of medial frontal 
cortex -- including the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) and the anterior insula -- 
activity remained near baseline until the time of recognition when a substantial increase in the 
BOLD signal occurred, suggesting their selective involvement in decision-related, as opposed 
to evidence accumulation processes (Ploran, et al., 2007; see also Ploran, et al., 2011). 
The aforementioned brain imaging studies extended earlier knowledge on mechanisms of 
perceptual decision making, providing evidence for the idea that accumulation and moment-
of-recognition processes could be subtended by non-overlapping brain networks (Heekeren, 
et al., 2004; Ploran, et al., 2007; Ploran, et al., 2011). However, the progressive stimulus 
revelation procedure used in these studies were adapted to be compatible with the sluggish 
temporal resolution of fMRI, and only a compound measure of brain activity across many 
events during a given trial could eventually be modeled with this haemodynamic imaging 
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technique. EEG (and local field potentials), on the other hand, offers the advantage to track 
brain activity using a millisecond temporal resolution (Logothetis, Pauls, Augath, Trinath, & 
Oeltermann, 2001). A recent study (Philiastides & Sajda, 2006) used single-trial EEG 
analysis to identify the neural correlates of decision making during a face-car discrimination 
task similar to the face-house task described above. Two distinct ERP components were 
found to maximally discriminate between faces and cars: (i) an early negative component, 
occurring between 130 and 200 ms after stimulus onset (consistent with the well-known face-
selective N170 component; Bentin, Allison, Puce, Perez, & McCarthy, 1996; Rossion, Joyce, 
Cottrell, & Tarr, 2003); (ii) a late component, peaking between 300 and 450 ms post-stimulus 
onset. Interestingly, the N170 was not affected by the amount of noise in the stimulus, 
whereas the subsequent ERP component correlated with task difficulty (i.e., signal-to-noise 
ratio) and change in response time. These findings were interpreted as an indication of 
accumulation processes that were dependent on the strength of perceptual evidence provided 
by the environment (Philiastides & Sajda, 2006). In another recent study (Jemel, Schuller, & 
Goffaux, 2010), the authors characterized the spatiotemporal dynamics of electrical brain 
activity prior to recognition of famous faces, in order to investigate whether face recognition 
processes (taking place in the infero-temporal cortex) showed a categorical as opposed to a 
more gradual effect. Famous and unfamiliar faces were progressively revealed by 
parametrically decreasing, in a stepwise fashion, the amount of perceptual noise in 
subsequent image frames (see also James, et al., 2000, for a similar procedure applied to 
complex visual scenes), and participants were required to perform familiarity judgments after 
each image level. Electrophysiological results revealed both gradual and categorical 
processes at work during overt recognition of familiar faces: whereas early and mid-latency 
ERP components (i.e., N170 and N250) showed an abrupt activity change at the moment of 
recognition, the N400 as well as the late positive component (LPC) exhibited an incremental 
increase in amplitude when approaching to actual time of recognition. These results are 
consistent with the fMRI results described above (Carlson, et al., 2006; James, et al., 2000; 
Ploran, et al., 2007), in that they suggest two distinct patterns of activation (gradual evidence 
accumulation vs. categorical, all-or-nothing activity) likely subtended by non-overlapping 
neural networks. 
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3.5. Emotion-based predictions during visual perception 
Predictive coding and accumulator models of visual object or scene recognition provide 
versatile functional accounts to describe and characterize proactive processes at work prior to 
overt recognition, when these processes operate primarily on “neutral” content (i.e., devoid of 
any emotional or motivational value). Therefore, one of the central research questions 
addressed in this dissertation was to explore whether, when encountering emotion-laden (as 
opposed to neutral) scenes, systematic changes in the extent and speed of proactive guesses 
during sensory processing may be revealed. As reviewed here above (see section 2), emotion 
can have profound influences during (early) stimulus processing, and hence it can bias visual 
perception, presumably because dedicated attention control processes are “automatically” 
recruited upon encounter of motivationally significant events or stimuli (Bocanegra & 
Zeelenberg, 2009; Öhman, Flykt, et al., 2001; Phelps, et al., 2006; Vuilleumier, 2005). 
Whereas these effects inform about the propensity of emotion to reactively influence and 
guide perception (once the stimulus has been processed, at least to some extent), the question 
arises as to whether emotion can also dynamically and proactively alter the generation of 
predictions during early sensory processing (i.e., before the actual content of the object or 
scene is fully disclosed), eventually influencing visual perception. 
In Chapter 3, I explored the electrophysiological correlates of upstream processes 
leading to visual scene recognition with the use of a novel experimental paradigm called 
progressive unfolding task. In this paradigm, the content of either emotional (i.e., pleasant 
and unpleasant) or neutral scenes is progressively revealed, using a six-step procedure, until 
participants were able to perform an animacy judgment task. Each new step progressively 
added a constant amount of LSF and HSF information, starting from a initial blurry and 
undistinguishable stimulus up to a fully resolved and meaningful picture. While participants 
performed this task, high density EEG (128 channels) was recorded in order to gain insight 
into the exact spatio-temporal dynamics associated with the online generation of predictions 
during sensory processing regarding the most likely interpretation of the retinal input. 
Critically, the actual moment of recognition was identified for each and every trial and, based 
on this specific time point, I looked “backward” at electrical brain activity generated prior to 
overt recognition, with the aim to track distinctive neural events prior to recognition 
presumably corresponding to the online generation of predictions. 
In Chapter 4, I modified this progressive unfolding task in an attempt to better 
constrain the generation and use of specific predictions regarding the identity of the 
36  CHAPTER 1 
scenes gradually revealed. More specifically, in Chapter 3 no specific constrain or prior 
information was given to participants regarding the likely identity of the visual scenes 
progressively revealed during the task. As a consequence, a bias towards the preferential 
processing of perceptual cues (hence with little control over the actual content and number of 
predictions generated “online” by the participants) was probably inadvertently introduced. To 
overcome this limitation, in Chapter 4 I introduced a standard memory manipulation 
(Goldman-Rakic, 1990; Rugg, et al., 1998). Specifically, on each trial, participants were first 
required to encode and store in short-term memory the content of a complex visual scene 
(carrying either an emotional or a neutral meaning), before the content of the same or a new 
scene was progressively revealed (similarly to the procedure employed in Chapter 3) and a 
delayed match-to-sample task was required. Again, high density EEG was recorded 
throughout the experiment, allowing me to investigate the precise spatio-temporal dynamics 
involved in the generation of predictions during scene perception, as well as its systematic 
influence by the emotional content of the scene. 
Finally, in Chapter 5 I ran additional experiments in order to verify that the results 
obtained in Chapters 3 and 4 could not solely be explained by uncontrolled variations 
along non-emotional factors, with a focus on visual complexity and familiarity. Picture 
complexity is commonly defined as the extent to which an object can be segregated from its 
background (Bradley, Hamby, Low, & Lang, 2007). Since figure-ground segregation (and 
more generally perceptual grouping) is a fundamental and early perceptual process during 
visual perception (Albright & Stoner, 2002; Craft, Schutze, Niebur, & von der Heydt, 2007; 
Wagemans, et al., 2012), scenes having a clear figure-ground segregation might artificially 
lead to faster and easier recognition than more complex, perceptually “noisy” scenes, 
especially during impoverished viewing conditions (see Chapters 3-4). Accordingly, in 
Chapter 5 I aimed at verifying whether emotional and neutral scenes shared similar picture 
complexity or not, and how this variable could eventually influence, on a trial-by-trial basis, 
overt recognition during the progressive unfolding task described in Chapter 4. Likewise, the 
degree of familiarity, defined here as the frequency of experience associated with a given 
stimulus content (Libkuman, Otam, Kern, Viger, & Novak, 2007), also likely contributes to 
the speed and accuracy of visual scene recognition. Previous research has already reported 
that novelty can engage the same cardiovascular systems as valence and arousal (Mendes, 
Blascovich, Hunter, Lickel, & Jost, 2007). Furthermore, novel scenes elicit startle reflex 
similarly to emotional pictures (Bradley, Lang, & Cuthbert, 1993). Moreover, neuroimaging 
studies have found enhanced activity to novel stimuli in several affective brain areas, such as 
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the amygdala (Schwartz, Wright, Shin, Kagan, & Rauch, 2003), OFC and dACC (Weierich, 
Wright, Negreira, Dickerson, & Barrett, 2010), providing further evidence for the assumption 
that novelty provides a significant stimulus dimension that can interact with (or even mimic) 
specific emotional effects (see also Ranganath & Rainer, 2003). Therefore, in Chapter 5 I 
also looked at the possible confounding effect of familiarity during recognition of emotional 
vs. neutral scenes, in particular when proactive guesses were made by the participants during 
the resolution of the complex progressive unfolding task. 
4. Methodological considerations 
4.1. Temporal order judgment and point of subjective 
simultaneity 
In Chapter 2, following standard practice, I calculated each participant’s point of 
subjective simultaneity (PSS) as a reliable estimate of prior entry, which is indicative of early 
attentional capture towards one of the two face stimuli in the pair. The PSS indicates the time 
interval needed for the participant to perceive the two stimuli as arriving simultaneously or, 
in other words, the SOA between two stimuli at which observers report maximal uncertainty 
(Schneider & Bavelier, 2003; Shore, Spence, & Klein, 2001; Spence & Parise, 2010). To 
obtain the PSS, I first calculated the proportion of “right first” responses for each condition 
and SOA. I then applied the inverse of the standard normal distribution function to these 
scores (probit analysis; Finney, 1964). The transformed z-scores of the proportion of “right 
first” responses were finally included in a linear regression to derive the PSS, calculated from 
the slope and intercept of the best-fitted line of the z-scores (PSS = -slope/intercept). To 
account for the correlation of measurements, each participant had its own intercept and slope 
with estimated random effects from a bivariate zero mean normal distribution. 
4.2. Progressive unfolding task and mixed proportional odds 
model 
In Chapters 3-5, I used a complex data analysis to assess whether emotion reliably 
influenced, at the behavioral level, accumulation of evidence processes leading to visual 
scene recognition. Because the six steps used to progressively reveal the content of the scenes 
were not independent with one another, the data were first expressed as the cumulative 
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percentage of correctly recognized pictures, from the first, blurred image until the sixth, intact 
scene. This resulted in an inverted s-shaped psychometric function, computed separately for 
each emotion condition (i.e., pleasant, neutral, and unpleasant scenes). Next, to verify 
whether these psychometric curves shifted as a function of the emotional content of the 
scenes (thereby indicating slower or faster accumulation of evidence for pleasant or 
unpleasant compared to neutral scenes), I used a proportional odds model (Agresti, 2007). 
This regression analysis for ordinal dependent variables (here applied on the single-trial 
data), which estimates correct recognition at each image level, enabled me to model the 
cumulative probability up to and including recognition from image level k (k = 1, ?, 5). 
Specifically, if one defines Y (Y=1,...,6) as the level of recognition at which a correct 
response is given, the cumulative probability of Y at the k-th level of recognition is Pr(Y≤k) 
(note that, since all participants eventually give a correct response at the end of the image 
sequence, Pr(Y≤6)=100%). Because it is mathematically more convenient to model the odds 
(i.e., the ratio of the probability that recognition will occur to the probability that it will not 
happen), it follows that:  
 
PrY  k
1 	 PrY  k
 
 
The derived odds ratio expresses how much the odds of recognition from image level k or 
earlier is increased (if larger than 1) or decreased (if smaller than 1) across the different 
experimental conditions, and thus it provides a single number capturing the shift in 
psychometric curve. Of note, this model has to take into account the fact that several 
observations are collected from different participants, and measurements from the same 
participants are expected to be correlated (De Boeck, 2008). Therefore, to account for 
dependencies of trials within the same participant, a multi-level version of the proportional 
odds model was used, in which subject-specific random effects were assumed. 
4.3. ERP topographic mapping analyses 
In Chapters 3-4, high density EEG was recorded by means of 128 (active) electrodes 
evenly covering the scalp surface in agreement with the five percent electrode system 
(Oostenveld & Praamstra, 2001). To fully characterize differences in electrical brain activity 
between experimental conditions while minimizing the number of priors, I opted for the use 
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of reference-free topographical analyses (Lehmann & Skrandies, 1980; Michel & Murray, 
2012; Michel, Seeck, & Landis, 1999; Michel, et al., 2001; Murray, Brunet, & Michel, 2008; 
Pourtois, Delplanque, Michel, & Vuilleumier, 2008) that depart from more conventional peak 
analyses in ERP research (Picton, et al., 2000). This data-driven clustering method allows to 
summarize and identify, within the fast evolving ERP signal, the dominant spatial 
configurations of the global electric field measured for all 128 channels concurrently (i.e., 
topographical maps), which is time-locked and phase-locked to the onset of the stimulus. 
This data analysis method heavily rests on the assumption that different topographic maps 
necessarily denote the activation of different brain generators, as previously demonstrated 
based on simulations and mathematical reconstructions (Brandeis & Lehmann, 1986; 
Lehmann & Skrandies, 1980; Michel, et al., 1999). This data-driven clustering method 
provides at least three advantages compared to standard peak measurements (Picton, et al., 
2000), which assume many priors regarding where and when (ERP) events of interest should 
take place following stimulus onset (Makeig, Debener, Onton, & Delorme, 2004). First, the 
amplitude and actual morphology of the so-called ERP components heavily depend upon the 
reference montage that is used by the experimenter (see Murray, et al., 2008 for direct 
evidence). This has important implications for the interpretation of ERP components as well 
as their comparison across studies, because different reference montages (e.g., average 
reference, tip of the nose, or linked mastoids) are often used, leading to profound changes in 
the actual expression (e.g., amplitude) of these ERP components. By contrast, the resulting 
geometry or spatial configuration of the electric field is reference-free, in the sense that it 
does not vary depending on local (or global) amplitude variations (Michel & Murray, 2012; 
Pourtois, et al., 2008). Second, the a priori selection of peaks and/or troughs in the ERP 
waveform typically overlooks low signal amplitude information, albeit potentially indicative 
of important neural events, given the intrinsic oscillatory nature of the recorded ERP signal 
(Murray, et al., 2008). Reference-free topographic analyses, by comparison, allow to cluster 
dominant topographies embedded in the continuous (grand average) ERP signal, regardless of 
(local or global) changes in amplitude. As a result, not only the heuristic, but also the overall 
interpretability of the observed ERP effects is substantially increased with this analysis, 
compared to standard peak measurements (Pourtois, et al., 2008). As pointed out above, 
because changes in the configuration of the active cerebral sources necessarily translate into 
changes in the scalp topographies (though the reverse inference is not necessarily true from a 
mathematical standpoint, an element that further complicates the well-known inverse 
problem in EEG/ERP research; see Scherg & Voncramon, 1986), data analysis techniques 
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that capitalize on these spatial properties allow to draw (indirect) inferences about the 
underlying configuration of neural generators at a given moment in time, and how it can vary 
depending on the actual experimental condition (Michel & Murray, 2012). Third, using ERP 
topographic mapping methods, one can more easily perform source imaging than with a 
standard peak analysis -- given that the dominant maps are reflecting different configurations 
of the underlying brain generators --, and hence gain insight into the putative neural networks 
involved at specific latency (following stimulus onset) and/or conditions (Michel & Murray, 
2012; Michel, et al., 2004). 
4.4. Source localization 
Once the dominant scalp topographies embedded in the ERP data set have been identified 
by the analysis outlined above (see also Chapters 3-4), I used a specific source localization 
algorithm in order to gain insight into the likely location and distribution of the intracranial 
generators underlying these dominant topographical maps. For this purpose, I used 
standardized low resolution brain electromagnetic tomography (sLORETA; Pascual-Marqui, 
2002), a standard linear distributed model for the mathematical reconstruction and statistical 
testing of the (possible) cortical intracerebral generators. Even though it remains 
mathematically impossible to solve the inverse problem (i.e., activity recorded on the scalp 
can be virtually generated by an infinite number of dipoles; Luck, 2005; Plonsey, 1963), the 
localization error of this algorithm can be minimized and some simulations even showed that, 
on average, a 1-voxel resolution (keeping in mind that voxels/nodes here are 6 mm isometric) 
could be obtained, which is remarkably better than other inverse solution methods, including 
single (regional) dipoles (Grech, et al., 2008; Pascual-Marqui, 1999). In short, this (non-
parametric) distributed inverse solution is based on the neurophysiological assumption of 
coherent coactivation of highly synchronized adjacent cortical areas (Silva, Amitai, & 
Connors, 1991), and is therefore suitable to compute multiple simultaneously active sources 
without any a priori assumption on the number and position of the underlying cortical 
generators. 
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CHAPTER 2: No prior entry for negative emotional facial expressions: evidence from temporal order judgments 
 
No prior entry for 
negative emotional facial expressions: 
evidence from temporal order judgments1 
 
Previous research has shown that threat-related faces, due to their intrinsic motivational 
relevance, capture attention more readily than neutral faces. Here we used a standard 
temporal order judgment (TOJ) task to assess whether negative (either angry or fearful) 
emotional faces, when competing with neutral faces for attention selection, may lead to a 
prior entry effect and hence are perceived as appearing first, especially when uncertainty is 
high regarding the order of the two onsets. However, we failed to find evidence for this 
conjecture across five different experiments, despite the fact that participants were invariably 
influenced by asynchronies in the respective onsets (or offsets) of the two competing faces in 
the pair, and could reliably identify the emotion in the faces. Importantly, by systematically 
varying task demands across experiments, we could rule out confounds related to suboptimal 
stimulus presentation, inappropriate task demands, or the presence of a confounding 
disengagement effect away from threat. These findings challenge the notion of an early 
automatic capture of attention by (negative) emotion. We argue that non-emotional, motion-
related cues can probably be used implicitly by participants during the TOJ task to decide 
which of the two competing faces appeared first. In this model, the lack of systematic bias of 
attention by emotion is imputed to the primacy of a non-emotional cue to resolve the TOJ 
task, which in turn prevents negative emotion to exert an early bottom-up influence on the 
guidance of spatial and temporal attention.  
                                                 
1
 Schettino, A., Loeys, T., & Pourtois, G. Manuscript in preparation. 
2 
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1. Introduction 
Results obtained from a variety of experimental paradigms suggest that, under specific 
circumstances, negative emotional stimuli may receive prioritized access to awareness by 
biasing perceptual and attentional processes (Bradley, 2009; Compton, 2003; Öhman, Flykt, 
et al., 2001; Pourtois, et al., 2012; Vuilleumier, 2005). In variants of the Stroop task, for 
instance, naming the color of a word is slower when the stimulus carries a negative emotional 
meaning, even though this semantic feature is task-irrelevant (Bar-Haim, et al., 2007; Phaf & 
Kan, 2007; Yiend, 2010). Similarly, in visual search tasks participants are usually faster at 
detecting negative emotional targets embedded in an array of neutral distracters (Eastwood, et 
al., 2001; Öhman, Flykt, et al., 2001; Olatunji, Ciesielski, Armstrong, & Zald, 2011). 
Furthermore, the well-known deficit in perceiving the second of two targets presented rapidly 
one after another among a stream of distracter items (attentional blink; Broadbent & 
Broadbent, 1987; Shapiro, et al., 1997) is reduced if the second target carries a negative 
emotional meaning (Keil, et al., 2006; Maratos, 2011; Schwabe, et al., 2011), or prolonged if 
the first target is (highly) arousing (Anderson, 2005; Anderson & Phelps, 2001; Arnell, et al., 
2007; Mathewson, et al., 2008). Finally, studies using spatial cueing tasks have shown that 
emotion-laden stimuli facilitate the processing of (non-emotional) targets subsequently 
presented at the same location, consistent with the assumption of a rapid orienting of 
attention towards these (task-irrelevant) stimuli, as opposed to neutral ones (Armony & 
Dolan, 2002; Bocanegra & Zeelenberg, 2009, 2011b; Fox, et al., 2001; Mogg & Bradley, 
1999; Most & Wang, 2011; Phelps, et al., 2006; Pourtois, et al., 2004). 
Taken together, these findings suggest that motivationally relevant stimuli (including 
negative facial expressions) can exert a strong modulatory influence on attentional control 
processes. However, still little is known about how these stimuli are initially prioritized by 
dedicated attentional control systems, mainly because the initial attentional deployment (or 
orienting) was not directly measured in these earlier studies. Visual search, spatial cueing, or 
attentional blink tasks, in fact, require participants to quickly engage, disengage and 
reallocate attention concurrently towards different competing stimuli in order to resolve the 
task. Therefore, these paradigms are not suited to titrate changes in the initial allocation of 
attention towards emotional vs. neutral stimuli (Horstmann, 2007; West, et al., 2009). By 
contrast, temporal order judgment (TOJ) tasks provide a more direct, sensitive and accurate 
measure of attentional capture (Jaskowski, 1993; Stelmach & Herdman, 1991; Stelmach, et 
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al., 1994; Titchener, 1908). In a typical TOJ task, attention is oriented either to the left or the 
right side of fixation, and participants have to judge which of two competing stimuli, 
displayed on the left and right at various stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs), was presented 
first. Because attention accelerates sensory processing (Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Serences 
& Yantis, 2006), the stimulus appearing on the attended location is processed faster and, as a 
consequence, its onset is perceived as taking place first (visual prior entry; Schneider & 
Bavelier, 2003; Spence & Parise, 2010; Spence, et al., 2001). In this study, we capitalized on 
these well-established functional properties to assess whether intrinsic negative emotional 
stimuli might lead to a genuine prior entry effect or not, when they compete for attention 
selection with neutral visual stimuli. We opted for the use of fearful and angry facial 
expressions, given their enhanced intrinsic biological relevance (Anderson, et al., 2003; 
Whalen, et al., 1998). Moreover, converging evidence from earlier studies shows that, across 
various task settings and experimental conditions, fearful and angry facial expressions have 
the propensity to reliably bias attention control and early perceptual processes (Esteves, et al., 
1994; Lang, et al., 1997; Vuilleumier, et al., 2001; Vuilleumier & Pourtois, 2007). 
To date, two earlier studies used TOJ tasks to assess whether (negative) emotional faces 
could lead to a prior entry effect when competing with neutral faces or not. In their study, 
Fecica & Stolz (2008) presented schematic neutral, happy or angry faces -- separated by 
SOAs of 0, 17, 34, or 100 ms -- on the left and right side of fixation, and asked participants to 
decide which of the two competing face stimuli appeared first. Results showed that, in 
conditions of high uncertainty (i.e., at short as opposed to long SOAs), happy and angry faces 
were consistently perceived as appearing first compared to neutral faces. Moreover and 
unexpectedly, a stronger prior entry effect was observed for happy relative to angry faces. 
This latter result is at variance with the well-known negativity bias for threatening stimuli 
(Baumeister, et al., 2001; Eastwood, et al., 2001; Fox, et al., 2001; Öhman, Lundqvist, et al., 
2001), and might ultimately be explained, at least in part, by the use of a small number of 
stimuli (i.e., three schematic faces repeated many times across trials) which may have 
introduced systematic attentional biases based on the (fast) processing of specific low-level 
perceptual features (Mak-Fan, Thompson, & Green, 2011; Wolfe & Horowitz, 2004). 
West, et al. (2009) conducted several experiments using the TOJ task to investigate 
whether motivationally significant stimuli could be prioritized over neutral ones. First, they 
reported a prior entry effect for schematic upright (neutral) faces when competing with 
inverted schematic faces, providing evidence for a bias in the early allocation of attention 
towards these biologically relevant stimuli. Moreover, they found that this initial attentional 
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deployment was influenced by the emotional content of the faces (i.e., schematic angry faces 
were prioritized over neutral faces), and was further enhanced by the use of realistic 
photographs of angry faces. However, in this study alike, a limited number of face stimuli 
was used (i.e., four angry and four neutral face identities). Therefore, it remains unclear 
whether the negative emotional facial expression per se, or rather uncontrolled perceptual 
factors, led to a differential early allocation of attention towards these emotion-laden stimuli. 
In our study we used a large set of realistic photographs of faces (extensively validated in 
the literature) and assessed whether negative emotional facial expressions could lead to a 
prior entry effect when competing with neutral faces. Importantly, to overcome any low-level 
perceptual confound, on each and every trial we presented participants with a pair of faces 
(with a variable SOA between the two onsets) that were always visually dissimilar, both in 
terms of identity and facial expression (i.e., either neutral or emotional). The rationale of this 
manipulation is that, across trials, visual dissimilarity between the two competing faces is 
always present and variable -- and thus uninformative -- and, accordingly, it cannot implicitly 
be used by participants as a distinctive visual cue to decide which of the two faces appeared 
first (Duncan & Humphreys, 1989; see also Pourtois, et al., 2004; Vuilleumier, et al., 2001). 
In these conditions, presumably, only the differential emotional content of the face would 
influence perceptual judgments. Furthermore, to verify that the emotional facial expressions 
were recognized as such, at the end of the experiment we asked participants to rate the 
emotion intensity of each and every face stimulus used during the main TOJ task. The goal of 
our study was threefold. First, we evaluated if negative emotional faces were processed faster 
than neutral faces (see Pourtois, et al., 2012), thereby showing prior entry consistent with the 
assumption of early attentional capture. Second, we compared the size of the prior entry 
effect for fearful (indirect threat) vs. angry faces (direct threat), bearing in mind that the 
capture of attention by negative emotion could very well depend on the perceived relevance 
of the threat displayed in the face (Cristinzio, et al., 2010; Sander, Grandjean, Kaiser, Wehrle, 
& Scherer, 2007; Whalen, et al., 2004). Finally, considering previous studies showing that 
attentional biases for threat-related information might result from a difficulty to disengage 
attention away from threat (i.e., holding effect rather than capture; see (Fox, et al., 2001; 
Koster, et al., 2006; Salemink, et al., 2007)), we devised a variant of the TOJ task that was 
suited to disentangle possible engagement from disengagement effects driven by the 
emotional content of the faces. In this version of the task, the onset of the two faces in the 
pair was identical but their offset was manipulated as a function of a variable SOA. 
Participants were asked to judge which of the two faces disappeared first. We hypothesized 
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that, if the enhanced attention allocation towards negative emotional expressions was due to a 
difficulty to disengage attention away from these emotion-laden stimuli, in conditions of high 
uncertainty (i.e., at short SOAs), participants would perceive negative emotional faces as 
disappearing the latest on the screen. 
2. Experiment 1 
2.1. Participants 
Thirty-seven psychology students of Ghent University participated in the study in 
exchange of course credits. All volunteers were native Dutch speaking, right-handed, had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision, with no history of neurological or psychiatric 
disorders. The data of five participants were excluded from subsequent analyses due to 
abnormal psychometric functions in at least one experimental condition (Perez, et al., 2009; 
Spence, et al., 2001; Weiß & Scharlau, 2012), suggesting that (in this specific condition) their 
performance was not influenced by the main SOA manipulation (see below). Thus, the final 
sample consisted of 32 participants (27 women, mean age 19 years, range 18-22). 
The study was approved by the local ethics committee of the Faculty of Psychology and 
Educational Sciences, Ghent University. All volunteers gave informed written consent prior 
to their participation. 
2.2. Stimuli 
We used pairs of grayscale photographs of ten different individuals (four women) selected 
from the standardized Ekman database (Ekman & Friesen, 1976). In order to remove most of 
the external facial features (e.g., hair and ears) and to standardize the spatial layout occupied 
by each face, each stimulus was enclosed in an oval frame encompassing 8.86° x 7.63° of 
visual angle (Figure 1; for a similar procedure, see also Pourtois, et al., 2004). Means and 
standard deviations of pixel luminance were extracted using ImageJ (v1.44; 
http://rsb.info.nih.gov/ij/), and apparent contrast, defined as the standard deviation divided by 
the mean, was calculated for each and every face stimulus. Independent samples t-tests 
revealed that neutral and fearful faces did not differ with regard to apparent contrast [t(18) = -
0.65, p = .523]. 
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2.3. Procedure 
The experiment was conducted in a small, dimly lit room on a PC connected to a 19" CRT 
monitor (refresh rate: 100 Hz) running E-Prime 2.0. (http://www.pstnet.com/products/e-
prime/). Viewing distance was held constant at 60 cm throughout the experimental session, 
with head motions restrained by a chinrest. After filling out the informed consent, 
participants were presented with either the onset or the offset task (see below), consisting of 
four blocks each (90 trials per block). Both tasks, whose presentation was counterbalanced 
across participants, were preceded by verbal task instructions, as well as practice blocks 
containing 10 trials with happy and neutral faces. 
Trials of the onset task were structured as follows (Figure 1, left panel). A central black 
cross (0.96° x 0.96°) was displayed for 1000 ms on a white background. Participants were 
instructed to maintain fixation on this cross. Afterwards, the first face (8.86° x 7.63°) 
appeared in one of two placeholders located on the left or right side of fixation. After a 
variable time interval (SOAs: 100, 30, or 10 ms), the second face appeared on the opposite 
side. Both stimuli were equidistant from fixation (distance between the center of the cross 
and the center of the face: 10.29°). Both faces remained on the screen for 100 ms before 
being replaced in synchrony by a uniform mask until response. The task was to indicate, as 
fast and accurately as possible, the location (either left or right) of the stimulus that was 
perceived as appearing first (i.e., two-alternative forced choice task), using numbers 2 or 8 on 
the numeric pad of a standard AZERTY keyboard. In order to avoid any stimulus-response 
compatibility effects (Schneider & Bavelier, 2003), we opted for the use of specific response 
buttons whose (vertical) alignment was orthogonal to the stimuli appearing on the screen 
along a horizontal axis. Response buttons were counterbalanced across participants. 
Importantly, each face pair always consisted of two different identities, resulting in a total 
number of 90 face pairs per condition. In 50% of the trials, one face conveyed a fearful 
expression, while the other one displayed a neutral expression. Each emotion expression 
appeared equally often to the left or right of the central fixation cross. As control conditions, 
either two neutral faces (25% of the trials) or two fearful faces (25% of the trials) were 
displayed on screen. Thus, three stimulus pair conditions were presented in random order: 
fearful face-neutral face (FearNeut), fearful face-fearful face (FearFear), neutral face-neutral 
face (NeutNeut). 
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Figure 1. Stimuli and procedure used in Experiments 1-5. In the onset task (left panel), participants were 
presented with two placeholders on either side of fixation. After 1000 ms, one of the two face stimuli in the pair 
appeared either in the left or right box for a given stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA; 10, 30, or 100 ms), 
immediately followed by the second face stimulus. The stimulus pair stayed on screen for an additional 100 ms 
before being masked in synchrony until participants could decide which stimulus appeared first (left or right in 
Experiments 1-2; emotional or neutral in Experiments 3-5). In the offset task (right panel), each trial began with 
both masks in the placeholders for 500 ms, replaced by facial stimuli. After 1000 ms, one of the two faces 
disappeared for the duration of the SOAs. The remaining face stayed on screen for an additional 100 ms, 
followed by a green fixation cross indicating that a response had to be made. Participants had to report which 
stimulus disappeared first. 
 
The offset task (Figure 1, right panel) was similar to the onset task described above, but 
here each trial began with a 500ms display including the fixation cross and both masks on the 
left and right side. Each mask was then replaced by a face (stimulus pairs: FearNeut, 
FearFear, NeutNeut) for 1000 ms, after which one of the two stimuli disappeared for the 
duration of the SOAs (100, 30, or 10 ms). The remaining face stayed on screen for an 
additional 100 ms, and then the black fixation cross turned green, signaling that a response 
had to be made. Participants had to perform a similar two-alternative forced choice task and 
judge the location of the face stimulus that was perceived as disappearing first, using 
numbers 2 or 8 on the numeric pad. 
Finally, to verify that the emotional content of the faces selected in our study was 
perceived in line with the normative ratings, at the end of the experiment we asked 
participants to rate the amount of fear conveyed by each neutral and fearful face. A standard 
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9-point Likert scale was used for this purpose, with anchor 1 corresponding to “not afraid” 
and anchor 9 to “extremely afraid”. 
2.4. Questionnaires 
At the end of the experiment (also valid for Experiments 2-5), participants were asked to 
fill out two questionnaires, in order to assess whether specific affective or personality traits 
might be related to task performance. Levels of trait anxiety were measured using the Dutch 
version of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, trait characteristics (Van der Ploeg, Defares, & 
Spielberger, 1979). Participants also completed the Need For Affect Scale (Maio & Esses, 
2001), which provides an estimate of participants’ general motivation to either approach or 
avoid emotion-inducing situations. The results confirmed normal scores of trait anxiety and 
Need For Affect (Table 1). However, no significant correlation was found between these 
scores and the behavioral results obtained across the five experiments. Therefore, the 
potential modulatory role of these two personality factors on the prioritized allocation of 
attention towards negative emotional stimuli is not discussed further. 
 
Table 1. Mean values and standard deviations (in parenthesis) of the scores obtained for each 
questionnaire (and relative subscales) administered at the end of the experiment. 
Questionnaire Scores 
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 Experiment 4 Experiment 5 
STAI-T 41.91 (10.08) 40.00 (7.11) 40.90 (10.43) 40.18 (9.08) 43.56 (11.68) 
NFAS 3.95 (0.47) 3.92 (0.41) 3.86 (0.46) 4.04 (0.38) 4.06 (0.54) 
Approach 4.72 (0.85) 4.78 (0.71) 4.95 (0.49) 4.86 (0.68) 4.80 (0.70) 
Avoidance 3.18 (0.73) 3.06 (0.63) 2.77 (0.71) 3.22 (0.90) 3.32 (1.03) 
Note. STAI-T: State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, trait version; NFAS: Need for Affect Scale. STAI-T scores range 
from 20 to 80. NFAS scores were obtained using a 7-points Likert scale. 
2.5. Data analysis 
Accuracy was expressed as the proportion of “right first” responses. Positive SOAs refer 
to cases when the first stimulus was presented on the right hemifield, whereas negative SOAs 
indicate that the first stimulus was presented on the left side (see Figure 2A). The effect of 
prior entry was assessed by calculating each participant’s point of subjective simultaneity 
(PSS). This parameter indicates the time interval needed for the participant to perceive the 
two stimuli as arriving simultaneously or, in other words, an estimate of the SOA at which 
participants would be likely to make each response equally often (Perez, et al., 2009; Shore, 
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et al., 2001; Sinnett, Juncadella, Rafal, Azanon, & Soto-Faraco, 2007; Spence & Parise, 
2010; Spence, et al., 2001). To compute the PSS, transformed z-scores of the proportion of 
“right first” responses were first obtained by applying the inverse of the standard normal 
distribution function to the raw proportion scores (probit analysis; Finney, 1964). This 
transformation enabled us to perform a linear regression on the transformed data to derive the 
PSS, calculated from the slope and intercept of the best-fitted line of the z-scores (PSS = -
slope/intercept)2. To account for the correlation of measurements within the same subject, we 
used a mixed probit regression model, where each participant had his/her own intercept and 
slope with estimated random effects from a bivariate zero-mean normal distribution. If a PSS 
value was falling outside the SOA range (i.e., > +100 or < -100 ms), the data of this 
participant were excluded from further analyses (for a similar procedure, see Spence, et al., 
2001; Weiß & Scharlau, 2012). Based on previous research (West, et al., 2009), we 
hypothesized a prior entry effect (i.e., PSS significantly different from zero, as assessed by 
one-sample t-tests) for fearful compared to neutral faces in the FearNeut condition, whereas 
no difference ought to be observed in the two control conditions (i.e., FearFear and 
NeutNeut)3 
Additionally, reaction times (RTs) were analyzed by means of repeated measures analysis 
of variance (ANOVA), with factors SOA (6 levels: -100, -30, -10, +10, +30, +100) and 
stimulus pair condition (3 levels: fear-neutral, fear-fear, neutral-neutral). We predicted that 
the SOAs for which uncertainty was high (i.e., ±30 and ±10 ms) would be associated with 
slower RTs, compared to longer SOAs (i.e., ±100 ms). 
                                                 
2
 We also computed and analyzed the so-called “just noticeable difference” (JND). JND corresponds to the slope 
of the best-fitted line of the z-scores (0.675/slope). This metric reflects the smallest temporal interval between 
two stimuli needed for an observer to correctly judge which stimulus had been presented first on 75% of the 
trials, since ±0.675 represents the 75% and 25% point on the cumulative normal distribution (Perez, et al., 2009; 
Sinnett, et al., 2007; Spence & Parise, 2010; Vatakis & Spence, 2006). However, from a theoretical standpoint, 
the effects of spatial attention on JND in a TOJ task are still unclear (Shore & Spence, 2005; Sinnett, et al., 
2007). In addition, our analyses performed on the JND obtained for each of the five experiments did not reveal 
any valuable (compared to the PSS) information regarding a potential differential prior entry effects for 
emotional relative to neutral faces. Therefore, the results obtained for the JND are not reported. 
3
 Several studies point either to a possible advantage of the right hemisphere in attention selection and 
processing (Holländer, Corballis, & Hamm, 2005; Verleger, Smigasiewicz, & Moller, 2011; Verleger, et al., 
2009), or a disadvantage of the left hemisphere in these processes (Hellige, 1983; Hellige, Cox, & Litvac, 1979). 
Moreover, earlier work suggested that the right hemisphere could preferentially be engaged in the processing of 
emotion-laden stimuli (Gainotti, 1972, 2012; Mammucari, et al., 1988; Wittling & Roschmann, 1993). 
Accordingly, in all the experiments reported here, we also assessed whether any enhanced prior entry effect 
could be observed when the first (emotional or neutral) face in the pair was presented in the left vs. right 
hemifield relative to fixation. However, we did not find any effect of the side of presentation during the TOJ 
task, a finding which is also consistent with the study by Fecica & Stolz (2008). 
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Whenever Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated, 
the degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates. The alpha level 
for all statistical analyses was set at p < 0.05. 
2.6. Results 
Trials whose RTs were slower than three standard deviations from the mean (calculated 
for each condition and SOA separately across participants) were removed from the analysis 
(M = 1.12%, SD = 0.73). 
Figure 2A shows the proportion of “right first” responses for each task (onset and offset) 
and condition (FearNeut, FearFear, NeutNeut). A clear inverted S-shaped psychometric 
function was obtained for each condition, providing evidence that the main experimental 
manipulation (i.e., SOA) was successful. Thus, participants perceived the onsets (or offsets) 
of the two stimuli in accordance with their respective occurrences. More specifically, 
participants’ TOJs were more uncertain (i.e., the proportion of “right first” responses was 
close to chance) at short (i.e., ±30 and ±10 ms) compared to long (i.e., ±100 ms) SOAs. The 
analysis of RTs corroborated this assumption. Participants were slower at short relative to 
long SOAs, as confirmed by a significant main effect of SOA [onset: F(5, 155) = 52.88, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .630; offset: F(5, 155) = 46.49, p < .001, ηp2 = .600], as well as its significant 
quadratic trend [onset: F(1, 31) = 98.42, p < .001, ηp2 = .760; offset: F(1, 31) = 99.17, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .762]. The SOA x condition interaction was not significant [onset: F(10, 310) = 
0.36, p = .964; offset: F(10, 310) = 1.46, p = .153], indicating a comparable response speed 
across the three experimental conditions (Figure 2B). 
The PSS values for each condition are reported in Table 2, separately for offset and onset 
tasks. In the onset task, for none of the three conditions did the one-sample t-test reach 
significance [FearNeut: t(31) = 1.15, p = .260; FearFear: t(31) = 1.37, p = .180; NeutNeut: 
t(31) = 1.82, p = .079]. Similar results were obtained for the offset task [FearNeut: t(31) = 
0.72, p = .479; FearFear: t(31) = -0.20, p = .847; NeutNeut: t(31) = -0.15, p = .884], 
indicating no reliable prior entry effect for fearful compared to neutral faces (Figure 2C). 
Importantly, results of the post-experiment ratings unequivocally confirmed that fearful 
faces were perceived as more fearful compared to neutral faces [t(31) = 28.10, p < .001] 
(Figure 2D). 
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Figure 2. Results of Experiment 1. (A) The average proportion of “right first” responses, separately for onset 
(black lines) and offset (grey lines) tasks, displayed for each condition as a function of SOA. Positive SOAs 
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indicate that the first stimulus actually appeared on the right hemifield, whereas negative SOAs refer to first 
stimuli appearing on the left. The different conditions are: fearful-neutral (FearNeut, solid lines), fearful-fearful 
(FearFear, dashed lines), neutral-neutral (NeutNeut, dotted lines). The horizontal line corresponds to the 50% 
response mark (chance level), that is when participants responded “left” or “right” equally often. Significant 
visual prior entry effects (indicating attentional capture for one of the two stimuli in the pair) would be 
visualized as horizontal shifts of the point of maximum uncertainty across the 50% response mark. (B) The 
average RTs of “right first” responses, separately for onset (black lines) and offset (grey lines) tasks, for 
FearNeut (solid lines), FearFear (dashed lines) and NeutNeut (dotted lines) conditions as a function of SOA. 
Slower RTs were observed at short relative to long SOAs, indicating increased response uncertainty. However, 
no difference in this inverted U-shape was evidenced across conditions. (C) PSS values (in ms) for onset (left) 
and offset (right) tasks, separately for FearNeut (grey bar), FearFear (black bar) and NeutNeut (white bar) 
conditions. Positive values indicate prior entry for the left stimulus in the pair, while negative values correspond 
to prior entry for the right stimulus. None of these values was significantly different from zero, indicating no 
prior entry for any of the experimental conditions. (D) Mean fear ratings collected at the end of the main 
experiment, separately for fearful (dark grey bar) and neutral (light grey bar) faces. Fearful faces were 
consistently rated as more fearful than neutral faces. *** p < .001. Vertical bars correspond to standard errors of 
the means. 
 
Table 2. Median values and standard deviations (in parenthesis) of the PSS scores obtained 
in Experiment 1 for each condition, separately for onset and offset tasks. 
Task Condition PSS 
Onset 
FearNeut 4.22 (14.70) 
FearFear 2.92 (15.56) 
NeutNeut 5.10 (15.35) 
Offset 
FearNeut 0.06 (18.21) 
FearFear 0.89 (21.35) 
NeutNeut -1.86 (21.71) 
Note. Positive values reflect processing prioritization (i.e., prior entry) for the left stimulus in the pair, whereas 
negative values refer to prior entry for the right stimulus in the pair. 
2.7. Discussion 
In Experiment 1, participants were presented with pairs of fearful and neutral faces, and 
were instructed to report whether the first stimulus appeared (or disappeared) on the left or 
right visual hemifield. We hypothesized that fearful faces, because of their enhanced intrinsic 
motivational salience compared to neutral faces, could rapidly capture exogenous attention 
and, accordingly, bias TOJs (as reflected by PSS values being significantly different from 
zero in the FearNeut condition). However, we failed to observe such pattern of results. 
Importantly, these null findings could not easily be accounted for by mere task difficulty or 
abnormal temporal perception and/or attentional allocation throughout the visual field, since 
most of the participants could correctly identify the first onset in the pair (as evidenced by the 
presence of a clear inverted S-shaped psychometric function observed for each experimental 
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condition; see Figure 2A). Moreover, post-experiment ratings confirmed that fearful faces 
were clearly recognized as such compared to neutral faces (Figure 2D), ruling out the 
possibility that the fearful faces selected in this experiment displayed weak or 
undifferentiated negative emotional expressions. Moreover, the results obtained for the offset 
task did not show any significant or differential effect for the FearNeut condition, suggesting 
that neither a rapid orienting (onset task) nor a prolonged disengagement effect (offset task) 
was evidenced for fearful faces in this TOJ task. 
Although fearful faces were previously shown to influence early attention selection 
processes (see Pourtois, et al., 2012, for a recent review), the lack of a reliable prior entry for 
fearful faces might be explained by the fact that the threat displayed in these faces is indirect 
in essence, thereby affecting the motivational significance to a lower extent than angry faces 
(Sander, et al., 2007; Whalen, et al., 2004). Moreover, earlier studies already reported prior 
entry effects for (schematic) angry faces (Fecica & Stolz, 2008; West, et al., 2009). 
Therefore, in Experiment 2, we used angry and fearful faces concurrently in order to assess 
whether any prior entry effect for negative emotional facial expressions might be specific to 
angry faces or not. Furthermore, we substantially reduced the size of the face stimuli 
compared to Experiment 1, as well as their eccentricity relative to fixation. We reasoned that 
the use of large face stimuli (i.e., subtending 8.86° x 7.63° of visual angle) shown in the far 
periphery (i.e., 10.29° from fixation) may have favored the use of low-level features to 
perform the TOJ task in Experiment 1. By comparison, West and colleagues (2009) presented 
schematic or human faces in squared boxes subtending 3.80° x 3.60° of visual angle at a 
lower horizontal eccentricity (3.15° from fixation). Accordingly, in Experiment 2, our 
stimulus parameters were closely matched to those used previously by West, et al. (2009). 
3. Experiment 2 
3.1. Participants 
Forty healthy psychology students participated in the study in exchange of course credits. 
None of them had participated to Experiment 1. All volunteers gave informed written consent 
prior to their participation. The data of two participants were excluded from further analyses 
due to an abnormal inverted S-shaped psychometric function in at least one experimental 
condition (similarly to Experiment 1). Thus, the final sample contained 38 participants (32 
women, mean age 18 years, range 17-22). 
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3.2. Stimuli 
Fearful and neutral faces were identical to the ones used in Experiment 1. However, they 
were now enclosed in a smaller oval frame, spanning 4.77° x 3.06° of visual angle. In 
addition, 10 faces displaying an angry expression were selected from the same standardized 
Ekman series (Ekman & Friesen, 1976). Apparent contrast was also calculated for angry 
faces, and independent samples t-tests revealed no significant difference between neutral and 
angry faces [t(18) = -0.99, p = .334], as well as fearful and angry faces [t(18) = -0.16, p = 
.877]. 
3.3. Procedure 
The procedure and design of the onset and offset tasks were similar to Experiment 1. 
However, here the facial stimuli were presented closer to fixation (distance between the 
center of the fixation cross and the center of the face: 6.68°) compared to Experiment 1. The 
stimulus pair conditions were angry face-neutral face (AngerNeut) and fearful face-neutral 
face (FearNeut). No additional condition (i.e., AngerAnger, FearFear or NeutNeut) was 
included, in order to avoid an excessively high number of trials and long testing session likely 
causing drops or lapses in attention. Note that the use of the AngerNeut and/or FearNeut 
conditions alone is sufficient to establish whether any reliable prior entry (for either angry or 
fearful faces) was present or not (West, et al., 2009). 
Ratings of perceived anger and fear conveyed by each face stimulus were collected at the 
end of the main TOJ task by means of 9-point Likert scales, ranging from 1 (“not 
afraid/angry”) to 9 (“extremely afraid/angry”). Additionally, participants were asked to 
provide ratings of perceived brightness for each emotional and neutral face (from 1, “very 
dark”, to 9, “very bright”), to further corroborate the lack of clear difference in this low-level 
visual property across the three emotion categories (i.e., neutral, angry, and fearful). 
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Figure 3. Results of Experiment 2. (A) The average proportion of “right first” responses, separately for onset 
and offset tasks, for each condition as a function of SOA. (B) The average RTs of “right first” responses, 
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separately for onset and offset tasks, for AngerNeut and FearNeut conditions. Participants were more uncertain 
at short compared to long SOAs, but no reliable differences were observed across conditions. (C) PSS values for 
onset and offset tasks, separately for AngerNeut and FearNeut stimulus pairs. No prior entry was found for any 
of the experimental conditions. (D) Mean anger (left), fear (middle) and brightness (right) ratings, separately for 
angry (dark grey bar), fearful (light grey bar) and neutral (white bar) faces. Emotion ratings were consistent with 
the a priori stimulus categorization. Of note, the statistically different ratings in perceived brightness did not 
influence behavior, as confirmed by a lack of prior entry effect for angry faces. ** p < .01; *** p < .001. 
Vertical bars correspond to standard errors of the means. 
3.4. Results 
Following standard practice, trials whose RTs were slower than three standard deviations 
from the mean were discarded (M = 0.98%, SD = 0.66). 
Behavioral results showed that, as reported in Figure 3A, the distribution of the proportion 
of “right first” responses was consistent with the results obtained in Experiment 1: responses 
were close to chance level at short compared to long SOAs, both in the onset and offset tasks. 
Accordingly, RTs were slower at short relative to long SOAs. A 6 (SOA) x 2 (condition: 
AngerNeut, FearNeut) repeated measures ANOVA confirmed a significant main effect of 
SOA [onset: F(5, 185) = 63.70, p < .001, ηp2 = .633; offset: F(5, 185) = 43.62, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.541], as well as a significant quadratic trend [onset: F(1, 37) = 103.03, p < .001, ηp2 = .736; 
offset: F(1, 37) = 66.82, p < .001, ηp2 = .644] (see Figure 3B). In addition, in the offset task 
exclusively, a marginally significant SOA x condition interaction was found [F(5, 185) = 
2.47, p = .055, ηp2 = .063]. However, post-hoc t-tests failed to evidence meaningful 
differences across conditions when corrected for multiple comparisons (ps > .05). 
Table 3 shows the PSS values for each condition, separately for offset and onset tasks. 
None of the one-sample t-tests were significantly different from zero, both in the onset 
[AngerNeut: t(37) = 0.99, p = .327; FearNeut: t(37) = 0.74, p = .466] and offset tasks 
[AngerNeut: t(37) = 0.04, p = .969; FearNeut: t(37) = 0.37, p = .718] (see also Figure 3C). 
Thus, no prior entry for negative emotional facial expressions (either fear or anger) was 
evidenced. 
Post-experiment ratings confirmed that fearful faces were perceived as more fearful 
compared to neutral [t(37) = 34.02, p < .001] and angry faces [t(37) = 29.60, p < .001]. 
Similarly, angry faces were rated higher along the anger intensity dimension compared to 
neutral [t(37) = 33.15, p < .001] and fearful faces [t(37) = 25.97, p < .001] (Figure 3D). Thus, 
participants correctly perceived the respective emotion content and intensity displayed by the 
selected face stimuli. Results further revealed higher perceived brightness for emotional 
relative to neutral faces [anger vs. neutral: t(37) = 4.73, p < .001; fear vs. neutral: t(37) = 
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2.97, p < .001]. Note that, despite these subjective differences in brightness, no prior entry 
effect for either angry or fearful faces was found compared to neutral faces. 
 
Table 3. Median values and standard deviations (in parenthesis) of the PSS scores obtained 
in Experiment 2 for each condition, separately for onset and offset tasks. 
Task Condition PSS 
Onset AngerNeut 3.06 (20.33) 
FearNeut 1.90 (20.39) 
Offset 
AngerNeut 0.20 (21.34) 
FearNeut 0.00 (23.12) 
3.5. Discussion 
Results of Experiment 2 failed to show any significant prior entry effect for either fearful 
faces (replicating the results of Experiment 1) or angry faces when compared to neutral faces, 
despite a clear and predictable effect of SOA on TOJs (i.e., inverted S-shaped psychometric 
function). Unlike previous studies using mainly schematic angry faces (Fecica & Stolz, 2008; 
West, et al., 2009), here we did not find evidence for the preferential (exogenous) orienting 
towards photographs of realistic fearful or angry faces when they compete with neutral faces 
for attention selection. Because our experimental setup was similar to West and colleagues 
(2009), these results are unlikely to be explained by suboptimal stimulus parameters or task 
demands. Moreover, since participants of Experiment 2 unambiguously identified the 
emotion conveyed by fearful and angry faces during a post-experiment rating phase (see also 
Experiment 1), these results cannot be accounted for by the use of face stimuli providing 
weak or undifferentiated emotional expressions relative to neutral faces. Finally, the results of 
the offset task also showed that no facilitated disengagement effect was evidenced for either 
angry or fearful faces, a phenomenon that could potentially mask any preferential early 
orienting of attention towards these negative stimuli in the onset task. 
An intriguing possibility to account for these null findings (Experiments 1-2) may be 
related to the specific task set adopted by the participants throughout the experimental 
session. Given that participants had to focus on spatial and temporal properties to carry out 
the two-alternative forced choice task (i.e., is it the left or right stimulus 
appearing/disappearing first?), the actual emotion content of the faces could somehow be 
filtered out completely in these two experiments. Moreover, previous research showed that 
early and automatic affective stimulus processing could substantially be reduced when 
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concurrent non-affective (spatial) stimulus dimensions became task-relevant (Everaert, 
Spruyt, & De Houwer, 2011; Pessoa, Kastner, & Ungerleider, 2002; Spruyt, De Houwer, & 
Hermans, 2009; Spruyt, De Houwer, Hermans, & Eelen, 2007), consistent with the idea that 
the (exogenous) capture of attention by emotion is not “magic”, but subject to (state) 
fluctuations depending on the availability of attentional resources, as well as the specific task 
set (see Pourtois, et al., 2012). In light of this evidence, we surmised that participants of 
Experiments 1-2 may have adopted an efficient strategy and eventually allocated attentional 
resources primarily to the processing of the spatial and temporal properties of the two face 
stimuli, while actively “ignoring” their emotional content because poorly informative to 
resolve the task. We have to acknowledge, however, that this account already posits that 
negative emotional facial expressions do not “automatically” capture attention, because this 
effect (at least in the case of a TOJ task) may actually depend upon the specific task demands 
(see Moors & De Houwer, 2006). Accordingly, no prior entry for angry or fearful faces was 
evidenced in these two earlier experiments, probably because participants could easily ignore 
the emotional content of the two competing faces and focus on a specific non-affective 
stimulus feature whose processing was sufficient to perform the task. To address this issue, in 
Experiment 3 we modified the task instructions and asked participants to judge whether the 
emotional or the neutral face appeared first (emotion TOJ), making the differential emotional 
content of the two faces in the pair directly task-relevant. Hence, in Experiment 3 a two-
alternative forced-choice task was still required, but it concerned the content rather than the 
spatial position of the stimuli. 
4. Experiment 3 
4.1. Participants 
Thirty-seven psychology students, who did not participate in Experiment 1 or 2, took part 
in Experiment 3. Using the same exclusion criteria as above (see Experiments 1 and 2), the 
data of 16 participants had to be removed from the subsequent statistical analyses. The data 
of 21 participants (19 women, mean age 18 years, range 18-21) were thus included in the 
final sample. 
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4.2. Stimuli and procedure 
The stimuli were identical to Experiment 2. However, unlike Experiments 1-2, participants 
were asked to perform a two-alternative forced choice task based on the emotional content of 
the face stimuli in the pair. More precisely, they were instructed to judge whether the 
stimulus that appeared first had either a neutral or an emotional expression, thereby making 
the emotional content of the face stimuli task-relevant. Another notable difference between 
Experiment 3 and Experiments 1-2 was the use of a block design. In order to facilitate 
participants’ discrimination between emotional and neutral faces, AngerNeut and FearNeut 
trials were no longer presented in random order throughout the experimental session, but in 
two separate blocks (counterbalanced across participants). 
Finally, ratings for the perceived anger, fear and brightness of the individual face stimuli 
were collected post-experiment, similarly to Experiments 1-2. 
4.3. Results 
A total of 0.55% (SD = 0.40) of trials were discarded because their RTs were slower than 
three standard deviations from the mean. 
The proportion of “emotion first” responses is plotted in Figure 4A, separately for each 
condition (AngerNeut vs. FearNeut) and task (onset vs. offset). As expected, the proportion 
of “emotion first” responses was close to chance level at short compared to long SOAs (both 
in the onset and offset tasks), as evidenced by a clear inverted S-shaped psychometric 
function. Moreover, RTs were slower at short relative to long SOAs, as confirmed by a 
significant main effect of SOA [onset: F(5, 100) = 9.19, p < .001, ηp2 = .315; offset: F(5, 100) 
= 10.40, p < .001, ηp2 = .342] and a significant quadratic trend [onset: F(1, 20) = 17.82, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .471; offset: F(1, 20) = 19.58, p < .001, ηp2 = .495] (see Figure 4B). However, no 
significant SOA x condition interaction was evidenced [onset: F(5, 100) = 1.16, p = .332, ηp2 
= .055; offset: F(5, 100) = 0.73, p = .603, ηp2 = .035]. 
PSS values for each condition (separately for onset and offset tasks) are shown in Table 4. 
No significant prior entry effect was found, either in the onset [AngerNeut: t(20) = 0.18, p = 
.858; FearNeut: t(20) = -1.27, p = .218] or in the offset task [AngerNeut: t(20) = 0.24, p = 
.815; FearNeut: t(20) = -0.81, p = .428] (Figure 4C). 
Post-experiment ratings confirmed that fearful faces were perceived as more fearful 
compared to neutral faces [t(20) = 15.84, p < .001] and angry faces [t(20) = 16.36, p < .001]. 
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In addition, angry faces were perceived as carrying more anger intensity than neutral [t(20) = 
17.00, p < .001] and fearful faces [t(20) = 16.72, p < .001] (Figure 4D). Finally, participants 
rated emotional and neutral stimuli as equally bright (ps > .05). 
 
Table 4. Median values and standard deviations (in parenthesis) of the PSS scores obtained 
in Experiment 3 for each condition, separately for onset and offset tasks. 
Task Condition PSS 
Onset AngerNeut 1.61 (34.60) 
FearNeut -3.63 (25.43) 
Offset 
AngerNeut -0.83 (24.25) 
FearNeut -2.55 (23.79) 
Note. Positive values reflect processing prioritization (i.e., prior entry) for the neutral stimulus in the pair, 
whereas negative values refer to prior entry for the emotional stimulus in the pair. 
4.4. Discussion 
Despite the use of an emotion TOJ task (as opposed to a TOJ task based on the location of 
the face appearing first; see Experiments 1-2), we did not find evidence for a differential prior 
entry effect for either fearful or angry faces relative to neutral faces. Noteworthy, these non-
significant results were obtained despite a clear emotion differentiation of the three emotion 
categories (as confirmed by post-experiment ratings), as well as the presence of clear inverted 
S-shaped psychometric functions in 21 participants (unambiguously revealing a clear 
sensitivity to the main SOA manipulation). Moreover, as was already the case for 
Experiments 1-2, we could rule out that these null-findings were somehow accounted for by 
the presence of a facilitated disengagement effect towards either fearful or angry faces in 
these participants, because no differential effect of the emotional content of the faces was 
evidenced during the offset task. 
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Figure 4. Results of Experiment 3. (A) Proportion of “emotion first” responses, separately for onset and offset 
tasks, for each condition as a function of SOA (positive SOAs: emotional stimulus appeared first; negative 
NO PRIOR ENTRY FOR NEGATIVE EMOTIONAL FACIAL EXPRESSIONS 65 
SOAs: neutral stimulus appeared first). (B) Average RTs of “emotion first” responses, separately for onset and 
offset tasks, for AngerNeut and FearNeut conditions. Participants were more uncertain at short compared to long 
SOAs in both tasks, although the distribution of these RTs across the SOAs is noisier. (C) PSS values in onset 
and offset tasks for AngerNeut and FearNeut conditions. Positive values indicate prior entry for the emotional 
face, while negative values indicate attentional capture for the neutral face in the pair. However, no prior entry 
was observed. (D) Mean anger, fear and brightness ratings confirmed that fearful faces were perceived as more 
fearful, whereas angry faces were rated as more angry. No difference in perceived brightness was reported. *** 
p < .001. Vertical bars correspond to standard errors of the means. 
 
The lack of prior entry effect for angry faces is puzzling to some extent, since participants 
were asked to process the emotional content of the faces in the pair in order to perform the 
task. Previous research showed that in these conditions (i.e., when emotion is directly task-
relevant), rapid and automatic effects of (negative) emotion on feature-specific attention 
allocation could be observed in healthy adult participants (Everaert, et al., 2011; Spruyt, De 
Houwer, Everaert, & Hermans, 2012; Spruyt, et al., 2007). Furthermore, these findings are 
also at odds with earlier results showing a reliable prior entry effect for angry faces (West, et 
al., 2009), because similar stimulus parameters were used in these two studies. However, in 
West, et al. (2009), a rather limited number of face stimuli was used (i.e., four angry and four 
neutral faces, two male and two female for each category), an element that somewhat casts 
doubt on the validity of these earlier results and raises the possibility of low-level perceptual 
confounds. By contrast, in Experiments 1-3, the two faces in the pair were always 
perceptually dissimilar across the whole experimental session, precluding the use of a 
systematic strategy (presumably based on the processing of a non-emotional feature) to detect 
which of the two face stimuli appeared/disappeared first. 
Using a stringent and standard exclusion criterion (Perez, et al., 2009; Spence, et al., 2001; 
Weiß & Scharlau, 2012), we found out that the data of sixteen participants had to be removed 
from the analysis because they did not show a normal change in TOJ (at least in one 
experimental condition) as a function of the SOA. This exclusion rate was substantially larger 
than what we found in Experiments 1-2 (where participants were instructed to focus on 
spatial and temporal properties of the two face stimuli in the pair), suggesting that the 
discrimination of the emotional content of the faces was more demanding than processing the 
temporal and spatial features of the first face appearing/disappearing on screen. Noteworthy, 
none of the two previous studies looking at prior entry for angry faces actually used a similar 
exclusion criterion (Fecica & Stolz, 2008; West, et al., 2009), suggesting that the results 
reported in these earlier studies might include the data of “poor-performers” who may 
encounter difficulties to process the (fine-grained) changes in the respective onsets of the two 
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faces. At any rate, in Experiment 4, we aimed at addressing this question and, accordingly, 
we devised a new modification of the TOJ task enabling to briefly “train” temporal 
perceptual abilities with low-level geometric stimuli, before the putative effect of the 
emotional content of the face was systematically explored. We hypothesized that this initial 
training or familiarization with geometrical figures might later reduce the drop rate for the 
emotion TOJ. Hence, in Experiment 4, we included at the beginning of the experiment two 
training blocks during which participants had to perform the TOJ task based on the 
orientation of line gratings (being either horizontal or vertical). Then, participants performed 
the emotion TOJ, as described in Experiment 3. Of note, we only used the onset task in 
Experiment 4, given that no evidence was obtained in Experiments 1-3 for a possible 
differential disengagement effect towards fearful or angry faces. 
5. Experiment 4 
5.1. Participants 
Forty psychology students, who did not participate in any of the previous experiments, 
took part in Experiment 4 for course credits. Using the same exclusion criteria as above (see 
Experiments 1-3), the data of 23 participants had to be excluded from the subsequent 
statistical analyses. Hence, the final sample consisted of 17 participants (13 women, mean 
age 20 years, range 18-30). 
5.2. Stimuli and procedure 
Face stimuli and procedure were identical to Experiment 3. In addition, before the emotion 
TOJ task (which was identical to Experiment 3), participants carried out a non-emotion TOJ 
task aimed at familiarizing them to detect different onsets with the different SOAs. Two 
blocks were included (each containing 90 trials), in which gratings consisting of either 
dominant horizontal or vertical black lines on a white background (matched in size with the 
face stimuli; see Figure 1) were presented equally often on the left and right hemifield for the 
duration of the SOAs. Participants had to judge whether the horizontal or vertical grating 
appeared first. Moreover, the offset task was discarded in Experiment 4 in order to shorten 
the total duration of the experimental session. 
Ratings of the individual faces regarding the intensity of anger, fear and brightness were 
collected at the end of the experiment. 
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Figure 5. Results of Experiment 4. (A) Proportion of “horizontal first” responses (in the initial orientation tasks) 
and “emotion first” responses (in the emotion TOJ task), separately for each condition (HorizVert: horizontal-
NO PRIOR ENTRY FOR NEGATIVE EMOTIONAL FACIAL EXPRESSIONS 69 
vertical, solid grey line; AngerNeut: anger-neutral, solid black line; FearNeut: fearful-neutral, dashed black 
line). Results for the orientation and emotion TOJ tasks are shown together for illustration purposes. Positive 
SOAs refer to horizontal lines or emotional faces appearing first, whereas negative SOAs indicate that vertical 
lines or neutral faces appeared first. (B) Average RTs of “horizontal first” and “emotion first” responses for 
HorizVert, AngerNeut and FearNeut conditions. Participants were more uncertain at short compared to long 
SOAs, although this effect was more pronounced in the orientation task (presumably because it was easier; see 
main text). (C) PSS values for HorizVert, AngerNeut and FearNeut conditions. Positive values indicate prior 
entry for either the horizontal lines or the emotional face in the pair, whereas negative values would indicate 
prior entry for either the vertical lines or the neutral face. However, no prior entry was observed. (D) Mean 
anger, fear and brightness ratings collected at the end of the experiment. As expected, fearful faces were rated as 
more fearful, while angry faces were rated as more angry, with no difference in perceived brightness. *** p < 
.001. Vertical bars correspond to standard errors of the means. 
5.3. Results 
Trials whose RTs were slower than three standard deviations from the mean were 
discarded (M = 0.73%, SD = 0.51). 
Figure 5A shows the proportion of “horizontal first” responses for the non-emotion TOJ 
task during the two familiarization blocks, as well as the proportion of “emotion first” 
responses for the subsequent emotion TOJ task. Performance for the non-emotion TOJ task 
was remarkably accurate, as evidenced by a clear inverted S-shaped psychometric function 
(HorizVert condition in Figure 5A). By contrast, accuracy was substantially reduced for the 
emotion TOJ task, as shown by flatter inverted S-shaped psychometric functions for the 
AngerNeut and FearNeut conditions. Please note that the results reported here are for good 
performers only (i.e., participants whose PSS was between -100 and +100 ms for all 
conditions). A 6 (SOA) x 3 (condition: HorizVert, AngerNeut, FearNeut) repeated measures 
ANOVA on RTs revealed a significant main effect of SOA [F(5, 80) = 19.42, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.548], as well as significant quadratic trend [F(1, 16) = 33.12, p < .001, ηp2 = .674] (Figure 
5B). Moreover, a significant SOA x condition interaction was found [F(10, 160) = 3.75, p = 
.005, ηp2 = .190]. However, post-hoc t-tests did not show reliable differences across 
conditions when correcting for multiple comparisons (ps > .05). 
Table 5 shows the PSS values for each condition separately. No significant prior entry 
effect was found in the HorizVert condition [t(16) = 0.58, p = .568], serving therefore as 
control condition or low-level baseline. However, PSS values were also not significant in the 
AngerNeut [t(16) = -0.51, p = .616] and FearNeut [t(16) = -1.24, p = .232] conditions (Figure 
5C). 
Post-experiment ratings confirmed that the face stimuli were perceived in line with the a 
priori emotion categories: fearful faces were perceived as more fearful compared to neutral 
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[t(16) = 23.66, p < .001] and angry faces [t(16) = -19.27, p < .001]. Likewise, angry faces 
were perceived as more angry relative to neutral [t(16) = 16.99, p < .001] and fearful faces 
[t(16) = 14.54, p < .001], with no significant difference in perceived brightness across these 
three conditions (ps > .05) (Figure 5D). 
 
Table 5. Median values and standard deviations (in parenthesis) of the PSS scores obtained 
in Experiment 4 for each condition. 
Condition PSS 
Orientation 0.10 (16.79) 
AngerNeut 0.07 (37.92) 
FearNeut -1.14 (26.36) 
Note. Positive values reflect processing prioritization (i.e., prior entry) for either the vertical lines in the 
orientation task or the neutral face in the emotional TOJ task. Conversely, negative values refer to prior entry for 
either the horizontal lines or the emotional face. 
5.4. Discussion 
Results of Experiment 4 failed to reveal any prior entry effect for either fearful or angry 
faces, when these stimuli compete with neutral faces for attention selection. As was already 
the case for Experiments 1-3, this result could not be imputed to a lack of perceived 
differences between the three emotion categories, since post-experiment ratings showed clear 
and predictable differences between these three categories. We reasoned that the use of 
familiarization blocks with horizontal and vertical line gratings (i.e., non-emotional features) 
might have eased performance during the emotion TOJ task. However, this turned out to be a 
wrong prediction. Despite the introduction of these two familiarization blocks, in fact, the 
drop rate was still substantial (23 out of 40 participants, 58%). Hence, 23 participants had 
PSS values (at least in one condition) exceeding the maximum SOA range (± 100 ms). 
Unexpectedly, this drop rate was even higher compared to the one found in Experiment 3 
(43%), where no familiarization with the vertical and horizontal gratings was introduced. 
Note that if we only used the data of the TOJ task performed on the gratings, this drop rate 
would be remarkably lower (10%), suggesting that participants encountered specific 
difficulties only when asked to decide whether the emotional face in the pair was shown first 
or not, but not when asked to decide whether horizontal or vertical line gratings appeared 
first. This conclusion was also reinforced by the direct comparison of the two tasks for the 17 
participants included in the analyses (see Figure 5A). 
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We reasoned that task difficulty during the emotion TOJ might perhaps decrease if we 
would give more specific instructions to participants. More specifically, while in Experiments 
3-4 instructions emphasized the discrimination between “emotional” and neutral faces, the 
use of specific response labels (angry vs. neutral or fearful vs. neutral) could possibly 
improve performance. A refined task set suited to bias feature-specific attention allocation 
towards specific emotional features (Everaert, et al., 2011; Kiefer & Martens, 2010; Spruyt, 
et al., 2012; Spruyt, et al., 2009), in fact, could facilitate TOJs based on these emotional 
features. Accordingly, in Experiment 5, we used the same stimuli and setup as in Experiment 
4, but asked participants to indicate whether the first stimulus was an angry/fearful 
(depending on the block) or a neutral face. 
6. Experiment 5 
6.1. Participants 
Thirty-six psychology students, who participated in none of the previous experiments, 
took part in Experiment 5 in exchange of course credits. Using the same exclusion criterion 
as above, the data of twenty volunteers were removed from the subsequent statistical 
analyses, leaving a final sample of 16 participants (9 women, mean age 22 years, range 18-
30). 
6.2. Stimuli and procedure 
Stimuli were identical to Experiment 4. Similarly, two familiarization blocks with 
horizontal and vertical line gratings were used at the beginning of the experiment in order to 
familiarize participants with the TOJ task and the different SOAs. Unlike Experiment 4, 
however, for the subsequent emotion TOJ task participants were specifically asked to decide 
whether the face that appeared first in the pair was angry vs. neutral or fearful vs. neutral (2 
blocks each, counterbalanced across participants). Ten practice trials with either angry/neutral 
or fearful/neutral stimulus pairs preceded the two experimental blocks. 
Ratings for the individual faces regarding the amount of anger, fear or brightness were 
collected at the end of the experiment. 
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6.3. Results 
Trials whose RTs were slower than three standard deviations from the mean were 
discarded (M = 0.66%, SD = 0.50). 
Overall, participants performed better in the familiarization task compared to the emotion 
TOJ task, as evidenced by flatter inverted S-Shaped psychometric functions for the 
AngerNeut and FearNeut conditions relative to the HorizVert condition (Figure 6A). A 6 
(SOA) x 3 (condition) repeated measures ANOVA on RTs disclosed a significant main effect 
of SOA [F(5, 70) = 10.60, p < .001, ηp2 = .431], with a significant quadratic trend [F(1, 14) = 
14.05, p = .002, ηp2 = .501] (Figure 6B). In addition, a significant SOA x condition 
interaction was found [F(10, 140) = 2.08, p = .030, ηp2 = .129], although Bonferroni-
corrected post-hoc t-tests did not reveal significant differences across conditions. 
None of the PSS values (reported in Table 6) was significantly different from zero 
[HorizVert; t(15) = -0.65, p = .524; AngerNeut: t(15) = -1.39 p = .184; FearNeut; t(15) = -
0.68, p = .508] (Figure 6C). 
Post-experiment ratings confirmed that emotional faces were perceived as such by 
participants. Fearful faces were perceived as more fearful compared to neutral [t(15) = 19.08, 
p < .001] and angry faces [t(15) = -13.45, p < .001]. Similarly, angry faces were perceived as 
more angry than neutral [t(15) = 15.21, p < .001] and fearful faces [t(15) = 9.77, p < .001] 
(Figure 6D). Higher perceived brightness for emotional relative to neutral faces was also 
reported [anger vs. neutral: t(15) = 5.54, p < .001; fear vs. neutral: t(15) = 3.56, p = .003]. 
However, these subjective differences in brightness did not lead to prior entry effect for either 
angry or fearful faces relative to neutral faces. 
 
Table 6. Median values and standard deviations (in parenthesis) of the PSS scores obtained 
in Experiment 5 for each condition. 
Condition PSS 
Orientation -2.56 (12.78) 
AngerNeut -9.34 (35.97) 
FearNeut 0.76 (22.90) 
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Figure 6. Results of Experiment 5. (A) Average proportion of “horizontal first” and “emotion first” responses, 
separately for HorizVert, AngerNeut and FearNeut conditions. (B) Average RTs of “horizontal first” and 
NO PRIOR ENTRY FOR NEGATIVE EMOTIONAL FACIAL EXPRESSIONS 75 
“emotion first” responses for each condition. Participants were more uncertain at short compared to long SOAs, 
corroborating the results obtained for Experiments 1-4. (C) PSS values for HorizVert, AngerNeut and FearNeut 
conditions. No prior entry was observed. (D) Mean anger, fear and brightness ratings confirmed that emotional 
faces were perceived as such by participants. The subjective difference in perceived brightness did not lead to 
any differential behavioral effect during the main emotion TOJ task. ** p < .01; *** p < .001. Vertical bars 
correspond to standard errors of the means. 
6.4. Discussion 
Using more specific task instructions than in Experiment 4 (i.e., by explicitly mentioning 
either anger or fear as target emotion), we still failed to observe a reliable prior entry effect 
for either fearful or angry faces in this new experiment. Moreover, as was already the case for 
Experiment 4, the data of a high number of participants had to be discarded (drop rate of 
56%) due to PSS values in the AngerNeut and FearNeut conditions that were falling outside 
the ±100 ms SOA range. Therefore, the use of specific emotion labels during the emotion 
TOJ did not lead to any gain in accuracy (Experiment 5), compared to more general task 
instructions only emphasizing the discrimination of emotional vs. neutral faces (Experiments 
3-4). Again, these results could not be explained by difficulties to identify or recognize the 
different emotional facial expressions (see results of the post-experiment ratings), or the use 
of suboptimal SOAs and/or stimulus parameters (see results for the two familiarization blocks 
with the line gratings). 
7. Additional analyses 
When the emotion content became task-relevant (Experiments 3-5), as opposed to the 
mere appearance of the two faces in the pair (Experiments 1-2), we found out that many 
participants showed PSS values outside the SOA range (±100 ms). These “poor-performers”, 
therefore, had to be excluded from subsequent statistical analyses (see Figure 7). This 
suggests that: (i) poor performers could not accurately carry out the emotion TOJ task, even 
though the majority of them could correctly discriminate which line gratings appeared first 
(Experiments 4-5), ruling out the possibility of a general perceptual deficit during TOJs; (ii) a 
temporal discrimination based on emotion was apparently more demanding than a temporal 
discrimination based on mere visual appearance. However, despite this increase in the drop 
rate across the five experiments, no prior entry effect for fearful or angry faces was 
evidenced, compared to neutral faces. We further analyzed the data of Experiments 3-5 to 
assess whether this increase in the drop rate (compared to Experiments 1-2) might perhaps be 
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explained by specific personality traits and/or differences in perceiving fear or anger intensity 
in the negative emotional facial expressions selected in our study. 
Independent paired t-tests comparing trait anxiety levels (Van der Ploeg, et al., 1979) and 
Need for Affect scores (Maio & Esses, 2001) between good and poor performers (as 
identified based on the PSS values) did not show any significant group difference (ps > .05) 
in any of the three experiments. These results could suggest that these specific predispositions 
did not influence performance during the emotion TOJ task, although a low inter-individual 
variability with these two trait-related measures might also explain this non-significant 
finding (see Table 1). 
 
Figure 7. Percentage of good (dark grey bar) vs. poor (light grey bar) performers across the five experiments. 
The number of poor performers reliably increased in Experiments 3-5 compared to Experiments 1-2, suggesting 
that the TOJ task based on the emotional content (Experiments 3-5) was more difficult to carry out than TOJ 
task based on mere spatial location (Experiments 1-2). 
 
By contrast, when comparing good vs. poor performers with regards to the ratings of the 
emotional faces, we found that -- only in Experiment 4 -- poor performers actually judged 
neutral faces as carrying significantly more anger and fear intensity compared to good 
performers [anger ratings: t(38) = -2.48, p = .019; fear ratings: t(38) = -2.08, p =.046] (Figure 
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8). Thus, poor performers in Experiment 4 may have perceived neutral faces as less neutral 
than good performers. Presumably, perceiving neutral faces as slightly more angry or fearful 
might turn out to be detrimental for performance during the emotion TOJ task, since the 
relative difference between emotional and neutral faces would be reduced for poor relative to 
good performers. Given that the perceived emotion intensity in the faces might modulate 
performance during the emotion TOJ task, we carried out an auxiliary control analysis. More 
specifically, for the data of Experiment 4, we included the emotional ratings of each neutral, 
angry and fearful face as covariates in our mixed probit regression model. Two separate 
analyses were conducted. First, we calculated the difference between the emotional ratings of 
the angry/fearful vs. neutral face on a trial-by-trial basis, to test the hypothesis that a higher 
difference in the perceived emotional intensity of the stimulus pair would result in facilitated 
attentional allocation towards the emotional face (i.e., its onset being perceived as first). 
Nonetheless, this covariate analysis did not reveal any significant PSS, either for the 
AngerNeut [t(16) = -2.08, p =.285] or the FearNeut [t(16) = -0.95, p =.357] condition. Next, 
we computed the sum of the emotional ratings for the two faces in the pair, in order to test 
whether, at the single trial level, an increased “emotional magnitude” (or overall 
emotionality) would somehow bias attention allocation towards the emotional faces, and in 
turn lead to a prior entry for either fearful or angry faces. However, this complementary 
covariate analysis did not show any significant (i.e., different from zero) PSS values, in any 
of the experimental conditions [AngerNeut: t(16) = -0.21, p =.983; FearNeut: t(16) = -1.25, p 
=.230]. Based on these results, we can conclude with high confidence that the absence of a 
reliable prior entry effect for angry or fearful faces compared to neutral faces in Experiment 4 
could not be ascribed to uncontrolled trial-by-trial fluctuations in the perceived (negative) 
emotionality of the two faces in the pair. 
8. General discussion 
In this study, we used a standard TOJ task to evaluate whether negative emotion (here 
with a focus on fear and anger) could “automatically” draw attention, and in turn lead to a 
prior entry effect when competing with neutral stimuli. The added value of this task is that it 
enables to titrate a more direct effect of the emotional stimulus on (early) attention 
allocation/orienting mechanisms (Jaskowski, 1993; Stelmach & Herdman, 1991; Stelmach, et 
al., 1994; Titchener, 1908). 
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Figure 8. Ratings of perceived anger and fear conveyed by neutral faces in Experiment 4, separately for good 
and poor performers. This auxiliary analysis showed that poor performers rated neutral faces as significantly 
more angry and fearful compared to good performers, raising the possibility that poor performers might actually 
perceive less difference between the two faces of the pair (regarding their emotional content) during the TOJ 
task, compared to good performers. This might explain why they had abnormal psychometric functions for at 
least one condition. However, control analyses including the perceived difference in emotional content between 
the two faces as a covariate in the mixed probit regression model failed to find any differential prior entry effect 
for emotional relative to neutral faces (see main text). 
 
Previous research using simple non-emotional stimuli already showed that attended 
stimuli are processed faster than unattended stimuli, an effect that can be captured in this task 
by a systematic bias in the perception of the onset of the attended stimulus (being perceived 
as first compared to the unattended one, usually occupying a non-overlapping spatial position 
in the visual field; see Shore & Spence, 2005; Shore, et al., 2001; Spence & Parise, 2010; 
Spence, et al., 2001). We sought to assess whether a similar prior entry effect could be 
obtained when a negative emotional facial expression directly competes for attention with a 
neutral one. However, results of five experiments clearly failed to corroborate this prediction, 
despite several incremental changes in task demands and stimulus parameters. Neither fearful 
nor angry faces were found to exert a systematic and differential influence on TOJs relative 
to neutral faces, casting doubt on the idea that these negative stimuli would “automatically” 
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or “irrepressibly” draw (exogenous) attention, at least when TOJ tasks are used. Furthermore, 
this outcome is at variance with two recent studies that did report prior entry for angry faces 
(Fecica & Stolz, 2008; West, et al., 2009). Before we discuss in depth the possible theoretical 
reasons for this discrepancy and null findings, we first consider a few methodological 
elements that might potentially account for these results. A critical analysis of these elements 
allow us to conclude that there is actually more to find in these results than a simple failure to 
replicate earlier findings. 
8.1. Lack of statistical power? 
In each of the five experiments we had a decent sample size -- ranging from N = 36 in 
Experiment 5 to N = 40 in Experiments 2 and 4. This number is comparable with Fecica & 
Stolz (2008) (N = 48), and appreciably larger than West, et al. (2009) (who used a sample 
size ranging from 12 to 16 participants, depending on the experiment). However, the drop 
rate was substantial in Experiments 3-5. This was based on a stringent (Perez, et al., 2009; 
Spence, et al., 2001; Weiß & Scharlau, 2012) exclusion criterion (i.e., PSS value exceeding 
the SOA range), compared to these two previous studies where no such criterion was 
apparently used (Fecica & Stolz, 2008; West, et al., 2009). Note that, even after excluding 
these “poor performers” in Experiments 3-5 from the subsequent statistical analyses, the 
remaining sample size was still similar to West, et al. (2009), who previously reported a prior 
entry effect for (schematic and realistic) angry faces. Accordingly, an underpowered 
experiment appears unlikely to account for the present null findings. On the contrary, the use 
of this stringent criterion enabled us to ascertain that only participants showing a normal 
sensitivity to the main SOA manipulation (as evidenced by an inverted S-shaped 
psychometric function) were eventually included in the final sample. It is therefore puzzling 
to observe that, for these good performers -- who did not differ in terms of personality traits 
from poor performers --, no differential influence of the emotional content of the faces was 
evidenced during TOJs with these faces, despite the use of increasingly more specific task 
demands between Experiment 4 and 5. 
8.2. Perceptual confounds? 
Fecica & Stolz (2008) and West, et al. (2009) made primarily use of schematic neutral and 
emotional faces in order to explore whether emotional factors might modulate early attention 
allocation, as indicated by prior entry effects for these emotion stimuli during the TOJ task. 
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The use of schematic faces is consistent with earlier studies (e.g., Fox, et al., 2000; Fox, et al., 
2001; Öhman, Lundqvist, et al., 2001) that have already investigated (mainly using visual 
search tasks) the interplay between attention and emotion control systems. While these 
schematic faces provide the added value to potentially control for perceptual differences 
between emotional and neutral expressions, these stimuli clearly lack ecological validity 
(e.g., Horstmann & Bauland, 2006). More importantly, recent research has shown that 
specific low-level features of schematic face stimuli (e.g., the curvature of the mouth) can 
actually bias perception and attention in a bottom-up fashion, without the need to postulate 
any mediation by specific emotion brain mechanisms (Becker, Horstmann, & Remington, 
2011; Mak-Fan, et al., 2011; VanRullen, Reddy, & Koch, 2004; VanRullen, Reddy, & Li, 
2005; Wolfe & Horowitz, 2004). Moreover, schematic faces are thought to exaggerate facial 
features, and the representation of the intended emotion may be equivocal (Horstmann & 
Bauland, 2006). In addition, schematic face stimuli have been shown to produce artificially 
greater behavioral effects (Hietanen & Leppanen, 2003). Accordingly, the existing evidence 
of a prior entry effect for angry faces obtained with schematic faces (i.e., Fecica & Stolz, 
2008, and Experiments 1-4 in West, et al., 2009) requires some careful evaluation and 
interpretation regarding the true emotional nature of this early attention orienting effect. Of 
note, to circumvent these limitations, in Experiments 5-6 West, et al. (2009) confirmed a 
significant prior entry effect for angry faces using realistic photographs of angry and neutral 
faces (selected from the same standardized database as used in this study; Ekman & Friesen, 
1976). In these conditions, an even larger and significant PSS value was found -- indicating a 
systematic early attentional capture towards emotional stimuli -- compared to the one 
obtained with schematic angry faces (Experiments 1-4). However, a careful evaluation of the 
methods section shows that West, et al. (2009) only used four different face identities (two 
men and two women) and thus a limited number of face pairs (between 12 and 16 according 
to our estimation). Presumably, these experimental conditions may have favored the use of a 
strategy based on perceptual, non-emotional cues to carry out the emotion TOJ task. 
Importantly, the degree of similarity between stimuli has been shown to reliably influence 
performance during visual search (Duncan & Humphreys, 1989). In our study, therefore, we 
opted for the use of a larger number of different face identities (four women and six men), as 
well as a large number of face pairs (90 per condition) in order to avoid the (implicit) use of a 
strategy based on specific perceptual cues (e.g., curvature or contrast). The added value of 
this alternative procedure is that the degree of perceptual dissimilarity between the two faces 
of the pair was always uninformative for each and every trial, thus preventing participants to 
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use this information to perform the TOJ task. Note that, in Experiment 4, we also ran 
additional control analyses taking the perceived emotion dissimilarity into account (as a 
covariate in the probit regression model) but still failed to find evidence for a direct 
contribution of the perceived (subjective) perceptual difference between the two faces in the 
pair as potentially accounting for a prior entry for fearful or angry faces. Furthermore, this 
discrepancy between our results and the findings reported by West, et al. (2009) cannot easily 
be explained by different stimulus parameters or task demands because, from Experiment 2 
onwards, we took special care in matching as much as possible the face stimulus size and 
(horizontal) eccentricity with the values reported in West, et al. (2009). We also collected 
additional ratings from the participants in each experiment to make sure that they could 
reliably perceive fearful, angry and neutral faces as such, and the results for these ratings 
(across the five experiments) unambiguously confirmed this conclusion. Accordingly, the 
lack of prior entry for either fearful or angry faces compared to neutral faces cannot easily be 
ascribed to the use of ambiguous or mildly emotional face stimuli. 
8.3. Different experimental procedures? 
Given that we explicitly set up our TOJ task based on previous studies (Fecica & Stolz, 
2008; West, et al., 2009), it appears unlikely that other uncontrolled factors related to the 
procedure or the stimulus set could immediately account for the present null findings. 
Specifically, we included the critical face stimuli in dedicated placeholders located on both 
sides relative to central fixation, which were subsequently masked by a uniform noise pattern 
until response (similarly to West, et al., 2009). This procedure ensured that bottom-up effects 
related to other visual features than the face did not contaminate the performance during the 
TOJ task. Moreover, the use of placeholders provided spatial cues to participants regarding 
the two opposite positions in the visual field where the faces would appear each time, limiting 
drifts of spatial and temporal attention towards non-informative portions of the visual field. 
Furthermore, we used SOAs of 10, 30, and 100 ms, comparable with 17, 34 and 100 ms in 
Fecica & Stolz (2008). In addition, by using two response buttons aligned along a vertical 
axis, we prevented the occurrence of (spatial) stimulus-response compatibility effects 
(Schneider & Bavelier, 2003), particularly in Experiments 1-2 where a left-right temporal 
order judgment was required. 
It is important to note that the failure to observe reliable prior entry effects for emotional 
relative to neutral stimuli was not limited to a specific (negative) emotion category. In fact, 
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we observed no attentional capture, neither for fearful (Experiments 1-5) nor for angry faces 
(Experiments 2-5), despite the fact that several studies, using a variety of experimental 
paradigms, have reported early orientation of attention towards these stimuli (Anderson, et 
al., 2003; Bocanegra & Zeelenberg, 2011a; Frischen, Eastwood, & Smilek, 2008; Phelps, et 
al., 2006; Pourtois, et al., 2004; Pourtois, et al., 2012; Sander, et al., 2007; Whalen, et al., 
2004). Accordingly, it is unlikely that the perceived relevance of the threat displayed in the 
face -- either indirect in the case of fear or more direct in the case of anger -- may have 
contributed to the differential allocation of attention towards these facial stimuli, and thus this 
factor cannot immediately account for the non-significant findings reported here. In addition, 
the results of the offset task (see Experiments 1-3) showed no evidence for a prolonged 
attentional disengagement for either fearful or angry faces compared to neutral faces, which 
could potentially have masked a preferential early orienting of attention towards emotional 
relative to neutral faces in the onset task. 
Finally, changes in task instructions did not have any impact on the size or expression of 
the putative prior entry effect for emotional compared to neutral stimuli. In Experiments 1-2 
participants were required to indicate whether the first face in the pair appeared on the left or 
right side relative to fixation, thereby focusing on spatiotemporal properties of the stimuli 
exclusively. Thus, the emotional content of the faces was not immediately informative and, as 
a consequence, it might be strategically useful to actually filter it out in order to resolve the 
task (Everaert, et al., 2011; Kiefer & Martens, 2010; Pessoa, Kastner, et al., 2002; Pessoa, 
Kastner, & Ungerleider, 2003; Spruyt, et al., 2012; Spruyt, et al., 2009; Spruyt, et al., 2007). 
However, no prior entry for emotional faces was observed when participants were explicitly 
requested to judge whether the emotional or the neutral face appeared first (Experiments 3-4), 
nor when specific emotion labels (i.e., angry or fearful) had to be used to perform the TOJ 
task (Experiment 5). Therefore, the use of task sets in which the processing of specific 
features of the stimuli (i.e., emotional valence) was promoted did not lead to enhanced 
attentional capture for emotional compared to neutral stimuli. 
8.4. PSS as an estimate of prior entry? 
In our study, visual prior entry was assessed, following standard practice, by computing 
the PSS according to the dominant procedure in literature, that is calculating the intercept and 
slope of a linear regression applied on the inverse normalized proportion of responses 
(Keetels & Vroomen, 2005; Nava, Bottari, Zampini, & Pavani, 2008; Perez, et al., 2009; 
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Shore, et al., 2001; Sinnett, et al., 2007; Spence & Parise, 2010; Spence, et al., 2001; Vatakis 
& Spence, 2006; Zampini, et al., 2005). Importantly, we calculated each participant’s 
intercept and slope with estimated random effects, in order to be able to control for the 
correlation of measurements within the same subject. By comparison, Fecica & Stolz (2008) 
did not report the PSS values, making any systematic comparison between their findings and 
our results (for Experiments 1-2) particularly difficult. Likewise, West, et al. (2009) reported 
that their PSS was calculated by “determining the intercept at the 50% point on the regression 
line of each participant’s TOJ function” (see p. 1035). However, based on this definition, it is 
unclear whether these authors initially applied the inverse normalization step described above 
or not. If we assume that they did not, this could potentially account for the difference 
between their earlier findings and our news results. 
8.5. First (apparent) motion, then emotion? 
The results of these five experiments do not support the notion of an automatic capture or 
early orienting of attention towards the location occupied by threat-related stimuli, as 
opposed to neutral ones. This outcome is intriguing, especially for Experiments 3-5 where 
participants were explicitly asked to process the emotional content of the two faces in the 
pair. However, it turned out that they could still perform the task (at least good performers) 
without being influenced (in a bottom-up fashion) by this emotion dimension. We 
hypothesize that these participants perhaps did not show any prior entry effect for negative 
emotional faces because they first relied on a non-emotional feature to perform the TOJ task. 
Presumably, the systematic difference between the two face onsets may have produced the 
compelling impression of apparent motion on the screen, a phenomenon previously described 
in the literature as “illusory line motion” (Goebel, Khorram-Sefat, Muckli, Hacker, & Singer, 
1998; Hikosaka, Miyauchi, & Shimojo, 1993; Schmidt, 2000). It appears plausible to 
consider, given the null findings reported in Experiments 3-5, that participants primarily used 
this motion cue in order to decide, during a second stage (maybe based on post-perceptual 
processes, including short term memory), whether the face stimulus triggering this illusory 
motion (either towards the left or right side) was emotional or not. In other words, as soon as 
the perceptual system “registered” which stimulus appeared first based on this motion cue, a 
second, post-perceptual process was perhaps taking place, enabling participants to decide 
whether this face stimulus had an emotional or neutral content. According to this framework, 
the processing of the emotional content of the face stimuli would not be early and automatic, 
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but it would likely take place at post-perceptual stages of stimulus processing, once (spatial 
and temporal) attention has already been allocated either to the left or right side (as 
determined primarily by the SOA manipulation which created the illusion of apparent motion 
between the two locations). Thus, in this model, early attention orienting is not biased by 
negative emotional (i.e., threat-related) stimuli because a concurrent, more advantageous 
strategy enables participants to resolve the TOJ task using primarily non-emotional, motion-
related perceptual cues. One way to test this prediction at the empirical level would be to 
extensively train participants to actively use the emotion information conveyed by the face 
stimuli (as well as actively ignore any motion-related cue), similarly to previous 
psychophysics studies documenting improvements in TOJ performance with experience 
(Hirsh & Sherrick, 1961) and training-induced improvement (Barsz, 1996; Bernasconi, 
Grivel, Murray, & Spierer, 2010; Merzenich, et al., 1996; Mossbridge, Fitzgerald, O'Connor, 
& Wright, 2006; Nickerson & Freeman, 1974; Warren, 1974). Alternatively, a direct 
disruption of the apparent motion could prevent participants from using (even implicitly) this 
specific cue in order to resolve the TOJ task. For example, this could be achieved by 
including a moving dot pattern in the background (as opposed to a uniform static background 
in the present case). 
More generally, the results of this study challenge the notion that threat-related stimuli 
“automatically” capture attention, and hence lead to a prior entry effect during TOJs when 
competing with neutral stimuli (West, et al., 2009). Instead, our findings suggest that even 
though the emotional content of the faces may be directly task-relevant, as long as other 
perceptual cues (probably motion) can be used by participants to perform the TOJ task, 
emotion does not bias early stages of attention allocation. Further studies are needed to 
establish whether, when controlling for these non-emotional perceptual factors, emotion can 
reliably prioritize the allocation of attention in a reflexive way. 
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Brain Dynamics of Upstream Perceptual 
Processes Leading to Visual Object 
Recognition: A High Density ERP Topographic 
Mapping Study1 
 
Recent studies suggest that visual object recognition is a proactive process through which 
perceptual evidence accumulates over time before a decision can be made about the object. 
However, the exact electrophysiological correlates and time-course of this complex process 
remain unclear. In addition, the potential influence of emotion on this process has not been 
investigated yet. We recorded high density EEG in healthy adult participants performing a 
novel perceptual recognition task. For each trial, an initial blurred visual scene was first 
shown, before the actual content of the stimulus was gradually revealed by progressively 
adding diagnostic high spatial frequency information. Participants were asked to stop this 
stimulus sequence as soon as they could correctly perform an animacy judgment task. 
Behavioral results showed that participants reliably gathered perceptual evidence before 
recognition. Furthermore, prolonged exploration times were observed for pleasant, relative 
to either neutral or unpleasant scenes. ERP results showed distinct effects starting 280 ms 
post-stimulus onset in distant brain regions during stimulus processing, mainly characterized 
by: (i) a monotonic accumulation of evidence, involving regions of the posterior cingulate 
cortex/parahippocampal gyrus, and (ii) categorical recognition effects in a region of the 
                                                 
1
 Schettino, A., Loeys, T., Delplanque, S., & Pourtois, G. (2011). Brain dynamics of upstream perceptual 
processes leading to visual object recognition: A high density ERP topographic mapping study. Neuroimage, 
55(3), 1227-1241. 
3 
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dorsal anterior cingulate cortex. These findings provide evidence for the early involvement, 
following stimulus onset, of non-overlapping brain networks during proactive processes 
eventually leading to visual object recognition. 
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1. Introduction 
Visual object recognition is a fast, accurate and effortless process. Despite swift or 
dramatic variations in the retinal input (i.e. due to modifications in orientation, size, 
appearance, viewpoint, or context), human's ability to readily detect and recognize a 
multitude of visual objects in the environment is hardly challenged (Bar, 2003; Biederman & 
Bar, 1999). Many studies and models have emphasized the sequential property of visual 
computations leading to perceptual decision making, from the analysis of sensory information 
to the selection of the behavioral outcome that best maximizes the expected utility 
(Biederman, 1987; Marr, 1982; Opris & Bruce, 2005). According to the dominant 
framework, the visual system evaluates in a probabilistic fashion the available information 
about various features of the input image, thereby making inferences about its content and 
preparing possible courses of action (Hegdé, 2008). Classical neurophysiological models 
postulate that fundamental visual features of the input image are initially processed in lower-
level cortical areas of the occipital and inferotemporal cortex, after which they are used to 
generate an abstract visual representation of the object. Recognition (and subsequent motor 
execution of the congruent response) is achieved when this representation is successfully 
matched with templates stored in memory (Biederman, 1987; Palmer, 1999; Ranganath & 
Rainer, 2003; Riesenhuber & Poggio, 1999; Ungerleider & Mishkin, 1982). 
The predominant role of bottom-up perceptual processes leading to recognition is clearly 
stressed in these hierarchical models. However, top-down modulatory effects may also 
influence visual object recognition mechanisms. They include selective attention (Blair, et al., 
2009; Treisman & Kanwisher, 1998), task relevance (Egner & Hirsch, 2005), prior 
probability of encounter (Summerfield & Egner, 2009), working memory (Ranganath, et al., 
2004), contextual information (Bar, 2004; Oliva & Torralba, 2007), as well as the monitoring 
of the decision's outcome (Ridderinkhof, et al., 2004; Ullsperger, et al., 2004). Hence, the 
rapid bottom-up processes leading to visual object recognition could be assisted by the online 
activation of abstract information -- stored in higher-level brain regions -- primarily recruited 
to speed up the concurrent ongoing processing in lower-level visual areas, with the aim to 
limit the number of computations necessary to eventually identify an object (Bar, et al., 2006; 
Ganis, et al., 2007). 
Recent theoretical accounts emphasized the role of expectations in visual recognition (Bar, 
2009b; Kersten, et al., 2004; Summerfield & Egner, 2009; Yuille & Kersten, 2006). In these 
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models, it is hypothesized that the active use of prior information about the most probable 
visual percept in the forthcoming sensory environment is at work in order to guide the rapid 
acquisition of diagnostic visual information (i.e., invariant and expected aspects in the 
environment do not need to be processed thoroughly), as well as to facilitate the 
interpretation of ambiguous stimuli. Predictive coding models of visual recognition (Friston, 
2005; Friston & Kiebel, 2009; Grossberg, 2009; Rao & Ballard, 1999; Serences, 2008) argue 
that feed-forward information coming from early visual areas is compared, at each stage of 
the visual processing hierarchy, to top-down expectations whose aim is to predict the 
responses at the next lower level, primarily through recurrent or feedback connections (see 
also Di Lollo, Enns, & Rensink, 2000; Enns & Lleras, 2008). If this comparison results in an 
erroneous output, an error signal is sent back to the higher level via feedforward connections. 
This error signal is then used to correct the estimate of the input signal at each level (Rao & 
Ballard, 1999; Serences, 2008). Expected and observed information are iteratively adjusted 
until the visual system is able to settle on a single perceptual interpretation of the sensory 
input (Summerfield & Egner, 2009). A plausible neural mechanism underlying the triggering 
of this top-down facilitation in object recognition has recently been proposed by Moshe Bar 
(Bar, 2003, 2004, 2007, 2009b). According to this model, a partially analyzed version of the 
input image, mainly composed of low spatial frequency (LSF) information, is projected 
rapidly from early visual cortex directly to orbitofrontal (OFC) and parahippocampal (PHC) 
areas, possibly via a fast dorsal magnocellular route. In the PHC, this blurred image activates 
the most probable (experience-driven) guesses about the context frame that needs to be 
triggered. This contextual information is projected to the infero-temporal cortex, where a set 
of visual associations corresponding to the relevant context is activated. In parallel, the visual 
information conveyed by the same scene -- here the allocation of attention is on the target 
object -- would be sufficient to rapidly activate themost likely interpretations of the input 
image in the OFC. The integration of the representations of the specific context and the 
candidate interpretations of the target object would in turn result in the reliable selection of a 
single identity, which can be further refined with specific detail gradually conveyed by high 
spatial frequency (HSF) information (Bar, 2004). Consistent with this framework, Peyrin, et 
al. (2010) combined fMRI and ERPs to explore the prioritization of LSF in the processing of 
visual input, and found that higher order areas in frontal and temporo-parietal regions 
responded more to LSF stimuli when presented first, whereas occipital visual cortex 
responded more to HSF stimuli when presented after LSF stimuli (Bar, 2003; Bullier, 2001; 
Hegdé, 2008). Hence, the use of different imaging methods confirmed a “coarse-to-fine” 
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processing of visual input (Hegdé, 2008; Lomber, 2002; Navon, 1977; Sanocki, 1993; Schyns 
& Oliva, 1994): the quick processing of LSF in higher order frontal or temporal brain regions 
could directly influence scene recognition by biasing perceptual processes in object-selective 
visual areas. 
Expectations may lower the threshold that needs to be overcome to make a decision in 
favor of one option, similar to what accumulator models of decision making propose (Gold & 
Shadlen, 2007; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008). Such models have proven highly effective in 
describing performance in recognition memory (Ratcliff, 1978), economic decisions (Sanfey, 
et al., 2006), semantic (Ratcliff & McKoon, 1982) and lexical (Ratcliff, et al., 2004) tasks, as 
well as sensory discrimination (Gold & Shadlen, 2007). According to these models, incoming 
information is accumulated over time, evaluated and assigned to a response option: the actual 
decision is made when evidence in favor of one of the two responses exceeds a threshold. 
This framework has been successfully applied in studies on nonhuman primates (Hanes & 
Schall, 1996; Kim & Shadlen, 1999; Shadlen & Newsome, 2001; Tanaka, 1996), eventually 
providing a useful mean to link neurophysiology with behavior. Important hints on the brain 
regions underlying proactive perceptual processes leading to visual object recognition in 
humans have also been obtained more recently, using mainly fMRI and gradual or 
progressive stimulus revelation tasks (Carlson, et al., 2006; Heekeren, et al., 2004; Heekeren, 
et al., 2008; James, et al., 2000; Ploran, et al., 2007; Wheeler, et al., 2008). Among these 
studies, Ploran, et al. (2007) used an elegant procedure enabling a gradual revelation of 
masked stimuli over eight discrete and consecutive steps. Participants had to press a button as 
soon as they could identify the pictures' content with a reasonable degree of confidence. 
Interestingly, Ploran, et al. (2007) found that different brain areas showed distinct effects 
during this progressive revelation task. Three different patterns of brain activation were 
identified. For several posterior occipital regions, activity increased monotonically as a 
function of the amount of visual information entering the visual system (sensory processors). 
By contrast, a gradual increase in activity with a distinctive peak at the time of recognition 
was found in inferior temporal, frontal and parietal regions (including the bilateral fusiform 
gyrus and the DLPFC), consistent with an accumulation of evidence process which may be 
necessary to recognize the identity of the target object (accumulators). Finally, in many 
regions of medial frontal cortex (including the dorsal region of the anterior cingulate cortex, 
dACC, and the anterior insula), activity remained close to baseline until the moment of actual 
recognition, suggesting their involvement in decision-related processes that accompany overt 
visual object recognition. These latter fMRI results are important, as they inform about 
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upstream brain mechanisms leading to visual object recognition and their different functions, 
with non-overlapping areas involved in accumulation of evidence vs. moment of recognition 
(Ploran, et al., 2007). However, since these results were obtained using fMRI techniques, the 
electrophysiological correlates and actual time-course of these upstream perceptual or 
decision-related effects during visual object recognition remain unclear. 
The goal of this study was to use a novel stimulus revelation task and explore, using high 
density EEG in healthy adult participants, the precise electrophysiological correlates of 
upstream processes leading to visual object recognition. More specifically, we sought to 
investigate whether different ERP response profiles could be evidenced, consistent with the 
assumption of accumulation of evidence prior to visual object recognition subserved by 
posterior occipital or temporal brain regions, in comparison with medial frontal areas which 
might show categorical moment-of-recognition effects (see Ploran, et al., 2007). For this 
purpose, we designed a new task enabling a progressive revelation of the stimulus content, 
while neural events prior to actual recognition were investigated on a trial-by-trial basis using 
the millisecond time resolution provided by EEG. Based on the psychological models and 
neuroscience evidence reviewed above, we hypothesized that upstream perceptual effects 
leading to visual object recognition could be twofold (Gold & Shadlen, 2007; Ratcliff & 
McKoon, 2008). First, we surmised ERP effects reflecting the accumulation of perceptual 
evidence over time, with the main neural generators being localized in posterior brain 
regions, including the occipital and temporal cortices (Ploran, et al., 2007). Consistent with 
this view, a linear relationship between the electrophysiological signal and the amount of 
visual input was expected. In contrast, we predicted that medial frontal brain regions (e.g. 
dorsal ACC, see Ploran, et al., 2007) might also provide an important mechanism at stake 
during visual object recognition, showing moment-of-recognition effects characterized by a 
non-linear and abrupt change in the amplitude of the ERP signal occurring close to actual 
recognition. As a secondary question, we also investigated whether the emotional content of 
the stimulus/scene might influence these upstream perceptual processes leading to 
recognition, consistent with previous imaging studies showing reciprocal interaction effects 
between regions involved in the processing of emotions (including the amygdala) and more 
posterior regions implicated in visual object recognition (Sabatinelli, et al., 2009; 
Vuilleumier, 2005). Hence, we presented participants with standard neutral and emotional 
scenes (whose content was progressively revealed) and tested for a differential neural effect 
likely triggered by the emotional content prior to actual recognition. Whereas previous 
studies have found reliable modulation of early and late ERP components following stimulus 
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onset as a function of the emotional content of the stimulus (either for valence or arousal 
dimensions; see Carretié, Hinojosa, Martin-Loeches, Mercado, & Tapia, 2004; D'Hondt, et 
al., 2010; Delplanque, Lavoie, Hot, Silvert, & Sequeira, 2004; Olofsson, Nordin, Sequeira, & 
Polich, 2008; Schupp, et al., 2000; Schupp, Junghöfer, Weike, & Hamm, 2003a, 2003b), to 
our knowledge, no ERP study has systematically explored whether upstream or anticipatory 
perceptual effects during visual object recognition may be influenced by the rapid decoding 
of the emotional content of the input stimulus, likely based on the selective processing of 
low-spatial frequency/impoverished visual cues. Accordingly, the goal of our study was also 
to verify whether the rapid processing of the emotional content of the scene (presumably 
based on LSF cues; see Bar, 2003, 2004; Pourtois, Dan, et al., 2005; Vuilleumier, Armony, 
Driver, & Dolan, 2003) could alter upstream brain processes underlying proactive 
mechanisms of visual object recognition. 
2. Methods 
2.1. Participants 
Nineteen psychology students (14 women, mean age 21 years, range 17-33) were recruited 
to freely participate in the study, which was approved by the local university ethical 
committee. All participants were native Dutch speaking, right-handed, had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision, with no history of neurological or psychiatric disorders. All 
volunteers gave informed written consent prior to their participation, and were paid 20€. 
2.2. Stimuli 
Two hundred and thirty-four pictures were selected from the International Affective 
Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2005), a standardized database containing 
emotionally-evocative pictures that depict objects and scenes across a wide range of 
categories and situations. The IAPS manual provides normative values for the basic 
dimensions of emotion -- including arousal and valence -- as rated by the Self-Assessment 
Manikin (SAM) on a scale from1 to 9 (Bradley & Lang, 1994). Since there are gender 
differences in both valence and arousal ratings, we selected two sets of pictures in order to 
balance the arousal levels of the emotional pictures across male vs. female participants. Each 
set consisted of 138 pictures. Among these, 42 were shared between male and female 
participants. The pictures were divided into three emotion categories, according to their pre-
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defined valence scores: neutral, unpleasant and pleasant (see Table 1). For each category 
(N=46), half of the pictures contained living objects (i.e., human beings or animals) while the 
other half did not (i.e., landscapes or artifacts)2. 
 
Table 1. Mean values and standard deviations (in parenthesis) of valence and arousal scores 
of the selected IAPS pictures. 
Picture set Valence Arousal 
Men 
Neutral 5.12 (1.29) 3.90 (1.88) 
Unpleasant 3.12 (1.62) 4.93 (2.14) 
Pleasant 7.31 (1.57) 5.27 (2.30) 
Women 
Neutral 4.96 (1.30) 3.34 (1.96) 
Unpleasant 2.75 (1.62) 5.27 (2.19) 
Pleasant 7.31 (1.60) 4.92 (2.37) 
Note. Scores range from 1 to 9. Independent samples t-test confirmed no significant difference between 
women’s and men’s picture sets, both for valence [t(274) = -0.31, p = .760] and arousal [t(274) = -1.18, p = 
.238] scores. In addition, no difference was found between pictures containing living [valence: t(136) = 0.10, p 
= .920; arousal: t(136) = -0.71, p = .478] and non-living [valence: t(136) = -0.54, p = .590; arousal: t(136) = -
1.01, p = .315] objects. 
 
We explicitly selected pictures that were neither highly pleasant (i.e., erotic scenes) nor 
highly unpleasant (i.e., mutilations), because such pictures could lead to specific emotion 
                                                 
2
 IAPS image codes. WOMEN PICTURE SET: practice (living) 2220, 2635, 4631, 4651, 4669; practice (non-
living) 7002, 7009, 7161, 7590, 7820; neutral (living) 1616, 2190, 2191, 2381, 2383, 2385, 2393, 2480, 2495, 
2570, 2595, 2749, 2840, 2890, 4250, 4255, 4310, 9070, 3550.2, 6570.2, 2516, 2702, 8192; neutral (non-living) 
6150, 7006, 7010, 7020, 7031, 7035, 7036, 7041, 7050, 7130, 7160, 7175, 7179, 7185, 7187, 7217, 7233, 7235, 
7830, 7950, 7025, 7500, 7705; negative (living) 1052, 1201, 1525, 1932, 2276, 2490, 2694, 2715, 2753, 3181, 
3300, 4621, 6311, 9041, 9046, 9331, 9404, 9417, 2055.1, 2900.1, 1274, 9160, 9592; negative (non-living) 2692, 
5971, 6020, 6230, 6241, 6610, 6800, 9000, 9280, 9320, 9340, 9373, 9470, 9471, 9495, 9611, 9620, 9622, 9630, 
9830, 9001, 9290, 9621; positive (living) 1604, 1610, 1721, 2209, 2345, 4510, 4538, 4572, 4626, 4640, 4660, 
5621, 8034, 8041, 8080, 8200, 8370, 8470, 8490, 8496, 1740, 4531, 8330; positive (non-living) 2791, 5220, 
5450, 5480, 5551, 5594, 5600, 5779, 5780, 5891, 5982, 5994, 7200, 7280, 7350, 7470, 7480, 7545, 7580, 8510, 
5300, 7390, 8502. MEN PICTURE SET: practice (living) 1112, 2210, 2214, 2393, 3210; practice (non-living) 
7030, 7035, 7050, 7185, 7235; neutral (living) 1101, 1230, 1390, 1935, 1945, 2005, 2220, 2441, 2487, 2514, 
2516, 2690, 2749, 2830, 2870, 4503, 4520, 4532, 9700, 2745.1, 1310, 1321, 2635; neutral (non-living) 5390, 
5731, 6150, 6800, 7009, 7010, 7020, 7036, 7038, 7041, 7090, 7160, 7161, 7179, 7184, 7186, 7207, 7211, 7233, 
7283, 7002, 7100, 7285; negative (living) 2053, 2095, 2141, 2710, 2750, 3181, 6243, 6311, 6312, 6315, 6510, 
6530, 6821, 6838, 7380, 9250, 9500, 2352.2, 3550.1, 6570.1, 2683, 2900, 9180; negative (non-living) 6260, 
6300, 9000, 9008, 9010, 9090, 9280, 9290, 9301, 9320, 9340, 9470, 9471, 9600, 9611, 9620, 9630, 9830, 9911, 
9912, 9001, 9360, 9621; positive (living) 1463, 1811, 1999, 2057, 2208, 2209, 2216, 4001, 4599, 4641, 4653, 
4656, 4676, 4681, 4689, 4810, 8116, 8120, 8200, 8496, 1460, 2340, 8470; positive (non-living) 5260, 5270, 
5480, 5594, 5600, 5660, 5700, 5760, 5780, 5910, 5982, 7200, 7230, 7270, 7330, 7480, 7580, 8170, 8502, 8510, 
7260, 7350, 7470. 
BRAIN DYNAMICS OF UPSTREAM PROCESSES LEADING TO RECOGNITION
reactions which may be different between male and female participants (Lithari, et al., 2010; 
Proverbio, Adorni, Zani, & Trestianu, 2009; Sabatinelli, Flaisch, Bradley, Fitzsimmons, & 
Lang, 2004). We also selected ten additional neutral pictures that were used during the 
practice session (see footnote) and were not included in the subsequent statistical analyses. 
Furthermore, 18 pictures were scrambled and their content made meaningless. These 
scrambled pictures were eventually used as “catch” trials to ensure that particip
attended to the content of the pictures before taking a decision.
The pre-selected original IAPS pictures (1024×768 pixels, corresponding to 20°×15° of 
visual angle at a distance of 75 cm) were first converted to grayscale. Each picture was 
bandpass-filtered (using ImageJ v1.44 software; http://rsb.info.nih.gov/ij/) according to the 
spatial frequency bands put forward by Delplanque, N'diaye, Scherer, & Grandjean (2007) 
(see Table 2). This procedure resulted in six different levels of fil
picture. Each of these levels reliably differed from one another depending on the actual 
content of low and high spatial frequency information (see Fig. 1A).
Table 2. The six frequency bands used to filter the IAPS images selecte
Image Level 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Note. HSF: high spatial frequencies; LSF: low spatial frequencies.
2.3. Procedure 
Participants were tested individually in a small, dimly lit room, and seated at 75 cm in 
front of a 19″ CRT computer screen (refresh rate 100 Hz). They were first asked to complete 
a practice/familiarization block containing 10 trials. Then, they started t
session, which was divided into four blocks (separated by a one
containing 67-68 trials. Each trial had the same underlying structure (see Fig. 1A). It began 
with a fixation cross displayed for 250 ms in the center of th
 
tering for each and every 
 
 
d in our study.
Frequency Band 
(pixels/cycle) 
256-512  
128-512  
64-512  
32-512  
16-512  
0-512  
 
-minute pause), each 
e screen. Then the first (blurred) 
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then 
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image level of a given picture was presented for 500 ms, followed by a 250 ms blank screen. 
Next, the second image level of the same picture (containing more HSF information) was 
immediately presented for 500 ms, plus 250 ms blank screen, and the same procedure was 
repeated until the presentation of the sixth image level (i.e., intact/unfiltered picture). Hence, 
this procedure resulted in a progressive and predictive revelation of the image content by 
adding, in a stepwise fashion, high spatial frequency information to an initial blurred and 
meaningless picture. The inter-trial interval (ITI)was set at 1000 ms. Participants were 
instructed to provide two consecutive responses. First, they were asked to press the spacebar 
key (on a standard AZERTY keyboard) with their dominant right hand as soon as they felt 
they could decide, with sufficient confidence, whether the scene contained a living object or 
not (Response1). Pressing the spacebar key immediately interrupted the presentation of the 
stimuli. 500 ms after pressing the spacebar, participants were required to validate their choice 
and to perform a two-alternative forced choice task. They were asked to press the “L” key of 
the keyboard if the scene contained a living object, or alternatively the “N” key if it did not 
contain any living object (Response2). This dual registration procedure enabled us to timely 
separate early recognition effects (Response1) from the overt discrimination of the scene 
(Response2). Importantly, the actual discrimination (Response2) was required to distinguish 
correct from incorrect early key presses (when looking retrospectively at ERP data recorded 
around the onset of Response1; see below). Hence, ERP analyses were primarily focused on 
neural events taking place prior to Response1, when the actual visual discriminations (based 
on Response2) turned out to be accurate and errors were removed from the analyses. Because 
Response1 always required a simple key press, this procedure minimized the potential 
contamination of ERP data by the activation of competing responses (living vs. non-living). 
Participants were instructed to find a good balance between high accuracy and the execution 
of speeded responses. Note that they were not encouraged to respond before the presentation 
of the last/sixth (unfiltered) picture. For catch trials (i.e., scrambled pictures), a non-living 
response (Response2) was expected. 
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Fig. 1. (A) Example of stimuli, and progressive unfolding task. Neutral, unpleasant and pleasant IAPS scenes 
(not shown here for copyright reasons) were presented to participants in random order. For each trial, the 
content of the scene was progressively revealed in six successive steps by adding high spatial frequency 
information to the initial blurred (meaningless) picture. Each image level was presented for 500 ms, followed by 
a 250 ms blank screen. Participants were required to press the spacebar key as soon as they could decide 
whether the scene contained a living object or not, thereby interrupting the sequence (Response1). Next, they 
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validated their response choice by pressing one out of two predefined response keys (Response2). (B) 
Cumulative percentages of correct Response1 as a function of the six image levels, separately for each emotion 
category. Vertical bars correspond to standard errors of the means. The results showed that participants were 
able to make the animacy judgment task reliably earlier (i.e., less perceptual evidence needed) for neutral (solid 
line), relative to unpleasant (dotted line) or pleasant (dashed line) scenes. The shift of the psychometric function 
for unpleasant compared to pleasant scenes was also significant (see behavioral results). 
 
Since we were primarily interested in ERP effects which might foreshadow the actual 
detection and recognition of a scene, we had, as a prerequisite, to include enough trials per 
condition (neutral, unpleasant and pleasant) to be able to eventually compute reliable ERP 
waveforms per condition and for each image level separately. However, we only had a 
limited set of pictures which were balanced with regard to the living vs. non-living attribute. 
For this reason, unbeknown to participants, each picture was presented twice during the 
experimental session. There was a random and unpredictable time lag (i.e., 4-15 intervening 
images, M = 10, SD = 3) between first presentations and repetitions. As expected, behavioral 
results showed significant earlier scene recognition for repetitions, relative to first 
presentations, and this priming effect was the same for neutral, pleasant and unpleasant 
scenes (all ps < .05). However, separate analyses of the ERP data for these two conditions 
(first presentations vs. repetitions) did not reveal any significant difference. Accordingly, they 
were collapsed in the statistical analyses to increase the signal-to-noise ratio. 
Stimulus presentation and behavioral response recordings were controlled using E-Prime 
software (V2.0.; http://www.pstnet.com/products/e-prime/). 
2.4. Questionnaires 
At the end of the experimental session, participants were asked to fill out three different 
questionnaires, in order to assess whether specific affective or personality traits might be 
related to task performance and/or our ERP effects. Trait anxiety levels were measured by 
means of the Dutch version of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, trait characteristics (Van der 
Ploeg, et al., 1979). Participants also completed a recent Dutch version of the Need For 
Closure Scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2007), which gave an estimate of the participant's tendency 
or need to obtain any answer, as opposed to tolerating ambiguity. Finally, we also 
administered the Need For Affect Scale (Maio & Esses, 2001) in order to obtain an 
independent measure of the general motivation of participants to either approach or avoid 
situations that are emotion-inducing. However, we found no significant correlation between 
the scores obtained for each of the three questionnaires and either the behavioral or ERP 
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results obtained during this progressive stimulus revelation task, presumably because of the 
low standard deviation of the scores obtained for each questionnaire (see Table 3). 
 
Table 3. Mean values and standard deviations (in parenthesis) of the scores obtained for each 
questionnaire (and relative subscales) administered at the end of the experiment. 
Questionnaire Score 
STAI-T 35.58 (8.73) 
NFCS 3.57 (0.60) 
Order 3.83 (0.83) 
Predictability 3.51 (1.07) 
Decisiveness 3.56 (0.60) 
Ambiguity 3.75 (0.80) 
Closedmindedness 3.12 (0.50) 
NFAS 3.71 (0.55) 
Approach 4.27 (0.77) 
Avoidance 3.15 (1.28) 
Note. STAI-T: State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, trait version; NFCS: Need for Closure Scale; NFAS: Need for 
Affect Scale. STAI-T scores range from 20 to 80; NFCS and NFAS use a Likert scale of 6 and 7 points, 
respectively. 
2.5. EEG data acquisition and pre-processing 
Electroencephalographic (EEG) activity was continuously recorded using a BIOSEMI 
Active-Two system (BioSemi, Inc., Netherlands; http://www.biosemi.com) by means of 128 
active electrodes fitted into a stretching cap and following the BioSemi ABCD positioning 
system (i.e., electrode positions are radially equidistant from CZ; 
http://www.biosemi.com/headcap.htm). Two electrodes, the common mode sense (CMS) 
active electrode and the driven right leg (DRL) passive electrode, were used as reference and 
ground electrodes, respectively (http://www.biosemi/faq/cms_and_drl.htm). Vertical electro-
oculograms (EOG) were monitored using two additional electrodes placed in the inferior and 
superior areas of the left orbit. EEG and EOG recordings were sampled at 512 Hz. 
ERPs of interest were computed offline using Brain Vision Analyzer 2.0 (Brain 
Products™  GmbH, Munich, Germany; http://www.brainproducts. 
com/analyzer2_release.php). First, a common average reference was applied. Next, 
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−100/+750 ms epochs were created around the onset of the visual stimulus. Afterwards, all 
the segments were baseline corrected using the pre-stimulus interval (100 ms), before ocular 
correction was performed (Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1983). Artifact rejection was then 
carried out (mean amplitude of ±76.32 µV scale across participants) to eliminate segments 
contaminated by artifacts such as residual blinks or muscle activity. Approximately one-third 
of the data (27.9%) were discarded using these strict criteria. Finally, averaging of the 
segments was performed, separately for each condition, and a 1-30 Hz bandpass filter was 
applied to the individual averaged data. Since we were primarily interested in neural 
processes occurring before the actual recognition of the scene, we used the time of detection 
(Response1) as the initial reference point in our analyses, and looked at stimulus-locked ERP 
effects backwards. Only recognitions (Response1) which turned out to be accurate (based on 
Response2) were included in our ERP analyses (see behavioral results below). Following this 
procedure, four different epochs were computed for each individual scene: (1) −100/+750 ms 
around the onset of the stimulus that was recognized during this specific time window 
(“Recognition”); (2) −100/+750 ms around the onset of the stimulus which immediately 
preceded recognition (“One image before” recognition); (3) −100/+750 ms around the onset 
of the stimulus appearing two images before recognition (“Two images before” recognition); 
(4) −100/+750 ms around the onset of the stimulus appearing three images before recognition 
(“Three images before” recognition). Epochs of 750 ms following stimulus were used 
because they encompassed the duration of the stimulus itself (500 ms), as well as the 
subsequent 250 ms interval. Using this procedure, we could thus look at stimulus-locked ERP 
effects for image levels that preceded actual recognition, with a gradual distance relative to 
this event (up to three images before recognition). Note that this specific data analysis 
allowed us to look at brain processes consistently foreshadowing visual object recognition, 
bearing in mind that, across trials, the actual decision could be based on different 
accumulations of perceptual evidence (i.e., the proportion of correct Responses1 turned out to 
be the largest at image levels three, four and five; see behavioral results below). Furthermore, 
we computed different ERP waveforms as a function of the emotional valence of the scenes. 
As a result, 12 individual averages were computed for each participant : (1) Neutral, 
Recognition (number of segments after pre-processing: M = 50, SD = 9); (2) Neutral, One 
image before (M = 58, SD = 9); (3) Neutral, Two images before (M = 58, SD = 8); (4) 
Neutral, Three images before (M = 43, SD = 9); (5) Unpleasant, Recognition (M = 44, SD = 
8); (6) Unpleasant, One image before (M = 52, SD = 7); (7) Unpleasant, Two images before 
(M = 49, SD = 7); (8) Unpleasant, Three images before (M = 37, SD = 10); (9) Pleasant, 
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Recognition (M = 47, SD = 10); (10) Pleasant, One image before (M = 56, SD = 10); (11) 
Pleasant, Two images before (M = 52, SD = 9); (12) Pleasant, Three images before (M = 47, 
SD = 10). 
2.6. Analysis of behavioral data 
Accuracy was expressed as percentage of correct responses. Since these image levels were 
not independent of each other (each image relies on the visual information conveyed by 
previous levels), cumulative percentages were calculated. Using this procedure, we obtained 
a psychometric curve showing the evolution of the recognition accuracy across the six image 
levels for each condition separately. Repeated measures analyses of variance (ANOVAs) 
with two factors (emotion: three levels; image level: six levels) and post-hoc t-tests were first 
employed to assess differences in recognition accuracy between conditions. The level of 
significance for all the analyses was set at p < .05. In addition, to verify whether the 
psychometric curve was shifted as a function of the emotional content of the scene (pleasant, 
neutral or unpleasant), we also used a proportional odds model (Agresti, 2007), a regression 
model for ordinal dependent variables (recognition from image level 1, …, recognition from 
image level 6). This data analysis allows to model the cumulative probability up to and 
including recognition from image level k (k = 1, ?, 5). The derived odds ratio expresses how 
much the odds of recognition from image level k or earlier is increased (if larger than 1) or 
decreased (if smaller than 1) across different emotional contents, and thus provides a single 
number capturing the shift in psychometric curve. To account for dependencies of trials 
within the same subject, a multi-level version of the proportional odds model was used here. 
2.7. Analysis of ERP data 
In this study, reference-free topographic analyses were carried out to objectively 
characterize differences between conditions and image levels. The basic principles of this 
method have been described extensively elsewhere (see Lehmann & Skrandies, 1980; 
Michel, et al., 1999; Michel, et al., 2001; Murray, et al., 2008; Pourtois, et al., 2008). The 
added value of this method, relative to a more traditional ERP peak analysis (see Picton, et 
al., 2000), is that it enables to reveal global differences between experimental conditions 
without a priori selecting a few channels or time frames. All channels and time frames are 
used concurrently in the analysis. Topographic analyses were performed using CARTOOL 
software (version 3.43; http://brainmapping.unige.ch/Cartool.htm). For each participant 
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separately, we first interpolated noisy channels using a spherical splines transformation 
(Perrin, Pernier, Bertrand, & Echallier, 1989). Then, the dominant topographic scalp maps 
were identified in the grand average ERP data (Recognition, One image before, Two images 
before and Three images before) over a wide time window spanning from 0 to 600 ms after 
stimulus presentation. To this end, a specific spatiotemporal clustering algorithm, the 
“Atomize and Agglomerate Hierarchical Clustering” (AAHC; for a detailed description, see 
Murray, et al., 2008), was used. This clustering method was developed on purpose to reduce 
complex EEG/ERP data sets. Following standard practice, the optimal number of dominant 
maps “explaining” the dataset was based on a cross-validation criterion (Pascual-Marqui, 
Michel, & Lehmann, 1995). The dominant scalp topographies (identified in the group-
averaged data) were then fitted to the ERPs of each individual subject using spatial fitting 
procedures, to determine their representation across subjects and conditions. This procedure 
provided fine-grained quantitative values, such as the duration of a specific topographic map 
or its global explained variance (GEV, or goodness of fit), which are critical indices of the 
significance of a given topography, not available otherwise in a classical component analysis 
(Picton, et al., 2000). GEV represents the sum of the explained variance weighted by the GFP 
(Global Field Power) at each moment in time. GEV was entered in repeated measures 
analyses of variance (ANOVAs) with image level and emotional content as within-subject 
factors. Paired t-tests (and a conservative Bonferroni correction) were used as post-hoc 
comparisons between conditions. When appropriate, degrees of freedom were corrected using 
Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity. As for the statistical analysis of the behavioral 
data, the level of significance for all these analyses was set at p < .05. 
2.8. Source localization analysis 
To estimate the likely neural sources underlying the electrical field configurations 
identified by the previous analysis, we used a specific distributed linear inverse solution, 
namely standardized low-resolution brain electromagnetic tomography (sLORETA; Pascual-
Marqui, 2002). Mathematical validation of this distributed source localization technique has 
been recently demonstrated (Sekihara, Sahani, & Nagarajan, 2005). The head model for the 
inverse solution uses the electric potential lead field computed with a boundary element 
method applied to the MNI152 template (Fuchs, Kastner, Wagner, Hawes, & Ebersole, 
2002). Scalp electrode coordinates on the MNI brain are derived from the international 5% 
system (Jurcak, Tsuzuki, & Dan, 2007). The source locations were therefore given as (x, y, z) 
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coordinates (x from left to right; y from posterior to anterior; z from inferior to superior). The 
calculation of all reconstruction parameters was based on the computed common average 
reference. sLORETA units were scaled to amperes per square meter (A/m2). Direct statistical 
comparisons between conditions were performed in this inverse solution space using paired t-
test. The level of significance for all the analyses was set at p < .05. 
3. Results 
3.1. Accuracy 
Participants were accurate in this task; mean error rate was 12.84% (SD = 5.02). A 3 
(emotion)×6 (image level) repeated measures ANOVA revealed a highly significant main 
effect of image level [F(5, 108) = 36.09, p < .001, ηp2 = .626]. However, there was no 
evidence of either a significant main effect of emotion [F(2, 36) = 0.24, p = .683, ηp2 = .013] 
or an emotion x image level interaction [F(10, 180) = 1.33, p = .271, ηp2 = .069]. Post-hoc 
comparisons showed a significantly higher percentage of errors during the presentation of 
Image4 compared to the other image levels (all ps < .001), because the majority of responses 
actually occurred during the presentation of this image level (see below). No significant 
difference was found between errors during Image1 and Image2 (p > .05). Furthermore, the 
percentage of errors was similar for Image1, Image2 and Image6 (all ps > .05). In addition, 
very few errors were committed with catch trials (Image1: M = .00, SD = .00; Image2: M = 
.00, SD = .00; Image3: M = .44, SD = 1.91; Image4: M = 2.90, SD = 12.62; Image5: M = 
5.70, SD = 15.73; Image6: M = 1.05, SD = 4.59), confirming that participants reliably 
processed the content of the scene before making a response (living vs. non-living object). 
Cumulative percentages of correct responses (i.e., Response1 only when Response2 was 
correct; see Methods) are presented in Table 4. A 3 (emotion) x 6 (image level) repeated 
measures ANOVA performed on these values showed a significant main effect of emotion 
[F(2, 36) = 39.62, p < .001, ηp2 = .688], a significant main effect of image level [F(5, 90) = 
637.37, p < .001, ηp2 = .973] and a significant emotion x image level interaction [F(10, 180) = 
21.80, p < .001, ηp2 = .548]. Post-hoc comparisons confirmed a progressive (although non-
linear) gain in recognition from Image1 to Image6 (all ps > .05, with the exception of Image1 
vs. Image2 for pleasant stimuli, p < .05), as shown by an S-shaped psychometric function 
(see Fig. 1B). Hence, image levels three, four and five presumably provided sufficient 
diagnostic low and high spatial frequency information to perform the animacy judgment task 
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with high accuracy. More generally, this S-shaped psychometric function confirmed that our 
progressive stimulus revelation task was successful, since participants did not respond 
randomly to the different filtered stimuli across trials but, instead, they consistently waited at 
least until Image3 before interrupting the stimulus sequence. Importantly, the analysis of the 
cumulative percentage of accuracy of catch trials revealed a similar outcome. A univariate 
ANOVA disclosed a significant main effect of image level [F(5, 108) = 152.88, p < .001, ηp2 
= .876]. 
 
Table 4. Mean values and standard deviations (in parenthesis) of cumulative percentages of 
correct responses, separately for each image level and emotional valence. 
Image Level Neutral Unpleasant Pleasant 
1 0.07 (0.29) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
2 3.53 (4.61) 2.74 (4.58) 1.06 (2.79) 
3 34.96 (15.32) 31.70 (16.85) 22.67 (16.41) 
4 79.71 (15.23) 71.98 (16.74) 66.66 (15.94) 
5 94.65 (7.02) 92.95 (7.23) 92.28 (4.95) 
6 100.00 (0.00) 100.00 (0.00) 100.00 (0.00) 
 
Post-hoc comparisons confirmed a progressive gain in recognition at each image level (all 
ps < .001, except Image1 vs. Image2, p > .05), lending additional support to the assumption 
that image levels three, four and five contained sufficient diagnostic spatial frequency 
information to perform the task with high accuracy. Altogether, these results are consistent 
with the assumption of non-linear accumulation of evidence prior to recognition (Biederman, 
1987; Gold & Shadlen, 2007; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008; Smith & Ratcliff, 2004). 
Next, we assessed whether the emotional content of the scene may have had an influence 
on the actual recognition of these scenes. To this end, a mixed proportional odds model with 
emotion as fixed factor (neutral, unpleasant or pleasant), and subject as random effect was 
carried out (see Table 5). Interestingly, this analysis suggested a highly significant main 
effect of emotion (p < .001). Pairwise comparisons revealed a shift of the distribution as a 
function of the emotional content of the scene, indicated by reliably earlier animacy 
judgments when the picture contained a neutral, as opposed to either an unpleasant (p < .001) 
or pleasant (p < .001) content (Fig. 1B). The psychometric function was also shifted leftwards 
(i.e., earlier recognition) for unpleasant relative to pleasant scenes (p < .001). Hence, these 
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results showed that pleasant scenes were recognized significantly later than either unpleasant 
or neutral scenes. 
 
Table 5. Results of the mixed proportional odds model (behavioral results). 
Comparison Odds Ratio (95% CI) p-value 
Neutral vs. Unpleasant 1.41 (1.21, 1.63) < .001 
Neutral vs. Pleasant 2.01 (1.74, 2.33) < .001 
Unpleasant vs. Pleasant 1.43 (1.23, 1.66) < .001 
Note. An odds ratio larger than 1 (smaller than 1, respectively) implies that the probability of recognition at 
earlier level is higher (smaller, respectively) for the first versus the second condition in the comparison. 
3.2. Reaction times 
Finally, we calculated the mean reaction times (RTs) for the correct responses at each 
image level separately (Image1: M = .00 ms, SD = .00; Image2: M = 133.21 ms, SD = 217.89; 
Image3: M = 476.43 ms, SD = 104.22; Image4: M = 362.00 ms, SD = 54.59; Image5: M = 
288.32 ms, SD = 40.29; Image6: M = 194.18 ms, SD = 105.94) and compared RTs at Image3, 
Image4 and Image5, for which the majority of behavioral responses were recorded. Pairwise 
comparisons revealed significant differences between Image3 and Image4 [t(18) = 4.72, p < 
.001], Image3 and Image5 [t(18) = 6.98, p < .001] and Image4 and Image5 [t(18) = 5.58, p < 
.001], each time indicated by faster decisions for images levels containing more high spatial 
frequency information than levels providing more degraded visual information. 
3.3. ERP results 
Following standard practice, a spatiotemporal cluster analysis was applied on the four 
main ERP conditions (Recognition, One image before, Two images before and Three images 
before) during a broad temporal window following stimulus onset (0-600 ms post-stimulus). 
This analysis revealed that five distinct dominant field topographies explained 91.37% of the 
total variance (see Figs. 2A and B). The two first dominant maps were common to all four 
conditions, with reliable topographic changes between conditions starting at 280 ms post-
stimulus onset. The first dominant map found in the spatial cluster analysis had a prolonged 
duration (0-216 ms post-stimulus onset) and shared several electrophysiological properties 
with the visual N1 component (Fig. 2C) (Vogel & Luck, 2000). The fact that this ERP 
component, which is usually phasic, showed here a sustained effect may be explained by our 
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specific task parameters, in which degraded stimuli are presented and a progressive 
accumulation of visual information is needed over a prolonged period of time. This N1 scalp 
map was next replaced by a visual P2 component (Carretié, et al., 2004; Crowley & Colrain, 
2004; Freunberger, Klimesch, Doppelmayr, & Holler, 2007; Luck & Hillyard, 1994) which, 
like the preceding N1 scalp map, was shared across the four image levels (Fig. 2C). The 
spatiotemporal cluster analysis disclosed that the P2 scalp map had the highest variance 
during the 216-280 ms time interval post-stimulus onset. Most likely, these two early neural 
activities reflected the encoding and low-level visual discrimination of the stimulus. 
Following the offset of the P2 scalp map (280 ms post-stimulus onset), the cluster analysis 
unambiguously revealed reliable topographic changes across the four image levels, which are 
necessarily indicative of changes in the configuration of the underlying intracranial 
generators (Lehmann & Skrandies, 1980; Michel, et al., 1999; Murray, et al., 2008). Whereas 
another broad occipito-parietal activity was generated following the P2 for image levels one, 
two and three before recognition, a distinctive occipital negative component (with a 
concurrent positive, frontal counterpart) was generated during the same latency for the image 
level corresponding to actual recognition (Fig. 2C). Interestingly, this differential scalp 
topography was actually generated during the time period (280-360 ms post-stimulus, 
Recognition level) in which the first decision (Response1) was most likely made by the 
participant. However, since RTs were variable or jittered across trials and participants, as 
well as differed as a function of image level (see behavioral results above), it is unlikely that 
this distinctive scalp map was somehow related only to the preparation or execution of a 
motor response. 
The next step was to verify whether the topographic changes observed across conditions 
280 ms after stimulus onset were reliable. Accordingly, these dominant maps were fitted back 
to the individual ERP data (by using a spatial fitting procedure, as described above) to 
estimate their representation across time and conditions. For this purpose, three different time 
intervals were defined based on the outcome of the spatiotemporal cluster analysis, each 
lasting 80ms: a first interval around the peak (as defined using the GFP) of the visual N1 
map, a second one corresponding to the occipital P2 map, and a third one immediately 
following the P2 map, where topographic differences were found by the preceding cluster 
analysis. 
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Fig. 2. (A) Grand-average (N = 19) ERP waveforms (obtained for the image level corresponding to actual 
recognition) for the 128 electrodes (butterfly). The red dashed vertical line indicates the onset of the visual 
stimulus. Clear exogenous N1 and P2 ERP components were recorded after stimulus onset. (B) Results of the 
spatiotemporal cluster analysis (from stimulus onset until 600 ms after stimulus onset) for the four main 
conditions (Recognition, One image before, Two images before, and Three images before recognition). A main 
solution with five dominant topographic maps was found to explain > 90% of the variance. Scalp topographies 
of the N1 and P2 were shared across the four conditions, suggesting a similar low-level encoding and processing 
of the visual stimulus. By contrast, starting at 280 ms after stimulus onset, reliable topographic alterations were 
found between the four image levels. Whereas a broad occipito-parietal activity was generated following the P2 
for all the image levels preceding recognition (in red), a distinctive occipital negative component (with a 
concurrent positive, frontal counterpart) was generated at the same latency for the image level corresponding to 
actual recognition (in green). (C) Horizontal, frontal and occipital views of the five dominant maps (including 
the N1 and P2) found in the spatial cluster analysis. Amplitude differences were normalized (i.e., the amplitude 
value at each electrode was divided by the GFP). 
 
For the visual N1 map (136-216ms post-stimulus onset), a univariate ANOVA performed 
on the GEV values failed to reveal any significant difference between the four image levels 
[F(3, 72) = 0.78, p = .507, ηp2 = .032], lending support to the assumption that this first 
occipital map might correspond to the early visual encoding or discrimination of the 
incoming (blurred) stimulus. For the P2 map (216-296 ms post-stimulus onset), the univariate 
ANOVA showed a significant main effect of image level [F(3, 72) = 5.04, p = .003, ηp2 = 
.173]. Post-hoc comparisons revealed a selective decrease of the global explained variance of 
this P2 map for the image level corresponding to actual recognition, relative to the three other 
levels (One image before, p = .044; Two images before, p = .010; Three image before, p = 
.008). The other pairwise comparisons remained non-significant (all ps > .05). This latter 
result suggested a substantial decrease of the P2 at the time of recognition, which could 
reflect either the processing of low-level visual properties of the stimulus (Luck & Hillyard, 
1994) or short-term memory load (Wolach & Pratt, 2001), including priming (Gruber & 
Muller, 2005; Rugg, Soardi, & Doyle, 1995; Wiggs & Martin, 1998). To ascertain the 
presence of a reliable topographic change during the third time interval (280-360 ms post-
stimulus onset), we then submitted the GEV values obtained after fitting during this time 
interval to a 2 (map configuration: occipito-parietal positive activity vs. occipital 
negative/frontal positive activity) x 4 (image level: Recognition, One image before, Two 
images before, Three images before) repeated measures ANOVA. This analysis revealed a 
main effect of map configuration [F(1, 18) = 4.89, p = .040, ηp2 = .214], and a highly 
significant map configuration x image level interaction [F(3, 54) = 14.34, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.443], corroborating the assumption of a reliable topographic change across the four image 
levels during this specific time interval, and in sharp contrast to the results obtained for the 
preceding visual N1 and P2 scalp maps. Interestingly, post-hoc comparisons showed that the 
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GEV of the occipital negative/frontal positive activity progressively increased from three 
images before recognition to actual recognition (see Fig. 3A). More specifically, the GEV of 
this component was found to reliably increase when comparing actual recognition to one 
image before [t(18) = 3.12, p = .006], two images before [t(18)= 2.61, p = .018] and three 
images before recognition [t(18) = 5.02, p < .001]. Similarly, the substantial increase in GEV 
as a function of the progressive unfolding of the scene content was evident when comparing 
one image to three images before recognition [t(18) = 2.56, p = .020], as well as two images 
to three images before recognition [t(18) = 2.98, p = .008]. By comparison, the evolution of 
the GEV values of the concurrent occipito-parietal positive activity over the four image levels 
showed a different statistical outcome (Fig. 3B). T-tests performed on the GEV values 
extracted for this topographic activity during the same time interval (280-360ms post-
stimulus onset) revealed a significant decrease of the GEV for the image level corresponding 
to actual recognition, relative to one image [t(18) = -4.59, p < .001], two images [t(18) = -
3.65, p = .002] and three images before recognition [t(18) = -4.50, p < .001]. The other 
pairwise comparisons were not significant. In other words, this significant map configuration 
x image level interaction indicated a reliable change of microstates during this time interval, 
when progressively moving from three images before recognition to actual recognition. This 
topographic change was best explained by a progressive increase of the negative 
occipital/frontal positive activity when moving closer to recognition, whereas the concurrent 
occipito-parietal positive activity was found to be stable for the three first levels but showed a 
sharp decrease at the time corresponding to actual recognition. 
We failed to find any significant modulation of these map configurations and their 
expressions as a function of the emotional content of the scene. We carried out a 2 (map 
configuration) x 3 (emotional content) x 4 (image level) repeated measures ANOVA on the 
GEV values extracted during this time interval (280-360 ms post-stimulus onset) that 
revealed a significant main effect of map configuration [F(1, 18) = 4.89, p = .040, ηp2 = .213] 
and a significant map configuration x image level interaction [F(3, 54) = 14.35, p < .001, ηp2 
= .444], but no significant modulation by the emotional content of the scene. This result 
suggested that these differential neural processes related to visual object recognition were not 
influenced by the emotional content of the scenes. 
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Fig. 3. (A) Statistical results (*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001; vertical bars correspond to standard errors of the 
mean), obtained after the fitting procedure, for the dominant topography characterized by an occipital negativity 
and a frontal positivity showed a linear increase when moving closer to recognition. The Global Explained 
Variance (GEV, arbitrary units) was computed during an 80 ms time interval (280-360 ms post-stimulus onset) 
and is presented separately for the four conditions. This analysis showed a linear increase of the GEV when 
moving from three images before recognition to actual recognition. (B) Results obtained for the concurrent 
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topography of the occipito-parietal positivity identified during the same time interval. Unlike the occipital 
negative/frontal positive activity, this scalp configuration showed an abrupt decrease for the image level 
corresponding to recognition, relative to the three preceding images levels where the variance remained stable. 
3.4. Source localization results 
Next, we used sLORETA (Pascual-Marqui, 2002) to gain insight into the likely neural 
generators accounting for the different topographies identified by the previous topographic 
analyses. More specifically, sLORETA was used to explore the brain regions underlying the 
substantial topographic change found in the previous analysis, which concerned the 280-360 
ms post-stimulus onset interval. Since the change in the electric field configuration was most 
obvious when directly comparing three images before recognition to actual recognition, we 
first used this contrast in the inverse solution space and performed statistical non-parametric 
mapping (SnPM) analyses. For this purpose, amplitude data were first normalized (i.e., total 
average power equal to unity) prior to performing statistical analyses. This procedure 
revealed a stronger activation for recognition compared to three images before recognition in 
the left dACC (-15x, -10y, +45z) [t(18) = 4.16, p < .001] and right dACC (+15x, -10y, +45z) 
[t(18) = 4.50, p < .001], extending bilaterally in the supplementary motor area (SMA; left: -
25x, -10y, +45z; right: +25x, -10y, +45z; t(18) = 4.31, p < .001 and t(18) = 3.01, p = .007, 
respectively). The reverse contrast (Three images before > Recognition) showed larger 
activations in the bilateral posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), extending ventrally in the 
parahippocampal gyrus (PHG) [left: -15x, -65y, +10z; right: -15x, -65y, +10z; t(18) = -4.56, p 
< .001 and t(18) = -2.80, p = .012, respectively] (Fig. 4A). Next, for each of these regions of 
interest (ROIs) and each subject separately, we extracted the amplitude value (mean 
amplitude during the 280-360 ms post-stimulus onset interval) to establish how the activity in 
these regions actually evolved as a function of time of recognition. A 2 (side: left vs. right 
hemisphere) x 2 (ROI: dACC vs. PCC/PHG) x 4 (image level: Recognition, One image 
before, Two images before, Three images before) repeated measures ANOVA disclosed a 
significant main effect of ROI [F(1, 18) = 22.61, p < .001, ηp2 = .557] and a marginally 
significant effect of image level [F(3, 54) = 2.71, p = .074, ηp2 = .131] but, more importantly, 
a significant ROI x image level interaction [F(3, 54) = 14.79, p < .001, ηp2 = .451]. For the 
left dACC (Fig. 4B), post-hoc comparisons revealed a significantly higher activity during 
actual recognition, relative to one image [t(18) = 5.29, p < .001], two images [t(18)=5.22, p < 
.001] or three images before recognition [t(18) = 4.90, p = .007]. None of the other pairwise 
comparisons was significant (all ps > .05). 
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Fig. 4. Source localization results. (A) Comparing actual recognition to three images before recognition during 
the 280-360 ms post-stimulus onset interval disclosed a highly significant effect (p < .001 corrected) in the 
dorsal ACC, bilaterally (±15x, +10y, +45z). The reverse contrast revealed a highly significant effect (p < .001 
corrected) in the posterior cingulate cortex, extending ventrally towards the parahippocampal gyrus (±15x, -65y, 
+10z). A: anterior; P: posterior; L: left; R: right. (B) Mean activity extracted from the left dorsal ACC as a 
function of image level (*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001). Vertical bars correspond to standard errors of the 
mean. In this dorsal ACC region, a sharp increase was found for recognition, relative to the three preceding 
levels. (C) By contrast, in the left PPC, a monotonic linear decrease of activity was evidenced when moving 
towards recognition. 
 
Inverse solution results obtained for the right dACC showed a very similar outcome: 
stronger activity was evidenced when comparing actual recognition to one image [t(18) = 
5.53, p < .001], two images [t(18) = 4.09, p = .001] or three images before recognition [t(18) 
= 4.21, p = .001]. By contrast, statistical analyses performed on the amplitude values 
extracted from the PCC/PHG showed a different result, mainly characterized by a linear 
decrease in activity when moving from three images before recognition to actual recognition. 
For the left PCC/PHG, paired t-tests showed a significantly lower activity in this region 
during actual recognition, relative to two images [t(18) = -4.50, p < .001] and three images 
before recognition [t(18) = -5.04, p < .001]. Significantly lower neural activity was also 
evidenced when comparing one image to two images before recognition [t(18) = -2.12, p = 
.048], one image to three images before recognition [t(18) = -3.39, p = .003], and two images 
to three images before recognition [t(18) = -2.51, p = .022], suggesting a linear monotonic 
decrease of activity in this region as a function of accumulation of perceptual evidence (see 
Fig. 4C). The activity extracted in the right PCC/PHG showed a similar trend, although 
attenuated. Statistical analyses revealed significantly higher amplitude during actual 
recognition compared to three images before recognition [t(18) = -2.31, p = .033]. The same 
effect was evidenced when comparing one image to three images before recognition [t(18) = -
2.19, p = .042]. 
Finally, we verified whether the activity in these ROIs varied with the emotional content 
of the scenes or not. In none of the four ROIs did the ANOVA reveal any significant effect of 
the emotional content of the scene, suggesting that neural processing in these four regions 
was not influenced by the emotional content of the scene during this specific time interval 
following stimulus onset, consistent with the topographic analyses reported above. 
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4. Discussion 
In this study, we used high density EEG to shed light on the neural events preceding and 
leading to perceptual decision making during a simple/binary visual categorization task 
(animacy judgment). For each trial, participants were presented with series of filtered images 
that were progressively unfolding the content of a complex visual scene, and the participant 
was asked to discriminate whether this scene contained a living object or not. The sequence 
started with the presentation of a blurred image whose content was increasingly revealed by 
adding up, in a non-linear fashion, HSF information, hence providing a temporal 
decomposition of a “coarse-to-fine” analysis of the incoming visual stimulus. Since previous 
models have emphasized such a “coarse-to-fine” analysis subtended by different 
contributions of low vs. high spatial frequency information (Bar, 2004; Bullier, 2001; Hegdé, 
2008), this sequential procedure was then developed to investigate upstream evidence 
accumulation processes leading to recognition. In addition, the visual scenes were neutral, 
pleasant or unpleasant, to assess whether their emotional content might affect the expression 
of neural events foreshadowing overt visual object recognition. 
Behavioral results confirmed that this new progressive stimulus revelation task was suited 
to study the temporal dynamic preceding visual object recognition. Participants consistently 
waited for sufficient perceptual evidence before categorizing the incoming visual stimulus as 
either living or non-living with high accuracy. Accurate perceptual decisions (mean % 
response correct > 87) mainly occurred after the presentation of three (spatial filtering: 64-
512 pixels/cycle), four (32-512 pixels/cycle) or five (16-512 pixels/cycle) images, suggesting 
systematic accumulation of evidence before recognition (see Fig. 1B). Consistent with 
previous studies (Bar, 2004; Delplanque, et al., 2007; Schyns & Oliva, 1994), these three 
image levels presumably contained adequate diagnostic spatial frequency content to perform 
the animacy judgment task with high accuracy and confidence. Behavioral results obtained 
for catch trials corroborated the assumption that participants did not simply guess about the 
content of the scene but, instead, they reliably accumulated perceptual evidence before 
making a decision about its content, as shown by progressively higher perceptual decisions 
made during the presentation of the third, fourth and fifth image levels. Altogether, these 
behavioral findings are compatible with predictions arising from accumulator models of 
decision making, which directly emphasize the accumulation of perceptual evidence in favor 
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of each alternative before a response boundary is surpassed (Gold & Shadlen, 2007; Ratcliff 
& McKoon, 2008). 
Interestingly, our behavioral results also showed reliable differences between the three 
emotion conditions, indicated by earlier recognitions for unpleasant compared to pleasant 
scenes. Although speculative, this effect obtained for negatively-valenced scenes might be 
consistent with a negativity bias effect, as described in the Evaluative Space Model (ESM: 
Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999; Cacioppo, et al., 1997, 1999; Norris, et al., 2010). This dominant 
model makes the assumption of two separable and partially distinct components of the system 
underlying the evaluation of emotion and affect: (1) positivity, sensitive to appetitive stimuli 
and promoting approaching behavior; (2) negativity, oriented towards threat or danger, and 
fostering avoidance (Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999). These components are characterized by 
distinctive activation functions, a negativity bias (strongly aversive stimuli elicit stronger 
responses than appetitive ones) and a positivity offset (when input to the affect system is 
minimal, positivity outweighs negativity). This negativity bias would lead to slower or 
diminished responses to non-negative (appetitive/pleasant), relative to negative stimuli 
(Norris, et al., 2010). However, because neutral scenes were recognized on average earlier 
than negative scenes, a general negativity bias only does not seem sufficient to account for 
our behavioral results. Alternatively, we cannot rule out the possibility that picture 
complexity (or stimulus ambiguity) might actually be different between pleasant, unpleasant 
and neutral scenes, a factor that could potentially account for the differences in speed of 
recognition found across these three emotion conditions in our task (see Fig. 1B). However, 
we first aimed at selecting mildly emotional pictures from the IAPS, which were balanced 
regarding the animacy dimension but for which clear contrast effects (regarding the valence 
and arousal dimensions) could be obtained when comparing these neutral, pleasant and 
unpleasant scenes (see Table 1). This selection procedure resulted in a limited number of 
individual scenes for each emotion condition. In this context, we could not control for 
possible low-level visual differences across the three emotion conditions, which may 
eventually influence performance during the animacy judgment task, even though it remains 
unclear if a specific low-level visual property may systematically bias the animacy judgments 
in one direction or the other. Moreover, because the early ERP components (0-200 ms post-
stimulus onset, including the N1 and P2) were found to be identical across the three emotion 
conditions, a differential recognition effect across the three emotion categories triggered by 
specific low-level visual properties appears unlikely. 
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At the electrophysiological level, we found evidence for the involvement of different brain 
regions that differently contributed to mechanisms of perceptual decision making. More 
specifically, we looked at electrophysiological effects occurring up to three images before 
recognition, and eventually found reliable topographic modulations of the ERP signal in a 
window spanning from 280 to 360 ms after stimulus onset across these four image levels. 
Notably, two different topographic activities showing different evolutions over time (see 
Figs. 3A and 3B) were evidenced. Whereas the explained variance of an occipital 
negative/frontal positive activity linearly increased from three images before recognition until 
time of recognition (Fig. 3A), the explained variance of a concurrent broad occipito-parietal 
positive activity remained stable for the different image levels before recognition, but 
substantially dropped at the time of recognition (Fig. 3B). On the other hand, we did not find 
any significant modulation of these effects by the emotional content of the scene, suggesting 
a common visual object recognition mechanism for neutral, pleasant and unpleasant pictures 
during this specific time interval. A possible reason may be that our pre-selected IAPS 
stimuli were only mildly arousing, in contrast with many previous studies in literature 
showing reliable visual ERP effects with highly arousing pictures (including the EPN and 
LPP components, recorded following stimulus onset), relative to neutral, or low arousing 
scenes (Delplanque, et al., 2004; Junghöfer, Bradley, Elbert, & Lang, 2001; Peyk, Schupp, 
Keil, Elbert, & Junghöfer, 2009; Schupp, Junghöfer, et al., 2003a, 2003b; Schupp, et al., 
2006; Wiens, Peira, Golkar, & Öhman, 2008). In addition, given the specific data analysis 
used in our study, we cannot rule out the possibility that these neural processes might be 
triggered with some delay for emotional compared to neutral pictures, an issue that requires 
further research. 
Since these topographic changes observed at the scalp level necessarily denote alterations 
in the configuration of the intracranial generators (see Lehmann and Skrandies, 1980; Michel, 
et al., 1999; Murray, et al., 2008; Pourtois, et al., 2008), we performed complementary source 
localization analyses to gain insight into the putative configuration of the intracranial 
generators underlying these two specific topographic activities related to visual object 
recognition. Inverse solutions based on sLORETA (Pascual-Marqui, 2002) confirmed a 
substantial shift in the localization of the neural generators underlying these two topographic 
maps. Comparing three images before recognition to time of recognition revealed a highly 
significant effect (p < .001 corrected) in the PCC/PHG complex (Brodmann's areas, BA 
29/30). The reverse contrast revealed a highly significant (p < .001 corrected) bilateral effect 
in the dACC (BA 24) (Fig. 4A), with additional effects localized more dorsally, including the 
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SMA bilaterally. This latter effect in the SMA might reflect a motor preparation component 
that preceded or was associated with the overt recognition of the scene. While the former 
regions showed a quasi-linear decrease in activation when moving from three images before 
recognition to actual recognition (see Fig. 4C), the extracted activity in the latter region 
showed instead a stable pattern up to the image level corresponding to actual recognition, 
where an abrupt and substantial increase was evidenced (see Fig. 4B). Hence, distinct effects 
were found in these two distant regions as a function of accumulation evidence processes 
preceding actual recognition. 
Previous neuroscience studies have linked the PCC, and more specifically its retrosplenial 
portion (BA 29), to the acquisition of visual memory traces (Dickerson & Eichenbaum, 2010; 
Shallice, et al., 1994; Valenstein, et al., 1987). Moreover, recent studies have advocated this 
brain region in the formation of canonical representations for typical contexts encountered 
during visual object recognition (Aminoff, Gronau, & Bar, 2007; Bar, 2009b; Bar, Aminoff, 
Mason, & Fenske, 2007), whereas the adjacent PHG would primarily be involved in the 
generation of associations related to these contexts (Aminoff, et al., 2007; Bar, 2004, 2007; 
Bar, et al., 2006). Therefore, these different brain areas might work in concert and form a 
functional network involved in the analysis and generation of contextual information 
presented together with the actual visual object (Bar, 2009b). Interestingly, here we found a 
similar network (involving the PCC and PHG) whose activity was found to monotonically 
decrease when increasing the spatial frequency content of the input image, and hence when 
progressively revealing important contextual cues about the object's identity (see Fig. 4C). 
This effect may therefore reflect the processing of diagnostic contextual information 
(primarily based on LSF information; see Bar, 2009b) needed to optimally categorize the 
content of the image, and eventually perform the animacy judgment task. 
By contrast, source localization results showed the involvement of the bilateral dACC (BA 
24) in our task, although the response profile in this region (see Fig. 4B) was reliably 
different compared to the PCC/PHG (Fig. 4C). The dACC was primarily found to be active 
during the image level corresponding to the actual recognition of the scene. Activity of the 
dACC was low and stable during the three image levels before recognition, but substantially 
increased at the time of recognition, consistent with its involvement in higher-order decision 
making processes. Various functions have been ascribed to the dACC (Bush, Luu, & Posner, 
2000; Ridderinkhof, et al., 2004), including reward evaluation (Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, 
Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003), response conflict/competition (Botvinick, 2007; Botvinick, 
Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Bush, et al., 1998), value judgments (Seitz, Franz, & 
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Azari, 2009), error detection (Dehaene, Posner, & Tucker, 1994; Holroyd & Coles, 2002), 
and reward-based decision making (Bush, et al., 2002; Hampton & O'Doherty, 2007; 
Rushworth & Behrens, 2008; Seo & Lee, 2007, 2009; Watanabe, 2007). A critical function of 
this region may be the monitoring of choice outcomes, with the aim to further adjust sensory 
acuity in order to improve the organism's response to the environment (Kable & Glimcher, 
2009). Recently, the dACC has also been thought to be responsible for both preparation and 
online adjustments in response to conflicts, considered either as environmental feedbacks or 
internally generated signals (Anderson, Anderson, Ferris, Fincham, & Jung, 2009; Fincham 
& Anderson, 2006; Sohn, Albert, Jung, Carter, & Anderson, 2007). Given the rather 
categorical/all-or-nothing response profile found for the dACC in our study, this effect may 
therefore reflect the involvement of this region in monitoring the outcome of a decision, 
which is based in the present case on the rapid and likely incomplete accumulation of 
perceptual evidence. Importantly, here perceptual evidence remains partial or incomplete at 
the time of overt decision (Response1; see Methods). This situation could potentially 
generate a mild conflict, expressed by the urge to make a rapid decision while the actual 
accumulation of evidence is not complete yet (Hayden, Pearson, & Platt, 2009; Sarinopoulos, 
et al., 2010; Scheffers & Coles, 2000). Thus, whereas the PCC/PHG complex may be 
involved in updating contextual information about the scene (based on the rapid extraction 
and accumulation of LSF information; see Bar, 2009b), the dACC may contribute to visual 
object recognition mechanisms in this task by monitoring the ongoing decision's outcome, 
and serving therefore as an important interface between the accumulation of perceptual 
evidence on the one hand, and the implementation and execution of a motor plan on the other 
hand. The rapid acquisition and accumulation of perceptual/contextual evidence taking place 
in the PCC/PHG would lead in turn to the monitoring of the actual decision's outcome within 
the dACC, as well as SMA to a smaller degree. This rapid transition might occur by means of 
reciprocal anatomical connections between these non-overlapping brain regions (Vogt, Finch, 
& Olson, 1992). 
Thus, the experimental design and data analyses used here enabled us to track, using a 
millisecond time scale, fast evolving upstream perceptual brain processes eventually leading 
to visual object recognition, whose precise temporal dynamics may be difficult to disclose 
using the BOLD-fMRI technique only, given its sluggish temporal resolution. However, our 
ERP are also complementary to previous fMRI results (see Ploran, et al., 2007), as they 
confirm that non-overlapping brain regions (i.e., dorsal ACC vs. PCC/PHG) were reliably 
active prior to visual object recognition at different latencies (relative to recognition) and 
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with different response profiles, but they also add new critical information about the precise 
electrophysiological time-course of these upstream perceptual effects, which primarily 
concerned an interval spanning from 280 to 360 ms post-stimulus onset. 
There are a few restrictions to the present study. First, each visual scene was repeated once 
after a variable and unpredictable time lag, which may have introduced a slight bias in top-
down recognition brain mechanisms for repetitions, relative to first presentations of the 
scenes. However, our ERP analyses failed to reveal any substantial topographical and source 
localization difference between first presentations and repetitions, suggesting similar 
accumulation of evidence processes in these two conditions (though occurring earlier for 
repetitions relative to first presentations). Although this behavioral advantage in speed of 
recognition for repetitions relative to first presentations did not yield ERP topographic 
differences in our study, one may assume that additional brain processes may underlie this 
differential effect, even if they were not visible in the present case. The use of a more explicit 
(as opposed to implicit) visual encoding strategy combined with the activation of visual 
recognition processes based on cues stored in memory might help to reveal different top-
down recognition processes for first encounters of the scenes, compared to repetitions. 
Another limitation concerns the stimuli selected from the IAPS and used in this ERP study. 
Low-level but uncontrolled differences (e.g., picture complexity, stimulus ambiguity) may 
exist between neutral, pleasant and unpleasant scenes, which could possibly influence 
behavioral performance during the animacy judgment task. We cannot exclude the possibility 
that some of the observed behavioral results (see Fig. 1B) were explained by some 
uncontrolled “low-level” differences between the three emotion categories (neutral, pleasant 
and unpleasant scenes). 
In sum, our new ERP results provide the first direct electrophysiological evidence of 
upstream neural events leading to visual object recognition, highlighting distinct effects in the 
PCC/PHG and dACC during this process rapidly following stimulus onset. Our findings are 
also in line with recent fMRI results showing that these two regions may differentially 
contribute to mechanisms of perceptual decision making (Ploran, et al., 2007; Wheeler, et al., 
2008). In addition, the use of high density scalp EEG helped us shed light on the distinctive 
temporal contributions of these two regions during visual object recognition. Whereas the 
PCC/PHG complex was involved in the accumulation of perceptual evidence prior to actual 
recognition, the dACC was likely implicated at a later stage in the monitoring of the 
decision's outcome (see also Ploran, et al., 2007). Future studies are needed to establish 
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whether these two distant regions may exhibit some coupling or reciprocal interactions during 
upstream perceptual processes leading to visual object recognition. 
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CHAPTER 
CHAPTER 4: Multiple synergistic effects of emotion and memory on proactive processes leading to scene recognition 
 
Multiple synergistic effects of 
emotion and memory on proactive processes 
leading to scene recognition1 
 
Visual scene recognition is a proactive process through which contextual cues and top-down 
expectations facilitate the extraction of invariant features. Whether the emotional content of 
the scenes exerts a reliable influence on these processes or not, however, remains an open 
question. Here, topographic ERP mapping analysis and a distributed source localization 
method were used to characterize the electrophysiological correlates of proactive processes 
leading to scene recognition, as well as the potential modulation of these processes by 
memory and emotion. On each trial, the content of a complex neutral or emotional scene was 
progressively revealed, and participants were asked to decide whether this scene had 
previously been encountered or not (delayed match-to-sample task). Behavioral results 
showed earlier recognition for old compared to new scenes. Moreover, delayed recognition 
for emotional relative to neutral scenes was observed. Electrophysiological results revealed 
that, ~400 ms following stimulus onset, activity in ventral object-selective regions increased 
linearly as a function of accumulation of perceptual evidence prior to recognition of old 
scenes. The emotional content of the scenes had an early influence in these areas. By 
comparison, at the same latency, the processing of new scenes was mostly achieved by dorsal 
and medial frontal brain areas, including the anterior cingulate cortex and the insula. In the 
latter region, emotion biased recognition at later stages, likely corresponding to decision-
                                                 
1
 Schettino, A., Loeys, T., & Pourtois, G. (2012). Multiple synergistic effects of emotion and memory on 
proactive processes leading to scene recognition. Manuscript submitted for publication. 
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making processes. These findings suggest that emotion can operate at distinct and multiple 
levels during proactive processes leading to scene recognition, depending on the extent of 
prior encounter with these scenes.  
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1. Introduction 
Visual scene recognition results from dynamic and reciprocal interactions between 
bottom-up sensory processing and top-down modulatory influences, including selective 
attention (Treisman & Kanwisher, 1998), contextual information (Oliva & Torralba, 2007), 
and prior expectations (Summerfield & Egner, 2009). Predictive coding models of visual 
perception (Friston, 2005; Grossberg, 2009; Rao & Ballard, 1999) emphasize the 
predominant role of predictions, i.e., experience-based information about what is possible or 
probable in the current sensory environment. Such predictions actively guide visual 
recognition processes, presumably by favoring the rapid selection of perceptual features that 
eventually help disambiguate the meaning of the retinal input (Clark, 2012). Whenever these 
top-down predictions happen to be discrepant with bottom-up sensory processing, an error 
signal (prediction error) is generated and propagated back to higher-level brain regions, with 
the aim to update or refine the content of the predictions based on the available sensory 
evidence. If recognition fails, these recursive loops continue to operate until sufficient 
sensory information is gathered, eventually enabling the activation of the corresponding 
visual representation of the object or scene stored in memory (Friston, 2005; Rao & Ballard, 
1999; Ullman, 1995). 
Of note, the differential sensory processing of low (LSF) and high (HSF) spatial frequency 
information could arguably underlie these reciprocal interaction effects between (bottom-up) 
sensory processing and (top-down) predictions (Bullier, 2001). In this framework, the rapid 
extraction of LSF information via dedicated magnocellular pathways may serve to quickly 
generate coarse predictions regarding the most probable content of the visual scene. This 
process would later be assisted and refined by the extraction of HSF information (Bar, 2003, 
2004). 
Whether these dynamic perceptual processes are differentially engaged depending on the 
(perceived) emotional content of the scene or not, however, has received little attention so 
far. Interestingly, mounting evidence shows that emotion exerts strong biases on visual 
perception, including at early stages of recognition (Bocanegra & Zeelenberg, 2009; Öhman, 
Flykt, et al., 2001; Phelps, et al., 2006; Vuilleumier & Pourtois, 2007; Whalen, et al., 2004). 
Thus, emotion is no longer seen as a by-product of perception but, instead, as a core 
determinant of it (Pourtois, et al., 2012). Accordingly, proactive processes during scene 
recognition are unlikely to be immune to emotion, defined here, following standard practice, 
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as the acquired valence and arousal values of the stimulus (Barrett & Bar, 2009; Bradley & 
Lang, 1994). More specifically, the speed and extent of iterative processes between bottom-
up processing and top-down predictions during scene recognition are probably subject to 
variations depending on the rapidly extracted emotional meaning of the stimulus. Consistent 
with this assumption, we recently reported evidence for the modulation of scene recognition 
by emotion (Schettino, Loeys, Delplanque, & Pourtois, 2011). In this study, participants were 
presented with series of pictures whose content was progressively revealed by increasing, in 
up to six sequential steps, the amount of LSF and HSF information. This experimental 
manipulation was used to mimic a “coarse-to-fine” decomposition of the retinal input, 
presumably fostering the online generation of guesses or predictions regarding the most likely 
identity of the stimulus (Bar, 2003; Bullier, 2001; Hegdé, 2008). Participants were asked to 
discriminate the content of the stimulus progressively revealed using this procedure by 
performing an orthogonal animacy judgment task. Crucially, the scenes used in this 
experiment were neutral, pleasant or unpleasant. Behavioral results showed a delayed 
recognition for emotional compared to neutral scenes, especially for pleasant compared to 
neutral scenes (see also Schettino, Loeys, Bossi, & Pourtois, 2012). At the 
electrophysiological level, we found reliable differences starting at approximately 280 ms 
after stimulus onset, depending on the amount of perceptual evidence accumulated by 
participants. More specifically, the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) and the parahippocampal 
gyrus (PHG) showed a distinctive response profile, characterized by a monotonic 
accumulation of evidence. Conversely, categorical recognition effects were evidenced in 
medial frontal regions, including the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) (Schettino, et 
al., 2011). However, none of these non-overlapping brain effects was found to depend upon 
the emotional content of the scenes. Hence, whereas behavioral results suggested that the 
emotional content of the scene could reliably slow down the generation of online predictions 
regarding the actual identity of the stimulus, we did not find a corresponding 
electrophysiological correlate for this effect. Based on this evidence, we therefore concluded 
that these proactive brain mechanisms during scene recognition were probably generic, albeit 
delayed for emotional relative to neutral scenes. 
In the present study, we used a modified version of this novel experimental paradigm 
(Schettino, et al., 2012; Schettino, et al., 2011), with the aim to resolve this apparent 
discrepancy and assess whether emotion may exert an early modulatory effect on the 
extraction of diagnostic visual information during proactive processes leading to scene 
recognition. To further promote the online generation and active use of predictions regarding 
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the likely identity of the scenes progressively revealed, we introduced a standard memory 
manipulation (Courtney, Ungerleider, Keil, & Haxby, 1997; Goldman-Rakic, 1990; Henson, 
Hornberger, & Rugg, 2005; Rugg, et al., 1998). For each trial, participants were first asked to 
encode a new complex colorful scene having either a neutral or emotional meaning. After a 
constant time interval, the content of either the same or a novel scene was progressively 
unfolded, similarly to Schettino, et al. (2011). Participants were asked to perform a delayed 
match-to-sample task, as opposed to a binary animacy judgment task in our previous study 
(Schettino, et al., 2011). This standard procedure was meant to stimulate the generation of a 
restricted number of predictions regarding the identity of the scenes progressively revealed, 
bearing in mind that these predictions were primarily shaped by the initial encoding phase. 
Moreover, here the emotional content of the scene was task-relevant, as opposed to fully 
irrelevant in Schettino, et al. (2011). Notably, several lines of evidence suggest that (early and 
automatic) affective stimulus processing is substantially reduced when concurrent non-
affective semantic stimulus dimensions become task-relevant (Everaert, et al., 2011; Pessoa, 
Kastner, et al., 2002; Spruyt, et al., 2007). We surmised that the lack of clear emotional effect 
at the electrophysiological level in our previous study was partly related to the use of an 
orthogonal task, which made the processing of the emotional content of the scenes 
superficial. To overcome this problem, in the present study, we occasionally asked 
participants to rate the emotional content of the scene, besides the delayed match-to-sample 
task. This procedure ensured that participants directly attended to the emotional content of the 
scenes on each and every trial. To provide additional evidence for the overt processing of the 
emotional dimension of the stimuli, we also used a standard ERP marker of emotional 
processing. More specifically, during encoding, we measured and compared the amplitude of 
the late positive potential (LPP) as a function of the emotional content of the scenes (Foti, 
Hajcak, & Dien, 2009; Schupp, Cuthbert, et al., 2004; Schupp, Stockburger, et al., 2003). 
This experimental design is suited to assess whether the perceived emotional content of 
the scene could alter brain mechanisms responsible for the online generation of predictions 
regarding the actual identity of this scene. Furthermore we could compare, using advanced 
EEG methods, the processing of “old” (previously encountered) vs. “new” scenes, and hence 
evaluate whether any influence of emotion on brain mechanisms underlying scene 
recognition was depending on the (short-term) memory status of these complex visual scenes. 
We anticipated that, if participants successfully encoded the initial picture and later made 
active predictions regarding the content of the progressively unfolded stimulus, recognition of 
old scenes should occur earlier than new scenes. In addition, in line with our previous results 
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(Schettino, et al., 2011), we predicted that participants would recognize emotional scenes 
later than neutral ones, suggesting that proactive processes during scene recognition are 
reliably influenced by the perceived emotional content of the scenes. At the 
electrophysiological level, we expected to observe dissociable response profiles in 
dorsal/medial frontal regions, as opposed to more ventral brain areas, depending on the extent 
of prior encounter with these scenes (Schettino, et al., 2011). 
2. Methods 
2.1. Participants 
Twenty-two undergraduate psychology students (all women, mean age 21 years, range 18-
26) participated in the study, which was approved by the local Ethics Committee. All 
participants were native Dutch speaking, right-handed, had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision, with no history of neurological or psychiatric disorders. The data of one participant 
could not be saved properly because of technical problems, whereas the EEG data of three 
other participants were discarded due to excessive artifacts and a low signal-to-noise ratio. 
Thus, the final sample consisted of 18 participants. All volunteers gave informed written 
consent prior to their participation, and were compensated 30€. 
2.2. Stimuli 
The visual stimuli were selected from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; 
Lang, et al., 2008). This database provides normative ratings for the basic dimensions of 
emotion -- including arousal and valence -- obtained with the Self-Assessment Manikin 
(SAM; Bradley & Lang, 1994). Our stimuli list consisted of 360 pictures, equally divided 
into three emotion categories according to their pre-defined valence scores: neutral, 
unpleasant, and pleasant (Table 1) (Schettino, et al., 2012). These pictures were selected on 
the basis of mean valence and arousal ratings reported by female responders (Lang, et al., 
2008), because only women eventually participated in the main experiment (see above). 
Similar to our previous study (Schettino, et al., 2011), we selected scenes that were neither 
highly pleasant (i.e., erotic situations) nor highly unpleasant (i.e., mutilations), because these 
categories were associated with specific emotion reactions in previous research (Schupp, 
Flaisch, Stockburger, & Junghöfer, 2006; Schupp, et al., 2007). We also included 16 
additional neutral pictures that were only used during the practice session (not included in the 
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subsequent statistical analyses). Furthermore, 36 supplementary neutral scenes were 
scrambled (i.e., each scene was divided into arbitrary grids of 255 x 255 pixels, whose 
locations were randomly shuffled 10 times) and, as a result, their content was made 
meaningless. Thus, in total, participants were presented with 412 IAPS scenes2. 
 
Table 1. Mean values and standard deviations (in parenthesis) of normative valence and 
arousal scores of the selected IAPS pictures  
Emotion category Valence Arousal 
Neutral 5.14 (1.38) 3.68 (2.05) 
Unpleasant 3.17 (1.61) 4.94 (2.15) 
Pleasant 6.95 (1.70) 4.97 (2.30) 
Note. Scores range from 1 to 9. Independent samples t-test confirmed a significant difference in valence ratings 
between neutral and unpleasant pictures [t(119) = 29.34, p < .001], as well as between neutral and pleasant 
[t(119) = -26.82, p < .001] and unpleasant and pleasant [t(119) = -52.58, p < .001] scenes. Significant 
differences in levels of arousal were also observed between neutral and unpleasant [t(119) = -29.34, p < .001] 
and neutral and pleasant [t(119) = -30.98, p < .001] pictures. However, no difference was evidenced between 
unpleasant and pleasant scenes [t(119) = -0.77, p = .441], confirming a balanced level of activation between 
these two emotion conditions. 
 
Each neutral, unpleasant and pleasant picture was arbitrarily paired with another one from 
the same emotion category based on low-level visual similarities, as assessed by systematic 
                                                 
2
 IAPS scenes selected for the experiment. Practice: 2107, 2600, 2980, 5533, 5731, 6837, 7017, 7030, 7036, 
7055, 7057, 7140, 7224, 7365, 8121, 8312. Neutral: 1350, 1616, 1675, 1903, 1935, 1947, 2025, 2026, 2034, 
2191, 2272, 2273, 2279, 2308, 2357, 2377, 2382, 2383, 2390, 2396, 2445, 2446, 2489, 2495, 2514, 2575, 2579, 
2593, 2595, 2597, 2606, 2702, 2720, 2749, 2850, 2880, 4090, 4150, 4220, 4250, 4255, 4274, 4275, 4320, 4325, 
4605, 4750, 5040, 5395, 5500, 5531, 5532, 5534, 5535, 5900, 6570.2, 7001, 7002, 7003, 7009, 7011, 7014, 
7016, 7018, 7019, 7021, 7032, 7033, 7037, 7038, 7042, 7043, 7044, 7045, 7058, 7061, 7062, 7081, 7096, 7130, 
7160, 7161, 7170, 7180, 7184, 7186, 7188, 7190, 7207, 7236, 7242, 7247, 7248, 7249, 7255, 7287, 7300, 7354, 
7484, 7487, 7493, 7500, 7503, 7506, 7512, 7513, 7546, 7547, 7550, 7590, 7595, 7710, 7820, 7830, 8241, 8311, 
8325, 9210, 9260, 9700. Unpleasant: 1230, 1240, 1270, 1275, 1280, 1390, 1505, 1617, 1945, 2115, 2130, 2141, 
2205, 2276, 2278, 2400, 2455, 2456, 2525, 2681, 2682, 2694, 2695, 2700, 2715, 2716, 2718, 2745.2, 2750, 
2752, 2770, 2795, 2799, 2810, 2900.1, 3061, 3160, 3181, 3190, 3210, 3216, 3280, 3300, 3301, 4621, 4635, 
4770, 5970, 5973, 6000, 6240, 6241, 6311, 6314, 6561, 6562, 6610, 6800, 6832, 7013, 7023, 7079, 7092, 7136, 
7137, 7520, 7521, 8231, 9002, 9005, 9008, 9031, 9041, 9045, 9046, 9080, 9090, 9102, 9145, 9171, 9180, 9182, 
9186, 9265, 9270, 9290, 9291, 9295, 9320, 9330, 9331, 9341, 9342, 9390, 9395, 9402, 9404, 9411, 9415, 9417, 
9419, 9421, 9435, 9440, 9445, 9469, 9471, 9561, 9584, 9592, 9596, 9635.2, 9830, 9831, 9832, 9912, 9913, 
9922, 9926, 9927. Pleasant: 1340, 1463, 1540, 1590, 1595, 1640, 1659, 1660, 1720, 1721, 1811, 1999, 2055.2, 
2056, 2092, 2151, 2156, 2158, 2224, 2274, 2300, 2331, 2344, 2346, 2352, 2398, 2605, 2616, 2655, 3005.2, 
4500, 4530, 4534, 4536, 4559, 4571, 4600, 4601, 4603, 4606, 4610, 4612, 4614, 4616, 4617, 4619, 4623, 4624, 
4641, 5199, 5215, 5260, 5301, 5480, 5600, 5622, 5628, 5660, 5700, 5814, 5829, 5831, 5849, 5990, 5994, 
6250.2, 7200, 7230, 7250, 7260, 7279, 7281, 7282, 7286, 7289, 7291, 7350, 7352, 7390, 7400, 7410, 7430, 
7440, 7460, 7461, 7470, 7477, 7481, 7482, 7488, 7489, 7492, 7496, 7501, 7505, 7508, 7515, 7570, 8032, 8050, 
8118, 8120, 8162, 8208, 8220, 8280, 8340, 8350, 8371, 8420, 8460, 8461, 8465, 8467, 8497, 8503, 8510, 8531, 
8540, 8620; Scrambled: 1112, 1303, 1310, 1645, 1726, 1908, 2002, 2018, 2032, 2038, 2101, 2102, 2104, 2122, 
2190, 2220, 2221, 2393, 2440, 2441, 2458, 2480, 2484, 2493, 2506, 2512, 2516, 2518, 2570, 2580, 2635, 2704, 
2780, 2830, 2840, 9070. 
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visual inspection. More specifically, pictures with a clear distinction between a central figure 
and a homogeneous background were paired together (e.g., a coffee mug on a table vs. a 
pocket watch on a dark background). The same strategy was applied for more complex 
scenes (e.g., a traffic jam vs. a woman in the crowd). All the pairs created with this procedure 
are reported in Table 2. 
The selected IAPS pictures were resized to 922 x 691 pixels (90% of the original size) and 
pre-processed similarly to Schettino, et al. (2011). After grayscale conversion, six bandpass 
spatial frequency filters were applied on each and every picture (using ImageJ v1.44 
software; http://rsb.info.nih.gov/ij/) (for a similar procedure, see Delplanque, et al., 2007). As 
a result, six distinct levels of filtering were obtained for every IAPS scene, each containing a 
different amount of low and high spatial frequency information (see also Figure 1A). All 
these modified pictures were finally resized to 768 x 576 pixels (75% of the original IAPS 
pictures). 
2.1. Procedure 
Participants were individually tested in a small, dimly lit room, and seated at a viewing 
distance of 75 cm in front of a 19" CRT computer screen (refresh rate: 100 Hz). After filling 
out the informed consent, they were presented with task instructions, followed by a practice 
block containing 16 trials (with neutral pictures). Then, they moved on to the main 
experimental session, which was divided into twelve blocks (separated by short breaks), each 
containing 33 trials (Schettino, et al., 2012; see also Figure 1A). Each trial began with a 
1500ms presentation of a colorful, fully detailed picture subtending 18.5° x 13.9° of visual 
angle, followed by a 2000ms grayscale mask. At the offset of the mask, the actual unfolding 
sequence started. A fixation cross appeared in the center of the screen for 250 ms. The first 
grayscale, blurred image level of a given picture (subtending 15.4° x 11.6° of visual angle) 
was then presented for 500 ms, followed by a 250ms blank screen. Next, the second image 
level of the same picture (containing slightly more HSF and LSF information) was displayed 
for 500 ms, plus the 250ms blank screen, and the same procedure was repeated until the 
presentation of the sixth, non-filtered image level. The inter-trial interval was set at 1000 ms. 
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Table 2. Stimulus pairs created for the Progressive Unfolding task. 
Pair 
number 
Stimulus pairs 
Neutral Unpleasant Pleasant 
First 
element 
Second 
element 
First 
element 
Second 
element 
First 
element 
Second 
element 
1 2191 7513 2455 9180 1640 7286 
2 2272 7500 2525 9635.2 1660 4641 
3 2308 4250 3300 2752 2158 2156 
4 2357 8311 5970 2694 2274 8208 
5 2382 7242 5973 9912 2605 7291 
6 2390 5535 6000 2115 2616 2300 
7 2514 7061 6241 6832 4530 4500 
8 2575 2273 6610 6800 4600 2398 
9 2579 2595 7013 9926 4616 4610 
10 2606 7037 7079 9041 4619 7260 
11 2880 7493 7136 9186 4624 7410 
12 4090 7003 7137 7092 5260 7440 
13 5040 7161 8231 9440 5622 8620 
14 5900 6570.2 9080 2715 5831 2056 
15 7009 7190 9102 6314 5849 5628 
16 7011 4320 9171 2718 5990 7496 
17 7014 2377 9182 2456 5994 8120 
18 7021 7248 9265 9031 6250.2 8032 
19 7038 5532 9290 9320 7200 8510 
20 7042 2034 9291 9342 7279 7489 
21 7044 7130 9330 9832 7430 7352 
22 7045 2396 9395 3181 7460 5480 
23 7062 7186 9415 9471 7477 8465 
24 7207 7032 9417 6561 7482 8540 
25 7287 2026 9421 2900.1 7501 7505 
26 7484 7096 9435 7520 7508 5199 
27 7503 1350 9584 9469 7570 5814 
28 7590 2850 9592 9270 8460 8497 
29 7830 7546 9596 2205 8461 2352 
30 9260 4275 9831 9402 8503 7470 
31 1616 2445 1270 1275 1340 8420 
32 1675 2593 1230 2799 1463 8280 
33 1903 7255 1240 1617 1540 1595 
34 1947 5531 1280 9830 1590 1720 
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Pair 
number 
Stimulus pairs 
Neutral Unpleasant Pleasant 
First 
element 
Second 
element 
First 
element 
Second 
element 
First 
element 
Second 
element 
35 2025 7506 1390 2745 1721 8340 
36 2446 2383 1505 9002 2224 4606 
37 2489 1935 1945 9419 2331 8350 
38 2495 2702 2130 9045 2344 1811 
39 2720 7033 2141 9090 3005.2 4571 
40 2749 4325 2276 2681 4536 2346 
41 4150 2597 2682 2795 4559 2055.2 
42 4274 7160 2695 9404 4601 7282 
43 4750 4255 2716 2700 4603 8162 
44 5534 7547 2810 9913 4612 2151 
45 7018 9210 3061 6311 4614 7488 
46 7019 7300 3160 9005 4617 2092 
47 7043 7016 3190 7521 4623 7481 
48 7081 7001 3210 6240 5301 8531 
49 7170 7002 3216 4770 5600 7350 
50 7180 4605 3280 6562 5660 5215 
51 7184 7236 4635 9008 7230 1999 
52 7188 7820 9445 9927 7250 7461 
53 7247 7249 2278 9295 7281 2655 
54 7354 7058 2400 9145 7390 5700 
55 7487 8325 2770 9341 7492 5829 
56 7512 2279 9390 7023 7515 8467 
57 7550 4220 9922 9561 8050 4534 
58 7595 5395 9046 4621 8118 1659 
59 7710 5500 2750 9411 8220 7289 
60 8241 9700 3301 9331 8371 7400 
Note. These numbers refer to picture codes, as available in the original database (Lang, et al., 2008). 
 
The aim of this experimental manipulation was to promote a gradual and predictive 
accumulation of visual information by progressively adding, in a stepwise fashion, diagnostic 
LSF and HSF information to an initial blurred and undistinguishable picture. Importantly, the 
grayscale and resize picture conversions (unfolding) relative to the colorful picture 
(encoding) were performed to discourage participants to use a purely perceptual, pixel-to-
pixel matching strategy to retrieve the content of the initial picture during the memory 
matching task. Participants were required to provide two separate and consecutive manual 
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responses (see also Schettino, et al., 2011, for a similar dual response procedure). First, they 
were asked to press with their right index finger a pre-defined button on a response box 
(Cedrus RB-730; http://www.cedrus.com/responsepads/rb730.htm) as soon as they gathered 
enough perceptual evidence to decide whether the content of the unfolded scene was either 
the same as the one displayed during the encoding phase, a new one, or a scrambled picture 
(Response1). These scrambled pictures, for which a separate response was required (see 
below), were used as “catch” trials to ensure that participants reliably attended to the content 
of the scenes before responding. Pressing the button immediately interrupted the presentation 
of the stimulus sequence. After 500 ms, participants were required to validate their first 
response (Response1). They were asked to press, on a standard AZERTY keyboard, the “O” 
key if the unfolded scene was the same as the colorful one previously presented (“old” 
condition), the “N” key if these two scenes were different (“new” condition), or the “S” key if 
the unfolded scene was displaying a meaningless content (“scrambled” condition). All these 
responses, for which no time limit was imposed, were coded as Response2. This dual 
response procedure was used for three main reasons: (i) to dissociate early visual recognition 
effects (Response1) from the overt discrimination and comparison in short-term memory of 
the scenes (Response2); (ii) to remove recognition errors (based on accuracy of Response2) 
from the behavioral and ERP analyses; (iii) to minimize the potential contamination of ERP 
data by the activation of competing motor responses across the three different conditions, 
because Response1 always required to press a single button shared across these three 
conditions. Although instructions emphasized accuracy, participants were encouraged to stop 
the sequence as soon as they felt they could recognize the content of the scene, which 
happened to occur before the end of the sequence for a vast majority of trials (see results 
below). Instructions encouraged participants to perform the memory matching task by using 
abstract visual representations stored in short-term memory to compare the visual input 
progressively revealed during unfolding against the colorful scene shown during encoding. 
The inclusion of “catch” trials (i.e., scrambled scenes) likely prevented the use of a strategy 
based on low-level details, as confirmed by our behavioral results (see below). In addition, 
the content of half of the ”old” scenes was unpredictably flipped along the horizontal axis 
between encoding and retrieval. Participants were informed that an “old” response was to be 
given for these “flipped” trials, since the memory matching task had to be performed 
primarily based on the content of the scenes. For the statistical analyses of the behavioral and 
EEG data reported hereafter, “old flipped” and “old unflipped” trials were combined into a 
single “old” condition, and these “old” trials were eventually compared to “new” trials (see 
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also Schettino, et al., 2012). Hence, using this procedure, for each emotion category (neutral, 
pleasant, unpleasant), two trial types were compared to each other: “old”, in which the 
identity of the colorful picture was identical to the scene progressively unfolded; “new”, 
meaning that the identities of the colorful and unfolded scene were different (although 
matched as far as possible in terms of low-level visual properties). Importantly, for “new” 
scenes, no change in terms of emotional content ever occurred between the colorful picture 
and the gradually unfolded scene. In other words, a neutral colorful picture was always 
followed by the unfolding of a neutral scene, and the same occurred for emotion-laden 
stimuli (pleasant-pleasant; unpleasant-unpleasant; see Table 2). 
Finally, we sought to verify whether the emotional content of the IAPS pictures selected in 
our study was actually perceived by our participants in accordance with the normative ratings 
(Lang, et al., 2008). Moreover, we wanted to make the emotional content of the scenes 
somehow task-relevant throughout the experiment, in order to increase the likelihood to find 
reliable differences at the electrophysiological level between emotional and neutral scenes. 
Therefore, additional ratings of the emotional valence of the colorful scene presented at the 
beginning of each trial were occasionally asked after the registration of Response2. A 
standard 9-point SAM (Bradley & Lang, 1994) was used for this purpose, with anchor 1 
corresponding to “very unpleasant” and anchor 9 to “very pleasant”. This additional emotion 
classification task was included in 10% of the total number of trials. 
Stimulus presentation and behavioral response recordings were controlled using E-Prime 
2.0. (http://www.pstnet.com/products/e-prime/). 
2.1. Questionnaires 
At the end of the experimental session, participants filled out two questionnaires 
measuring specific affective dispositions. Levels of trait anxiety were measured by means of 
the validated Dutch version of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Van der Ploeg, et al., 1979). 
Participants also completed the Need For Affect Scale (Maio & Esses, 2001), which provides 
an estimate of the general motivation of participants to either approach or avoid emotion-
inducing situations. The results confirmed that our participants had sub-clinical levels of trait 
anxiety, as well as normal Need For Affect values (Table 3). However, none of these 
personality measures was found to correlate significantly with either the behavioral or ERP 
results collected in our study (see also Schettino, et al., 2011, for similar results). 
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Figure 1. (A) Procedure and task. Colorful neutral, unpleasant and pleasant IAPS scenes (not shown here for 
copyright reasons) were randomly presented to participants for 1500 ms. After a 2000ms mask, the same scene, 
a new one, or a scrambled picture was progressively revealed in grayscale, using six successive steps. Each step 
added new low and high spatial frequency information to the previous one, in a parametric fashion. Each image 
level was presented for 500 ms, followed by a 250ms blank screen. Participants were required to press a button 
on the response box (Response1) as soon as they could decide whether the content of the gradually unfolded 
scene was the one seen at the beginning of the trial (i.e., colorful picture), a new one, or a scrambled picture. 
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Five hundred milliseconds after Response1, participants validated their choice and confirmed whether the scene 
was “old”, “new” or “scrambled” (Response2). (B) Behavioral results. Cumulative percentage of correct 
Responses1 as a function of the six image levels, separately for new (grey lines), old (black lines), neutral (solid 
lines) and emotional (dashed lines) scenes. Vertical bars correspond to standard errors of the means. Results 
show that participants were able to perform the memory task reliably earlier (i.e., less perceptual evidence 
needed) for old relative to new scenes. Moreover, neutral scenes were recognized reliably earlier compared to 
emotional scenes. No significant interaction effect between memory and emotion was found (see main text). 
 
Table 3. Mean values and standard deviations (in parenthesis) of the scores obtained for each 
questionnaire (and relative subscales) administered at the end of the experiment. 
Questionnaire Score 
STAI-T 40.61 (10.17) 
NFAS 3.98 (0.51) 
Approach 4.79 (0.61) 
Avoidance 3.16 (1.16) 
Note. STAI-T: State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, trait version; NFAS: Need for Affect Scale. STAI-T scores range 
from 20 to 80. NFAS scores were obtained using a 7-points Likert scale. 
2.2. Recording and pre-processing of EEG data 
Electroencephalographic (EEG) activity was continuously recorded using a BIOSEMI 
Active-Two system (BioSemi, Inc., Netherlands; http://www.biosemi.com) by means of 128 
Ag/AgCl electrodes fitted into a stretching cap and following the BioSemi ABCD position 
system (i.e., electrode positions are radially equidistant from CZ; 
http://www.biosemi.com/headcap.htm). Two additional electrodes, the common mode sense 
(CMS) active electrode and the driven right leg (DRL) passive electrode, were used as 
reference and ground electrodes, respectively (http://www.biosemi/faq/cms_and_drl.htm). 
Vertical electro-oculograms (vEOG) were monitored using two additional electrodes placed 
on the inferior and superior areas of the left orbit, whereas horizontal EOG (hEOG) were 
recorded by means of two electrodes situated symmetrically on the outer canthus of each eye. 
EEG and EOG recordings were sampled at 512 Hz. 
ERPs of interest were computed offline using Brain Vision Analyser 2.0 (Brain 
Products™  GmbH, Munich, Germany; 
http://www.brainproducts.com/analyser2_release.php). First, a topographic interpolation 
(interpolation by spherical splines; Perrin, et al., 1989) was applied on noisy channels 
(interpolated channels across 18 subjects: M = 3.78, SD = 4.28, range 0-11), and a common 
average reference was then applied. Afterwards, the continuous EEG signal was segmented 
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into individual epochs, excluding trials corresponding to errors (based on accuracy on 
Response2). Similar to our previous study (Schettino, et al., 2011), four main epochs were 
computed around stimulus onset (using an interval of 200 ms prior to and 750 ms after this 
event), enabling us to look backwards at visual ERPs progressively elicited prior to actual 
recognition (i.e., Response1): (1) segments in which Response1 occurred from 0 to 750 ms 
after stimulus presentation (“recognition”); (2) segments in which Response1 occurred from 
750 to 1500 ms after stimulus presentation (“one image before” recognition); (3) segments in 
which Response1 occurred from 1500 to 2250 ms after stimulus presentation (“two images 
before” recognition); (4) segments in which Response1 occurred from 2250 to 3000 ms after 
stimulus presentation (“three images before” recognition). A segment length of 750 ms was 
used in order to include stimulus presentation duration (500 ms) as well as the following 
250ms blank screen. All these individual segments were then baseline corrected using the 
entire pre-stimulus interval of 200ms, before a standard ocular correction was performed 
(Gratton, et al., 1983). Artifact rejection was then carried out (−80/+80µV amplitude scale 
across participants) to remove segments contaminated by artifacts, including residual eye 
blinks and muscle activity. Using this procedure, 21.82% of the EEG data were discarded. 
Finally, stimulus-locked ERP averages were computed, separately for each condition 
(memory: 2 levels; emotion: 3 levels; recognition times: 4 levels), resulting in 24 individual 
ERP averages. However, because no difference in recognition between unpleasant and 
pleasant pictures was observed at the behavioral level, these two emotion conditions were 
collapsed in order to increase the signal-to-noise ratio, leaving a total number of 16 individual 
ERP averages (percentage of segments kept after pre-processing: > 70%). These averages 
were eventually bandpass filtered, using 1-30 Hz cutoffs. 
In an auxiliary analysis, we also computed visual ERPs time-locked to the onset of the 
colorful picture (epoch length: -200/+1500 ms) that was presented at the beginning of the 
trial and had to be encoded in short-term memory. We sought to establish whether emotional 
scenes were perceived and processed differently compared to neutral scenes, as indicated by a 
larger LPP amplitude for emotional relative to neutral scenes (Schupp, et al., 2006; Schupp, 
et al., 2000; Schupp, Junghöfer, Weike, & Hamm, 2004). 
2.3. Analysis of behavioral data 
Accuracy was expressed as percentage of correct responses. Since the six image levels 
were not independent of each other (the new visual information provided at each image level 
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relied on perceptual evidence accumulated during previous levels), cumulative percentages 
were calculated. Using this procedure, we computed psychometric curves showing the 
evolution of recognition performance across the six image levels for each memory and 
emotion condition, separately. To statistically verify whether these psychometric curves 
reliably varied as a function of memory and emotion, we used a proportional odds model 
(Agresti, 2007). This data analysis allows to model the cumulative probability up to and 
including recognition from each image level k (k = 1, ?, 5). The derived odds ratio expresses 
how much the odds of recognition from image level k or earlier is increased (if larger than 1) 
or decreased (if smaller than 1) across new, old, neutral and emotional contents, and thus 
provides a single number capturing the shift in psychometric curve. To account for 
dependencies of trials within the same subject, a multi-level version of the proportional odds 
model was used, similarly to our previous studies (Schettino, et al., 2012; Schettino, et al., 
2011). The level of significance for these statistical analyses was set at p < 0.05. 
2.4. Analysis of ERP data 
First, we analyzed the average amplitude of the LPP component time-locked to the onset 
of the colorful scene -- extracted from a 500-1000ms time window following stimulus onset -
- from an array of centro-parietal electrodes, where this component reached its maximum 
amplitude (Figure 2). Mean amplitudes of the LPP were analyzed by means of repeated 
measures ANOVAs, and t-tests were employed as post-hoc comparisons. 
To examine the ERP data recorded during the progressive unfolding sequence, reference-
free topographic analyses were used, similarly to our previous study (Schettino, et al., 2011). 
The basic principles of this method have extensively been described elsewhere (Lehmann & 
Skrandies, 1980; Michel & Murray, 2012; Michel, et al., 1999; Michel, et al., 2001; Murray, 
et al., 2008; Pourtois, et al., 2008). In short, this method allows to summarize a complex ERP 
data set into a smaller number of dominant scalp topographies (i.e., global configuration of 
the electric field across all 128 channels at each time frame). Subsequent analyses further 
enable to assess how the distribution and expression of these dominant topographies vary in 
time across experimental conditions, irrespective of changes in the strength of the ERP 
signal. Topographic analyses were performed using CARTOOL software (version 3.43; 
http://brainmapping.unige.ch/Cartool.htm; see also Brunet, Murray, & Michel, 2011). The 
dominant scalp maps were identified in the grand-average ERP data for each main condition 
(recognition, one image before, two images before and three images before) over a wide time 
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window spanning from 0 to 600 ms after stimulus onset. To this end, a specific 
spatiotemporal clustering algorithm, the “Atomize and Agglomerate Hierarchical Clustering” 
(AAHC; for a detailed description, see Murray, et al., 2008; Tibshirani & Walther, 2005), 
was used. The optimal number of dominant maps best “explaining” the ERP dataset was 
determined, following standard practice, using a cross-validation criterion (Pascual-Marqui, 
et al., 1995). These dominant scalp topographies were then fitted back to the ERPs of each 
individual subject to obtain a quantitative estimate of each map’s relative expression across 
subjects and conditions, as defined by the Global Explained Variance (GEV, or goodness of 
fit). GEV represents the sum of the explained variance weighted by the Global Field Power 
(GFP) at each moment in time (Michel & Murray, 2012; Pourtois, et al., 2008). GEV values 
were entered in repeated measures ANOVAs, with recognition level, memory and emotion as 
within-subject factors. Paired t-tests were used as post-hoc comparisons between conditions, 
when required to back up significant interaction effects. Whenever Mauchly’s test indicated 
that the assumption of sphericity had been violated, the degrees of freedom were corrected 
using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates. The alpha level was set at p < 0.05. 
2.5. Source localization analysis 
To estimate the putative neural generators underlying the dominant voltage topographies 
identified at the scalp level by the previous analyses, we used sLORETA (Pascual-Marqui, 
2002). sLORETA is a distributed linear inverse solution based on the neurophysiological 
assumption of coherent co-activation of neighboring cortical areas, known to have highly 
synchronized activity (Silva, et al., 1991). Accordingly, it estimates multiple simultaneously 
active sources without any a priori assumption on the number and position of the underlying 
dipoles (for a mathematical validation of this localization technique, see Sekihara, et al., 
2005). sLORETA solutions are computed within a three-shell spherical head model co-
registered to the MNI152 template (Mazziotta, et al., 2001), restricted to the grey matter and 
the hippocampus. The source locations were therefore given as (x, y, z) coordinates (x from 
left to right; y from posterior to anterior; z from inferior to superior). The estimation of the 
three-dimensional intracerebral current density distribution is performed in 6239 voxels (5 
mm resolution), each containing an equivalent current dipole. The head model for the inverse 
solution uses the electric potential lead field computed with a boundary element method 
applied to the MNI152 template (Fuchs, et al., 2002). Scalp electrode coordinates on the MNI 
brain are derived from the international 5% system (Jurcak, et al., 2007). The calculation of 
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all reconstruction parameters was based on the computed common average reference. 
sLORETA units were scaled to amperes per square meter (A/m2), normalized across subjects, 
and non-parametric statistics were then applied on log transformed data. Direct statistical 
comparisons between conditions were performed in this inverse solution space using repeated 
measures ANOVAs and post-hoc paired t-tests. The level of significance for all theses 
analyses was set at p < 0.05. 
3. Results 
3.1. Emotion classification 
Results of the emotion classification task showed high (i.e., more pleasant) ratings for 
pleasant (M = 6.14, SD = 0.81), intermediate for neutral (M = 4.89, SD = 0.58), and low for 
unpleasant (M = 3.45, SD = 1.06) scenes. A one-way ANOVA performed on these mean 
ratings disclosed a highly significant effect of emotion [F(2, 34) = 39.94, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.701]. Paired samples t-tests carried out on these mean ratings confirmed highly significant 
differences between neutral and unpleasant pictures [t(17) = 4.83, p < .001], as well as 
between neutral and pleasant [t(17) = -7.47, p < .001] and unpleasant and pleasant [t(17) = -
6.81, p < .001] scenes. Thus, participants rated the emotional valence of the pre-selected 
stimuli in accordance with the published normative scores (Lang, et al., 2008). These results 
also confirmed that participants correctly attended to the actual emotional content of the 
scenes throughout the experiment. 
3.2. Errors and late responses for the progressive unfolding 
task 
Participants accurately performed the delayed matching task during gradual stimulus 
revelation. The percentage of errors was negligible (M = 3.66%, SD = 1.85). Likewise, an 
extremely low error rate was obtained for “catch” trials (M = 1.75%, SD = 1.90). The 
percentage of late responses (Responses1 occurring after the last/sixth image level) was also 
negligible (M = 1.71%, SD = 1.18) (see also Table 4). 
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3.3. Accuracy for the progressive unfolding task 
Cumulative percentages of correct responses (i.e., Responses1 only when Responses2 
were correct) are presented in Table 4. A mixed proportional odds model (Agresti, 2007; 
Schettino, et al., 2011) with memory (old, new) and emotion (neutral, emotional) as fixed 
factors, and participant as random effect was carried out on these values, to verify whether 
the psychometric curve shifted as a function of memory and/or emotion (see Figure 1B). This 
analysis revealed an overall earlier recognition for old compared to new scenes, in both 
neutral and emotional conditions (all ps < .001). Interestingly, pairwise comparisons revealed 
a shift of the psychometric curve as a function of the emotional content of the scene, 
indicated by an earlier recognition when the scenes contained a neutral as opposed to an 
emotional content (all ps < .01)3. No significant interaction was found between memory and 
emotion (p = .632). 
3.1. ERP results 
3.1.1. LPP during stimulus encoding 
Figure 2 shows the grand-average ERPs recorded from an array of medial centro-parietal 
electrode sites (A8, A20, B5, where A20 roughly corresponds to Pz in the 10/20 international 
EEG system). These electrodes were selected for illustration purposes after an initial 2 
(emotion) x 9 (electrode) repeated measure ANOVA revealed no significant interaction effect 
between these two factors (p > .05). The analysis performed on the mean amplitude of the 
LPP showed a larger sustained positive component for emotional (M = 5.86 µV, SD = 4.32) 
relative to neutral (M = 4.91 µV, SD = 4.47) scenes. Paired t-tests confirmed a significant 
amplitude difference between neutral and emotional scenes [t(17) = -3.75, p = .002]. Thus, 
these results for the LPP component provided additional evidence for the differential 
processing of the emotional content of the scenes encoded in short-term visual memory prior 
to unfolding. 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 The same mixed proportional odds model did not reveal significant differences between pleasant and 
unpleasant scenes (all ps > .05). 
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Table 4. Mean values and standard deviations (in parenthesis) of cumulative percentages 
of correct responses, errors and late responses, separately for each image level, emotion, and 
memory condition. 
Image Level 
New Old 
Neutral Emotional Neutral Emotional 
Image1 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
Image2 0.10 (0.41) 0.09 (0.39) 1.22 (2.42) 0.32 (0.58) 
Image3 5.01 (5.36) 2.81 (3.16) 13.12 (10.40) 8.90 (6.97) 
Image4 38.88 (17.72) 32.74 (17.19) 56.93 (19.28) 50.62 (16.98) 
Image5 85.66 (14.51) 79.66 (14.55) 90.98 (8.55) 87.90 (11.73) 
Image6 100.00 (0.00) 100.00 (0.00) 100.00 (0.00) 100.00 (0.00) 
Errors 2.96 (2.18) 2.64 (1.67) 4.26 (3.04) 4.77 (3.15) 
Late Responses 1.95 (2.08) 2.08 (1.62) 1.39 (2.23) 1.43 (1.45) 
3.1.1. Topographic analysis of ERPs recorded during the 
unfolding task 
Similarly to our previous study (Schettino, et al., 2011), we found a reliable topographical 
change across recognition levels immediately following the exogenous N1 and P2 ERP 
components (Figure 3A). Because this topographical alteration necessarily indicates changes 
in the configuration of the underlying intracranial generators (Lehmann & Skrandies, 1980; 
Murray, et al., 2008), a detailed characterization of this topographical change starting ~400 
ms following stimulus onset is provided. 
At the offset of the P2 scalp map, for three, two and one image before recognition, an 
occipital positivity with a concurrent, broad frontal negativity was evidenced. Conversely, an 
occipital positivity accompanied by a more focal frontal positivity was observed one image 
before recognition, being then predominant at time of recognition. These two distinctive 
dominant topographical components were then fitted back to the individual ERP data. Based 
on the outcome of the spatiotemporal analysis, we selected a large time interval lasting 120 
ms, namely from 402 to 522 ms after stimulus onset, during which these topographic 
differences were most obvious (Figure 3A). A 2 (map configuration: occipital 
positivity/frontal negativity, occipital positivity/frontal positivity) x 4 (recognition level: 
recognition, one image before, two images before, three images before) repeated measures 
ANOVA on the GEV values obtained for these two specific topographies revealed significant 
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main effects of map configuration [F(1, 17) = 7.40, p = .015, ηp2 = .303] and recognition level 
[F(3, 51) = 10.69, p < .001, ηp2 = .386], as well as a highly significant map configuration x 
image level interaction [F(3, 51) = 9.53, p < .001, ηp2 = .359]. Interestingly, pairwise 
comparisons showed that the GEV of the occipital positivity/frontal positivity map 
progressively increased from three images before recognition to actual recognition (all ps < 
.05, except two images vs. three images before recognition, p = .079) (see Figure 3C). By 
comparison, the GEV of the occipital positivity/frontal negativity showed a different pattern 
(Figure 3B). Paired t-tests revealed a sharp increase in GEV from three to two images before 
recognition [t(17) = -3.88, p = .001], followed by a gradual decrease between two images 
before and time of recognition [t(17) = 3.21, p = .005], as well as between one image before 
and actual recognition [t(17) = 2.67, p = .016]. Thus, this latter topographical scalp map 
explained most of the variance already two images before recognition, but then gradually 
decreased and was replaced by the previously described occipital positivity/frontal positivity. 
 
 
Figure 2. Grand-average LPP recorded from a posterior parietal cluster of electrodes (average of activity 
recorded from electrodes A8, A20, B5), separately for neutral (black line) and emotional (pleasant and 
unpleasant merged; red line) scenes. The black vertical dashed line indicates the onset of the colorful picture. 
The grey area indicates the time window during which the mean amplitude of the LPP was measured (500-1000 
ms post-stimulus onset). LPP was significantly larger (p = .002) for emotional compared to neutral scenes. 
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Next, we investigated whether these two dominant topographical maps were differentially 
influenced by memory, emotional content, or both factors concurrently. Regarding the 
occipital positivity/frontal negativity topography, a 2 (emotion) x 2 (memory) x 4 
(recognition level) repeated measures ANOVA showed a significant memory x recognition 
level interaction [F(3, 51) = 3.28, p = .028, ηp2 = .162], but no significant effect of 
emotion[F(1, 17) = 1.01, p = .330, ηp2 = .056]. A similar 2 x 2 x 4 ANOVA on the GEV 
values of the occipital positivity/frontal positivity map disclosed a significant main effects of 
memory [F(1, 17) = 20.30, p < .001, ηp2 = .544], and a memory x recognition level 
interaction [F(3, 51) = 3.36, p = .026, ηp2 = .165] but, again, no significant effect of emotion 
[F(1, 17) = 0.29, p = .596, ηp2 = .017]. 
Given the lack of statistical significance for the emotion factor, we collapsed GEV values 
for neutral and emotional scenes and further investigated the modulatory role of memory. A 2 
(memory) x 4 (recognition level) repeated measures ANOVA on the GEV values of the 
occipital positivity/frontal negativity map disclosed a significant memory x recognition level 
interaction [F(3, 51) = 3.28, p = .028, ηp2 = .162]. Post-hoc comparison showed higher GEV 
for new compared to old condition two images before recognition [t(17) = 2.52, p = .022] 
(Figure 3B). Thus, this analysis revealed a similar pattern of activity in new and old 
conditions for this occipital positivity/frontal negativity topographical map, with higher GEV 
values for new relative to old condition two images before recognition. 
A comparable 2 x 4 ANOVA was used for the GEV values obtained for the concurrent 
occipital positivity/frontal positivity topography. This analysis showed a significant main 
effect of memory [F(1, 17) = 20.30, p < .001, ηp2 = .544], as well as a significant memory x 
recognition level interaction [F(3, 51) = 3.36, p = .026, ηp2 = .165]. Post-hoc paired t-test 
revealed higher GEV values for new relative to old condition, both one image before [t(17) = 
3.41, p = .003] and at recognition level [t(17) = 4.12, p = .001] (Figure 3C). Thus, a 
comparable, gradual increase in GEV was observed for new and old scenes, with higher 
values for new relative to old condition one image before, as well as at time of recognition. 
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Figure 3. Topographic mapping results. (A, upper panel) Grand-average (N = 18) ERP waveforms, obtained for 
the level corresponding to actual recognition, for all 128 electrodes concurrently (butterfly). The red dashed 
vertical line indicates the onset of the visual stimulus. Exogenous N1 and P2 ERP components were recorded 
after stimulus onset, and were shared across recognition levels. The grey area indicates the time window during 
which a reliable topographical change occurred. (A, lower panel) The spatiotemporal cluster analysis (0-600 ms 
after stimulus onset) revealed reliable topographic differences in a time window spanning 402-522 ms following 
stimulus onset (in red). A dominant occipital positivity/frontal negativity scalp map was recorded for 
recognition level preceding recognition, whereas a concurrent occipital positivity/frontal positivity map was 
evidenced mostly one image before recognition, being then predominant at time of recognition. (B) Statistical 
results, obtained after the fitting procedure, for the GEV of the occipital positivity/frontal negativity scalp map 
identified in the 402-522ms time window following stimulus onset (separately for new vs. old scenes). Results 
showed a sharp increase in GEV from three images to two images before recognition, followed by a progressive 
decrease until recognition. Furthermore, a higher GEV for new relative to old scenes was evidenced two images 
before recognition. (C) On the other hand, a linear increase in GEV as a function of recognition level was 
evident for the concurrent occipital positivity/frontal positivity topography. A higher GEV was observed for 
new compared to old scenes one image before recognition, as well as at recognition. * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p 
< .001. Vertical bars correspond to standard errors of the mean. 
3.1.2. Source localization results 
Using sLORETA (Pascual-Marqui, 2002) we performed statistical non-parametric 
mapping (SnPM) analyses on the average activity estimated during the 402-522ms post-
stimulus onset interval, during which the main topographic change took place across the four 
recognition levels (from three images before up to recognition). We first compared ERP 
activity for three images before recognition to actual recognition (see Schettino, et al., 2011, 
for a similar approach), separately for new and old scenes. This analysis revealed, for new 
scenes, a stronger activation for recognition relative to three images before in the dACC 
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(±10x, +15y, +35z) [t(17) = 2.75, p = .014], whereas symmetrically stronger activity three 
images before compared to recognition was found in the insula (±40x, +15y, 0z) [t(17) = -
3.29, p = .004] (Figure 4, upper panel). On the other hand, the SnPM analysis for old scenes 
showed stronger activity during recognition relative to three images before recognition in a 
non-overlapping network of brain regions, including the PHG (±29x, -49y, -6z) [t(17) = 4.46, 
p < .001] and the fusiform gyrus (FG; ±41x, -45y, -19z) [t(17) = 4.02, p = .001] (Figure 4, 
lower panel). Therefore, these four brain areas (dACC, insula, PHG and FG) were defined as 
regions of interest (ROIs) for further analyses4. For each ROI, we then extracted the mean 
amplitude (current density) value during the same time interval (402-522ms following 
stimulus onset) and statistically assessed potential effects of recognition level and emotion. 
3.1.1. dACC and insula (new scenes) 
Regarding the dACC (Figure 5A), the 2 (emotion) x 4 (recognition level) ANOVA 
performed on the mean current density extracted during the 402-522ms interval post-stimulus 
onset only revealed a significant main effect of recognition level [F(3, 51) = 5.84, p = .002, 
ηp
2
 = .256]. Post-hoc t-tests revealed higher activity for late vs. early recognition levels, as 
evidenced by a significant difference between two images and one image before recognition 
[t(17) = -2.74, p = .014]. Activity remained stable between three images and two images 
before recognition, as well as between one image before and time of recognition (ps > .05) 
(Figure 5A). 
Inverse solution results obtained for the insula in the new condition revealed a similar 
response profile (Figure 5B). However, the emotional content of the scenes visibly influenced 
reconstructed activity in this ROI. A 2 (emotion) x 4 (recognition level) ANOVA disclosed a 
significant emotion x recognition level interaction [F(3, 51) = 3.75, p = .016, ηp2 = .181]. 
Post-hoc analyses showed, for neutral pictures, only a significant difference between three 
images before and time of recognition [t(17) = -2.34, p = .032]. Therefore, activity in the 
insula for neutral pictures was relatively stable until recognition. By contrast, emotional 
scenes elicited higher activity during late stages of accumulation of evidence, as evidenced by 
significantly higher activity one image relative to two images before recognition [t(17) = -
3.17, p = .006]. Activity remained stable between three images and two images before 
                                                 
4
 None of these ROIs showed differential lateralization effects, as confirmed by 2 (side: left, right) x 4 
(recognition level: recognition, one image before, two images before, three images before) repeated measures 
ANOVAs. Accordingly, for each ROI, activity from both hemispheres was combined. 
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recognition, as well as between one image before and time of recognition (ps > .05) (Figure 
5B). 
 
 
Figure 4. Source localization results. (Upper panel) For new scenes, comparing actual recognition to three 
images before recognition during the 402-522 ms post-stimulus onset interval revealed a highly significant 
effect in the dACC (ROI #1: ±10x, +15y, +35z). The reverse contrast (three images before vs. recognition) 
revealed a highly significant effect in the insula (ROI #2: ±40x, +15y, 0z). (Lower panel) For old scenes, a 
nonparametric analysis contrasting actual recognition to three images before recognition revealed increased 
activity in the PHG (ROI #3: ±29x, -49y, -6z), as well as the FG (ROI #4: ±41x, -45y, -19z). L: left; R: right; A: 
anterior; P: posterior. 
3.1.2. PHG and FG (old scenes) 
The response profile of the PHG and FG during recognition of old scenes was reliably 
different compared to the two previous ROIs (i.e., dACC and insula) identified primarily for 
the processing of new scenes. Unlike a somehow categorical difference between early vs. late 
stages of accumulation of perceptual evidence, a linear increase in current source density was 
observed when moving from three images before to actual recognition in the PHG and FG. A 
2 (emotion) x 4 (recognition level) ANOVA on the extracted amplitude values for the PHG 
revealed significant main effects of emotion [F(1, 17) = 6.33, p = .022, ηp2 = .271] and 
recognition level [F(3, 51) = 17.06, p < .001, ηp2 = .501]. Post-hoc comparisons showed 
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higher activity three images before recognition for neutral compared to emotional scenes 
[t(17) = 2.96, p = .009] (Figure 5C). The same analyses performed on the extracted amplitude 
values for the FG led to comparable results. The 2 (emotion) x 4 (recognition level) ANOVA 
showed significant main effects of emotion [F(1, 17) = 8.71, p = .009, ηp2 = .339] and 
recognition level [F(3, 51) = 11.75, p < .001, ηp2 = .409], as well as a significant  emotion x 
recognition level interaction [F(3, 51) = 3.62, p = .019, ηp2 = .176]. As was the case for the 
PHG, the FG showed higher activity for neutral vs. emotional scenes three images before 
recognition [t(17) = 5.62, p < .001] (Figure 5D). 
4. Discussion 
Using advanced EEG methods, we characterized the electrophysiological correlates of 
proactive processes active during the recognition of complex visual scenes and conveying 
either a neutral or an emotional (pleasant or unpleasant) content. We designed a task suited to 
explore the temporal dynamic of these accumulation of evidence processes, and eventually 
assessed whether the emotional content of the scenes could reliably modulate its expression 
or not. Each trial started with the presentation of a colorful neutral or emotional scene to be 
encoded in short-term memory, followed by the gradual unfolding of the same scene content, 
a new one, or a scrambled picture. Participants had to decide whether this latter scene 
progressively unfolded had actually the same identity than the one shown at encoding or not. 
Moreover, we occasionally asked participants to explicitly rate the emotional valence of the 
pictures, a manipulation that was meant to promote the overt processing of the emotional 
content of the scenes throughout the experiment. The acquired ratings confirmed that this 
manipulation was successful. Likewise, results obtained for the LPP component at encoding 
further corroborated this conclusion (Figure 2). Interestingly, a number of important new 
results emerge from this study regarding possible modulatory effects of emotion on the online 
generation of predictions during overt scene recognition, as discussed here below. 
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Figure 5. (A) Extracted current density values for the dACC (new scenes) as a function of recognition level. A 
categorical increase in activity was observed between two images and one image before recognition. (B) 
Activity in the insula for new scenes, separately for neutral and emotional pictures, as a function of time of 
recognition. A stable pattern of activity was evidenced in the insula in response to neutral pictures, confirmed by 
a lack of statistically significant differences among all four recognition levels, except between one image before 
and recognition. By contrast, insula activity sharply increased between two images and one image before 
recognition for emotional scenes. (C) and (D) Extracted current density values for the PHG (C) and the FG (D) 
(old scenes). A monotonic increase of activity in these regions as a function of accumulation of perceptual 
evidence was evidenced. Moreover, higher activity for neutral (dark grey bars) vs. emotional (light grey bars) 
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scenes was found three images before recognition. * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. Vertical bars correspond 
to standard errors of the means. 
4.1. Prolonged exploration for emotional compared to neutral 
scenes 
Behavioral results confirmed that recognition performance was not random in this task, 
but based on the accurate gathering of diagnostic perceptual evidence, as provided by the 
progressive unfolding of the stimulus content and directly constrained by knowledge stored in 
visual short-term memory. As hypothesized, old scenes were recognized systematically 
earlier than new scenes (Figure 1B), providing direct evidence for the use of abstract visual 
representations during unfolding, which were directly shaped by information provided to 
participants at encoding. Moreover, we replicated our previous results (Schettino, et al., 
2011) and found that, regardless of the memory status of the scenes (old vs. new), 
participants dwelt longer on emotional compared to neutral scenes (Figure 1B). Delayed 
recognition for emotional relative to neutral scenes could be explained by differential 
motivational drives between these two categories, including positivity offset (Cacioppo & 
Gardner, 1999; Cacioppo, et al., 1997, 1999; Norris, et al., 2010), as we argued in a recent 
study (Schettino, et al., 2012). According to this general motivational account, participants 
are usually inclined to engage in additional exploratory behavior when encountering emotion-
laden stimuli, especially stimuli carrying an intrinsic hedonic (or rewarding) value. 
Interestingly, the use of mildly arousing scenes in our study, as opposed to mutilations or 
erotica, may have boosted this asymmetry in motivational exploratory strategies between 
emotional and neutral scenes. We found that this motivational effect found in a sample of 
healthy (female) individuals was similar for old and new scenes, which suggests that effects 
of emotion on proactive guesses during scene recognition probably occurred either before or 
after the input stimulus was compared against existing visual representations stored in (short-
term) memory. 
4.2. New and old scenes recruit non-overlapping brain 
networks during proactive visual processes 
The use of high-density EEG allowed us to gain insight into the putative brain networks 
giving rise to proactive processes during scene recognition. Four hundred ms after stimulus 
onset, we found that the topography of the evoked electric field reliably changed depending 
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on the amount of perceptual evidence accumulated, unambiguously revealing changes in the 
configuration of the underlying brain networks (Lehmann & Skrandies, 1980; Michel & 
Murray, 2012; Michel, et al., 1999; Pourtois, et al., 2008). Moreover, these topographical 
effects were different for old vs. new scenes. Two images before recognition, we found that 
the dominant occipital positivity/frontal negativity topographical map was decreased for old 
compared to new scenes, this memory effect later influencing the concurrent occipital 
positivity/frontal positivity scalp map. These results suggest that memory could rapidly alter 
the expression of accumulation of evidence processes taking place prior to overt recognition, 
probably via the activation of non-overlapping brain structures during the processing of old 
vs. new scenes (Bar, 2004; Ranganath & Rainer, 2003). By contrast, the temporal dynamic of 
these two dominant topographical maps was not reliably influenced by the emotional content 
of the scenes, replicating our previous results (Schettino, et al., 2011). 
4.3. Modulatory effect of emotion depends on memory 
In agreement with the assumption of non-overlapping brain networks between new and 
old scenes, our complementary source localization analysis (based on sLORETA) confirmed 
that the processing of old scenes was mostly achieved by a distributed network of ventral 
brains regions, including the PHG and FG, whereas the processing of new scenes involved 
mainly neural changes in more dorsal brain regions at the same latency, including the dACC 
and the insula. Interestingly, we found that activity extracted in these ROIs was influenced by 
the emotional content of the scenes, though at different stages during the accumulation of 
evidence depending on the actual memory status of these scenes (old vs. new). These results 
suggest that emotion may actually exert pervasive effects on these proactive processes during 
scene recognition. Accordingly, the reconstruction and estimation of the neural sources of the 
ERP signal using a linear distributed inverse space (containing 6239 nodes) turned out to be 
more sensitive to capture subtle changes related to the processing of the emotional content of 
the scenes, compared to the topographical mapping analyses carried out at the scalp level 
exclusively (using 128 channels in the present case) (Esslen, Pascual-Marqui, Hell, Kochi, & 
Lehmann, 2004; Pascual-Marqui, Esslen, Kochi, & Lehmann, 2002). This dissociation is not 
surprising though, given the enhanced spatial sensitivity of distributed source localization 
methods (including sLORETA) that enables to reveal subtle differences between 
experimental conditions, which may be otherwise difficult to capture based on local 
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amplitude measurements performed at the sensor level (Brodbeck, et al., 2011; Lantz, 
Menendez, Andino, & Michel, 2001; Michel & Murray, 2012). 
4.4. Enhanced uncertainty during the processing of new scenes 
Activity in the dACC for neutral scenes was low and close to baseline until one image 
before recognition, when a sharp increase took place (see Figure 5A). This specific response 
profile for the dACC, which is consistent with the involvement of this medial frontal region 
in higher-order decision making processes (Bush, et al., 2002; Ridderinkhof, et al., 2004; Seo 
& Lee, 2007), was already found in previous imaging studies looking at accumulation of 
evidence processes taking place during object or scene recognition (Ploran, et al., 2007; 
Ploran, et al., 2011; Schettino, et al., 2011). This sharp increase in the dACC close to 
recognition could reflect either uncertainty or conflict, given the urge to stop the stimulus 
sequence and take a decision before the sequence comes to an end, while the accumulated 
sensory evidence may not be completed yet (Anderson, et al., 2009; Philiastides & Sajda, 
2007; Sohn, et al., 2007). Interestingly, a similar effect in the dACC was already reported in 
our previous ERP topographic mapping study, though based on a different task (Schettino, et 
al., 2011). Hence, this region may be involved in the coding of conflict or uncertainty during 
perceptual-decision making tasks at a more general level (Ridderinkhof, et al., 2004; 
Ullsperger, et al., 2004), particularly when recognition targets are embedded in an emotional 
context (Kanske & Kotz, 2011a, 2011b). 
Not only the dACC, but also the insula showed increased activity in response to new 
scenes, although it additionally showed a modulation according to the emotional content of 
the scenes. In this region, emotion influenced the response profile during the accumulation of 
evidence prior to recognition. Activation of the insula has previously been reported for a 
variety of tasks and stimuli (Craig, 2009), including when exogenous sensory stimuli acquire 
salience (Seeley, et al., 2007), as well as in response to challenging and uncertain perceptual 
tasks (Grinband, Hirsch, & Ferrera, 2006; Philiastides & Sajda, 2007). Likewise, previous 
ERP work based on a similar approach as used here already source-localized the insula 
during the early processing of response errors during a speeded go/nogo task (Dhar, 
Wiersema, & Pourtois, 2011). Presumably, similar effects could explain the involvement of 
the insula in our task, during the accumulation of perceptual evidence prior to recognition. 
Whereas uncertainty likely decreased as a function of accumulation of evidence, at time of 
recognition this process is presumably not completed yet. It is interesting to note that 
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emotional stimuli could somehow exacerbate this process in the insula, thereby shifting the 
neural response earlier in time -- probably because of their intrinsic motivational salience -- 
compared to neutral stimuli. Presumably, the emotional content of the stimulus might actively 
interfere with task demands (memory matching task), resulting in an earlier experience of 
uncertainty or conflict for emotional compared to neutral scenes. 
More generally, the parallel involvement of the insula and dACC in our study during the 
processing of new scenes is not surprising, but consistent with many previous findings 
showing that these two regions likely operate together and eventually form a functional 
network activated across a variety of stimuli and tasks (Ploran, et al., 2007; Seeley, et al., 
2007; Sterzer & Kleinschmidt, 2010), including the implementation of task sets (Dosenbach, 
Fair, Cohen, Schlaggar, & Petersen, 2008; Nelson, et al., 2010), awareness processes (Craig, 
2009; Dhar, et al., 2011; Mayr, 2004), as well as performance monitoring (Ito, Stuphorn, 
Brown, & Schall, 2003; Ridderinkhof, et al., 2004; Wheeler, et al., 2008). 
4.5. Emotion-dependent monotonic accumulation of perceptual 
evidence in ventral object-selective regions during the 
processing of old scenes 
While the processing of new scenes was selectively associated with specific neural effects 
in the dACC and insula starting 400 ms post-stimulus onset, a different picture emerged for 
the processing of old scenes at the same latency, where ventral object-sensitive brain regions 
were found to be significantly more active. Among them, activity in the PHG increased 
linearly as a function of accumulation of evidence, with the lowest amplitude values three 
images before recognition and the highest at time of recognition (see Figure 5C). Given the 
ubiquitous involvement of this specific brain area in the processing of contextual information 
needed for successful scene recognition (Bar & Aminoff, 2003; Bar, Aminoff, & Schacter, 
2008; Kveraga, et al., 2011), we interpreted our results as reflecting similar mechanisms. The 
linear trend found in this region during accumulation of evidence prior to recognition (see 
also Schettino, et al., 2011) is consistent with the assumption that this region is rapidly 
involved in the analysis of diagnostic contextual information, primarily conveyed by 
magnocellular input (Bar, 2004, 2007, 2009b). Interestingly, we found that this response 
profile was not identical for emotional compared to neutral scenes. More specifically, during 
early stages of accumulation of evidence (i.e., three images before recognition), the amplitude 
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of the PHG was significantly lower for emotional compared to neutral scenes. An early 
interference effect probably took place for emotional scenes, eventually preventing the 
initiation of the generative accumulation of evidence process (presumably based on 
contextual information carried by LSF cues) taking place in this region. However, because at 
time of recognition this amplitude difference between neutral and emotional scenes was no 
longer significant, it is likely that a more rapid accumulation of evidence took place in this 
region for emotional compared to neutral scenes. Hence, emotional factors would initially 
interfere with the processing of diagnostic contextual information (based on the extraction of 
LSF cues), but later boost this same process when more evidence is timely gathered and 
accumulated (Figure 5C), presumably based on the concurrent processing of HSF 
information. Such an interpretation is compatible with mounting evidence showing the 
importance of contextual visual information during emotional scene recognition (Barrett & 
Kensinger, 2010; Barrett, Mesquita, & Gendron, 2011; de Gelder, et al., 2006; Righart & de 
Gelder, 2006, 2008a, 2008b). Thus, due to their enhanced biological relevance, emotional 
scenes led to a steeper accumulation of evidence in the PHG relative to neutral scenes. 
A similar outcome was found for the FG. Previous imaging studies already reported the 
involvement of the FG in the gradual accumulation of perceptual evidence (James, et al., 
2000; Malach, et al., 1995). Presumably, a similar accumulation of evidence mechanism took 
place in the FG in our study, although one may argue that the diagnostic visual information 
used by this region may be different compared to the PHG. More specifically, the FG could 
be involved in the accumulation of perceptual evidence based on the rapid extraction of 
invariant object features or viewpoint information, as opposed to contextual information in 
the PHG (Epstein, Harris, Stanley, & Kanwisher, 1999; Grill-Spector & Malach, 2004; 
Malach, et al., 1995; Pourtois, Schwartz, Seghier, Lazeyras, & Vuilleumier, 2005; Pourtois, 
et al., 2010a). 
4.6. Conclusion 
The results of this study shed light on the electrophysiological correlates (and the putative 
underlying brain sources) of accumulation of perceptual evidence prior to scene recognition. 
Four hundred ms following stimulus onset, regions in the dACC and insula were selectively 
active prior to overt recognition of new scenes, likely translating either enhanced uncertainty 
or conflict monitoring during perceptual decision making for this specific condition. By 
contrast, at the same latency following stimulus onset, old scenes recruited primarily ventral 
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object-selective regions during accumulation of perceptual evidence, including the PHG and 
FG. However, an early modulation of their response profile as a function of the emotional 
content of the scenes was observed. Accordingly, even though neural mechanisms underlying 
accumulation of evidence during scene recognition are multiple and can be dissociated based 
on memory (i.e., old vs. new scenes), it is striking to observe that emotion exerts pervasive 
interference effects on these proactive processes during fairly early stages of accumulation of 
perceptual evidence (when the retinal input is still minimal or impoverished), in addition to 
these strong modulatory effects imposed by memory on perception. 
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CHAPTER 5: Valence-specific modulation in the accumulation of perceptual evidence prior to visual scene recognition 
 
Valence-specific modulation in the 
accumulation of perceptual evidence prior to 
visual scene recognition1 
 
Visual scene recognition is a dynamic process through which incoming sensory information 
is iteratively compared with predictions regarding the most likely identity of the input 
stimulus. In this study, we used a novel progressive unfolding task to characterize the 
accumulation of perceptual evidence prior to scene recognition, and its potential modulation 
by the emotional valence of these scenes. Our results show that emotional (pleasant and 
unpleasant) scenes led to slower accumulation of evidence compared to neutral scenes. In 
addition, when controlling for the potential contribution of non-emotional factors (i.e., 
familiarity and complexity of the pictures), our results confirm a reliable shift in the 
accumulation of evidence for pleasant relative to neutral and unpleasant scenes, suggesting a 
valence-specific effect. These findings indicate that proactive iterations between sensory 
processing and top-down predictions during scene recognition are reliably influenced by the 
rapidly extracted (positive) emotional valence of the visual stimuli. We interpret these 
findings in accordance with the notion of a genuine positivity offset during emotional scene 
recognition. 
  
                                                 
1
 Schettino, A., Loeys, T., Bossi, M., & Pourtois, G. (2012). Valence-Specific Modulation in the Accumulation 
of Perceptual Evidence Prior to Visual Scene Recognition. PloS One, 7(5), e38064. 
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1. Introduction 
Visual object recognition has classically been conceived as resulting from a set of serial 
computations performed by dedicated ventral object-selective brain regions located in the 
infero-temporal cortex, eventually enabling to progressively extract the precise meaning of 
the retinal input (Palmer, 1999; Riesenhuber & Poggio, 1999). Whereas bottom-up processes 
are typically emphasized in these hierarchical models, the visual computations performed by 
these object-selective areas are nonetheless susceptible to top-down modulatory effects, 
including selective attention (Blair, et al., 2009; Kim & Rehder, 2011; Treisman & 
Kanwisher, 1998), prior expectations (Rahnev, Lau, & de Lange, 2011; Summerfield & 
Egner, 2009), contextual information (Bar, 2004; Oliva & Torralba, 2007), or decision-
making (Heekeren, et al., 2008; Ridderinkhof, et al., 2004). Therefore, visual object 
recognition processes are not limited to the analysis of sensory information, but they are 
further shaped by higher order (i.e., not strictly perceptual) processes. 
Interestingly, an alternative view has been put forward to account for these complex 
interaction effects between bottom-up sensory processing and top-down modulatory 
influences during recognition. Namely, predictive coding models (Enns & Lleras, 2008; 
Friston, 2005; Friston & Kiebel, 2009; Grossberg, 2009; Lochmann & Deneve, 2011; 
Mumford, 1992; Rao & Ballard, 1999; Spratling, 2008; Ullman, 1995) advocate that visual 
object recognition processes taking place within the infero-temporal cortex result from the 
dynamic interplay between (top-down) predictions and (bottom-up) errors (Alink, et al., 
2010). Predictions reflect prior knowledge related to probable events in the sensory 
environment, and they are employed to reduce the computational burden of visual perception 
by guiding attention towards salient aspects of the environment, as well as facilitating the 
interpretation of ambiguous visual input (Summerfield & Egner, 2009). Whenever a 
discrepancy is detected between these top-down predictions and bottom-up sensory 
processing, an error signal (prediction error) is generated and propagated back to higher-level 
brain regions, with the aim to update or refine the content of the predictions, and in turn 
accommodate online sensory processing with the current specificities carried by the visual 
input (Di Lollo, et al., 2000; Friston, 2005; Rao & Ballard, 1999; Ullman, 1995). In this 
framework, the expected and actual sensory input are dynamically compared at each stage of 
processing by means of recursive loops, until the system is able to generate the most likely 
interpretation of the target object (Friston, 2009; Summerfield & Egner, 2009). 
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Of note, asymmetries in speed of processing and visual pathways between low spatial 
frequency (LSF) and high spatial frequency (HSF) information could potentially provide a 
mechanistic account to explain predictive coding effects during early stages of recognition of 
single objects and complex visual scenes (Bar, et al., 2006). Several studies have already 
established the differential contribution of LSF vs. HSF input in face recognition (Goffaux, et 
al., 2011; Pourtois, Dan, et al., 2005; Winston, et al., 2003), as well as in the processing of 
complex visual scenes (Carretié, Hinojosa, Lopez-Martin, & Tapia, 2007; Oliva & Schyns, 
1997; Schyns & Oliva, 1994; Torralba & Oliva, 2003). More precisely, LSF information 
seems more useful in identifying the gist of the scene in conditions of fast stimulus 
presentation (i.e., 30 ms), whereas for longer durations (150 ms) observers rely more on HSF 
information (Schyns & Oliva, 1994). Interestingly, because LSF information travels rapidly 
from early sensory visual areas to prefrontal and anterior temporal regions (via magnocellular 
projections), this early coarse analysis of the visual input might actually serve to generate 
predictions about its content (Bar, 2003, 2004, 2007, 2009b; Kveraga, Ghuman, & Bar, 
2007). 
Nonetheless, all the models reviewed so far have dealt with the processing of neutral 
visual stimuli, exclusively. Hence, the question remains whether, when encountering 
emotion-laden objects or scenes, perceptual processes underlying these proactive guesses are 
comparable to those involved during the processing of neutral stimuli or not. In fact, given 
the accumulating empirical evidence showing that emotion does not simply add a specific 
flavor to perception but can have profound influences in stimulus processing, both at the 
behavioral and neural levels (Barrett & Bar, 2009; Bocanegra & Zeelenberg, 2009; Öhman, 
Flykt, et al., 2001; Phelps, et al., 2006; Vuilleumier, 2005; Vuilleumier & Pourtois, 2007), 
one can argue that predictive coding during visual scene recognition may reliably be 
influenced by emotional factors. However, this question has received little empirical support, 
and it is therefore still unclear whether mechanisms of predictive coding may change during 
visual scene recognition or not, depending on the extracted emotional content or value of the 
incoming stimulus. To address this issue, we recently developed and validated a new 
experimental paradigm. It enables us to study effects of emotion (i.e., valence and/or arousal) 
on the speed of proactive guesses during scene recognition, both at the behavioral and 
electrophysiological (event-related brain potentials, ERPs) levels (Schettino, et al., 2011). For 
each individual trial, participants were presented with series of filtered images that were 
gradually unfolding the content of a complex visual scene while they had to perform an 
(orthogonal) animacy judgment task. Each trial began with the presentation of a blurred 
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image, whose content was progressively revealed by increasing, in up to six sequential, 
parametric and predictive steps, the amount of diagnostic LSF and HSF information. 
Therefore, this procedure mimicked a “coarse-to-fine” accumulation of perceptual evidence 
(Bar, 2003; Bullier, 2001; Hegdé, 2008; Navon, 1977; Schyns & Oliva, 1994). Importantly, 
the visual scenes used in this study (extracted from a standard database) could be neutral, 
pleasant or unpleasant, based on independent arousal and valence ratings obtained for these 
visual stimuli. Behavioral results confirmed that this task was suited to study predictive 
coding effects during scene recognition because participants did not respond randomly, but 
they accumulated sufficient perceptual evidence before deciding, with high accuracy, whether 
the content of the scene was living or not (Gold & Shadlen, 2007; Heekeren, et al., 2008; 
Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008; Smith & Ratcliff, 2004). Importantly, this effect was not identical 
for the three emotion categories. Participants probably accumulated perceptual evidence less 
rapidly (reflected in prolonged recognition) for emotional compared to neutral scenes, this 
effect being most obvious for pictures having a pleasant content. These results could be 
interpreted as reflecting a negativity bias during scene recognition (Cacioppo & Ito, 1999; 
Ito, et al., 1998). Negativity bias refers to the fact that aversive stimuli usually elicit stronger 
responses compared to appetitive ones, leading in turn to a faster recognition for unpleasant 
relative to pleasant pictures. However, the prolonged exploration for pleasant scenes was also 
consistent with the concurrent activation of positivity offset during scene recognition (Ito, et 
al., 1998; Norris, et al., 2010). In this view, when input to the affect system is minimal, 
positivity may outweigh negativity. Due to their intrinsic hedonic value, pleasant scenes 
could therefore be associated with prolonged exploration. Hence, behavioral results of this 
study (Schettino, et al., 2011) were equivocal with regard to the underlying emotional or 
motivational drive accounting for these findings. 
Whereas these results shed light on mechanisms underlying the generation of proactive 
guesses during scene recognition and how emotion may influence these complex processes, a 
main question also arose regarding the specificity of these effects. For instance, considering 
the fact that we used an orthogonal task (i.e., animacy judgment), it is conceivable that the 
emotional content of the scene had little or no direct impact on the expression of processes 
involved in accumulation of perceptual evidence (Pessoa, 2008; Pessoa, Kastner, et al., 2002; 
Spruyt, et al., 2009; Spruyt, et al., 2007). Moreover, it was unclear from these results alone 
whether emotion as such, or other non-controlled factors, may actually have produced the 
change in the rate of accumulation of evidence between emotional and neutral scenes. 
Presumably, the selected visual scenes did not differ only regarding the actual emotional 
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content, but also their intrinsic picture complexity and/or familiarity, even though we took 
special care to minimize obvious perceptual and structural differences across the three 
emotion categories (Schettino, et al., 2011). However, if the neutral vs. emotional scenes 
selected in our study were not properly balanced along these two specific non-emotional 
dimensions (i.e., picture complexity and familiarity), we cannot exclude the possibility that 
the reported behavioral effects may be imputed to these factors, rather than the differential 
processing of the emotional content during scene recognition. Presumably, more complex or 
less familiar visual scenes might be associated with delayed accumulation of evidence in our 
task. Hence the question remains whether the prolonged accumulation of evidence found in 
our study for emotional relative to neutral scenes may (at least partly) be explained by 
changes in picture complexity and/or familiarity across the three emotion categories, rather 
than the emotional content per se (Schettino, et al., 2011). Therefore, the goal of the present 
study was to assess whether trial-by-trial variations along these two dimensions may 
overshadow or confound genuine effects of emotion during the accumulation of perceptual 
evidence prior to scene recognition or not. 
We referred to picture complexity as the extent to which a target object in the foreground 
can be easily segregated from its background (Bradley, et al., 2007). Figure-ground 
segregation is a fundamental process in visual scene recognition (Craft, et al., 2007; Driver & 
Baylis, 1996; Roelfsema, Lamme, Spekreijse, & Bosch, 2002). Following initial sensory 
registration of contours, the visual system automatically groups regions adjacent to each 
contour with either the main figure in the foreground or the background, thereby prioritizing, 
in the subsequent analysis, all regions grouped with the figure (Albright & Stoner, 2002). 
However, despite the ubiquitous importance of this gestalt mechanism in vision, previous 
research has found only weak correlations between picture complexity (e.g., figure-ground 
segregation) and visual emotion processing (Bradley, et al., 2007; Carretié, et al., 2007; 
Carretié, et al., 2004; Wiens, Sand, & Olofsson, 2011). As a matter of fact, motivationally 
relevant stimuli, particularly emotional scenes, usually influence late perceptual or even post-
perceptual stages of processing, presumably after earlier mechanisms contributing to figure-
ground segregation come into play (Schupp, et al., 2006; Schupp, et al., 2007). However, all 
these studies used (relatively) brief and static presentations of fully detailed neutral vs. 
emotional stimuli, therefore strongly limiting the online generation of predictions about the 
actual identity of the incoming visual input. Therefore, these earlier studies did not allow to 
titrate the potential influence of picture complexity on the accumulation of evidence leading 
to (emotion) scene recognition. We predicted that, in our experiment, picture complexity 
160  CHAPTER 5 
might actually influence accumulation of evidence, indicated by slower accumulation rates 
for pictures characterized by a more complex, as opposed to less complex content (i.e., a less 
vs. a more obvious figure-ground segregation). 
Familiarity, on the other hand, was defined as the frequency of encounter associated with 
a given stimulus (picture content), following standard practice (Libkuman, et al., 2007). 
Familiarity is a relevant construct to take into account in the present case, given its potential 
overlap with emotion processes. In fact, novelty has been found to elicit threat-like 
cardiovascular responses in social situations involving the violation of stereotypical 
expectations (Mendes, et al., 2007). Moreover, a comparable startle reflex was observed for 
novel and emotional pictures (Bradley, et al., 1993). These negative evaluations of 
novel/unfamiliar stimuli could be due to the difficulty with which individuals extract 
diagnostic information necessary for a quick and efficient recognition (Winkielman, Schwarz, 
Fazendeiro, & Reber, 2003). Specifically, high fluency (i.e., enhanced processing facilitation) 
is accompanied by an increase of positive affective reactions, as evidenced by more positive 
judgments of neutral pictures presented for a prolonged period of time (Winkielman & 
Cacioppo, 2001). This effect could potentially explain well-known psychological phenomena 
such as “mere-exposure”, that is people’s general tendency to prefer stimuli they are 
repeatedly exposed to (Monahan, Murphy, & Zajonc, 2000; Zajonc, 1968, 2001). 
Accordingly, it is important to establish whether familiarity, rather than emotion (i.e., valence 
and/or arousal), may account for changes in accumulation of evidence prior to recognition. 
Given the evidence reviewed here above, we predicted more familiar scenes to be recognized 
earlier than less familiar scenes in our experiment. 
To address these questions, we designed a new experiment based on the previously 
validated progressive unfolding task (Schettino, et al., 2011) and collected data in a sample of 
healthy adult participants. Noteworthy, in addition to the main memory matching task (old-
new judgment; see below), we instructed participants to directly attend to the emotional 
content of the stimuli by occasionally asking them to rate the emotional valence of the scenes. 
These instructions are at variance with the animacy judgment task used in our previous study 
(Schettino, et al., 2011). We reasoned that this manipulation should augment the relevance of 
emotional features during the task (Spruyt, et al., 2009), and hence the likelihood to observe 
reliable differences between the three emotion categories (neutral, pleasant and unpleasant) 
during accumulation of evidence prior to scene recognition. Furthermore, each and every 
scene used during the main experiment was subsequently rated in terms of familiarity and 
picture complexity by two independent samples of participants, using standard 9-point Likert 
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scales. Afterwards, we used these independent ratings in a single-trial analysis to assess 
whether systematic changes in accumulation of evidence prior to recognition (as measured in 
the main progressive unfolding experiment) might be confounded by variations along picture 
complexity and/or familiarity. More specifically, we assessed whether the prolonged 
exploration for emotional compared to neutral scenes (see results) might be due to systematic 
changes in picture complexity and/or familiarity across these categories. 
2. Methods 
2.1. Ethics statement 
The study was approved by the ethics committee of the Faculty of Psychological and 
Educational Sciences, Ghent University. All participants were required to give written 
informed consent prior to their participation. 
2.2. Participants 
Eighteen psychology students (all women, mean age 21 years, range 18-26) participated in 
the main experiment (progressive unfolding task) in exchange of 30€. In addition, 20 
volunteers (15 women, mean age 23 years, range 18-34) participated in the picture 
complexity rating experiment, whereas another sample of 21 participants (17 women, mean 
age 23 years, range 19-37) completed the familiarity rating experiment. Each participant of 
the two rating experiments received 8€. All individuals were native Dutch speaking, right-
handed, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, with no history of neurological or 
psychiatric disorders. 
2.3. Stimuli 
The visual stimuli were selected from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS) 
(Lang, et al., 2008), a standard database containing neutral and emotionally-evocative 
pictures depicting objects and scenes across various ecological situations. This database 
provides normative ratings for the basic dimensions of emotion -- including arousal and 
valence -- using the Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM) (Bradley & Lang, 1994). The stimulus 
list consisted of 360 pictures, equally divided into three emotion categories according to their 
standardized valence scores: neutral, unpleasant and pleasant (Table 1). Notably, these 
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pictures were selected on the basis of mean valence and arousal ratings reported by female 
responders (Lang, et al., 2008), because only women eventually participated in the main 
experiment (see above). Since the main purpose was to assess valence-specific effects during 
scene recognition, the selected pleasant and unpleasant scenes were properly balanced with 
regard to levels of arousal (see Table 1). Similarly to our previous study (Schettino, et al., 
2011), highly pleasant (i.e., erotic situations) or highly unpleasant (i.e., mutilations) scenes 
were not included in the stimulus set, given the specific emotion responses often associated 
with these two categories (Schupp, et al., 2006, 2007). Moreover, we included 16 additional 
neutral pictures that were only used during the practice session (therefore not considered in 
the subsequent statistical analyses). Finally, 36 supplementary neutral scenes were scrambled 
(i.e., each picture was divided into grids of 255 x 255 pixels, which were randomly shuffled 
10 times), thereby disrupting the content of the scene. Thus, a total of 412 IAPS pictures 
(including practice and scrambled trials) were shown to participants of the main experiment, 
while participants of the two rating experiments were presented with the 360 main pictures 
(excluding practice and scrambled scenes)2. 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 Number codes of pictures selected from the database (Lang, et al., 2008) are provided, for each category 
separately. Practice: 2107, 2600, 2980, 5533, 5731, 6837, 7017, 7030, 7036, 7055, 7057, 7140, 7224, 7365, 
8121, 8312. Neutral: 1350, 1616, 1675, 1903, 1935, 1947, 2025, 2026, 2034, 2191, 2272, 2273, 2279, 2308, 
2357, 2377, 2382, 2383, 2390, 2396, 2445, 2446, 2489, 2495, 2514, 2575, 2579, 2593, 2595, 2597, 2606, 2702, 
2720, 2749, 2850, 2880, 4090, 4150, 4220, 4250, 4255, 4274, 4275, 4320, 4325, 4605, 4750, 5040, 5395, 5500, 
5531, 5532, 5534, 5535, 5900, 6570.2, 7001, 7002, 7003, 7009, 7011, 7014, 7016, 7018, 7019, 7021, 7032, 
7033, 7037, 7038, 7042, 7043, 7044, 7045, 7058, 7061, 7062, 7081, 7096, 7130, 7160, 7161, 7170, 7180, 7184, 
7186, 7188, 7190, 7207, 7236, 7242, 7247, 7248, 7249, 7255, 7287, 7300, 7354, 7484, 7487, 7493, 7500, 7503, 
7506, 7512, 7513, 7546, 7547, 7550, 7590, 7595, 7710, 7820, 7830, 8241, 8311, 8325, 9210, 9260, 9700. 
Unpleasant: 1230, 1240, 1270, 1275, 1280, 1390, 1505, 1617, 1945, 2115, 2130, 2141, 2205, 2276, 2278, 2400, 
2455, 2456, 2525, 2681, 2682, 2694, 2695, 2700, 2715, 2716, 2718, 2745.2, 2750, 2752, 2770, 2795, 2799, 
2810, 2900.1, 3061, 3160, 3181, 3190, 3210, 3216, 3280, 3300, 3301, 4621, 4635, 4770, 5970, 5973, 6000, 
6240, 6241, 6311, 6314, 6561, 6562, 6610, 6800, 6832, 7013, 7023, 7079, 7092, 7136, 7137, 7520, 7521, 8231, 
9002, 9005, 9008, 9031, 9041, 9045, 9046, 9080, 9090, 9102, 9145, 9171, 9180, 9182, 9186, 9265, 9270, 9290, 
9291, 9295, 9320, 9330, 9331, 9341, 9342, 9390, 9395, 9402, 9404, 9411, 9415, 9417, 9419, 9421, 9435, 9440, 
9445, 9469, 9471, 9561, 9584, 9592, 9596, 9635.2, 9830, 9831, 9832, 9912, 9913, 9922, 9926, 9927. Pleasant: 
1340, 1463, 1540, 1590, 1595, 1640, 1659, 1660, 1720, 1721, 1811, 1999, 2055.2, 2056, 2092, 2151, 2156, 
2158, 2224, 2274, 2300, 2331, 2344, 2346, 2352, 2398, 2605, 2616, 2655, 3005.2, 4500, 4530, 4534, 4536, 
4559, 4571, 4600, 4601, 4603, 4606, 4610, 4612, 4614, 4616, 4617, 4619, 4623, 4624, 4641, 5199, 5215, 5260, 
5301, 5480, 5600, 5622, 5628, 5660, 5700, 5814, 5829, 5831, 5849, 5990, 5994, 6250.2, 7200, 7230, 7250, 
7260, 7279, 7281, 7282, 7286, 7289, 7291, 7350, 7352, 7390, 7400, 7410, 7430, 7440, 7460, 7461, 7470, 7477, 
7481, 7482, 7488, 7489, 7492, 7496, 7501, 7505, 7508, 7515, 7570, 8032, 8050, 8118, 8120, 8162, 8208, 8220, 
8280, 8340, 8350, 8371, 8420, 8460, 8461, 8465, 8467, 8497, 8503, 8510, 8531, 8540, 8620; Scrambled: 1112, 
1303, 1310, 1645, 1726, 1908, 2002, 2018, 2032, 2038, 2101, 2102, 2104, 2122, 2190, 2220, 2221, 2393, 2440, 
2441, 2458, 2480, 2484, 2493, 2506, 2512, 2516, 2518, 2570, 2580, 2635, 2704, 2780, 2830, 2840, 9070. 
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Table 1. Mean values and standard deviations (in parenthesis) of normative valence and 
arousal scores for the selected IAPS pictures. 
Emotion category Valence Arousal 
Neutral 5.14 (1.38) 3.68 (2.05) 
Unpleasant 3.17 (1.61) 4.94 (2.15) 
Pleasant 6.95 (1.70) 4.97 (2.30) 
Note. Scores range from 1 to 9. Independent samples t-test confirmed a highly significant difference in valence 
between neutral and unpleasant [t(119) = 29.34, p < .001], neutral and pleasant [t(119) = -26.82, p < .001] and 
unpleasant and pleasant [t(119) = -52.58, p < .001] scenes. Significant differences were also observed in levels 
of arousal, specifically between neutral and unpleasant [t(119) = -29.34, p < .001] and neutral and pleasant 
[t(119) = -30.98, p < .001] pictures. However, no significant arousal difference was evidenced between 
unpleasant and pleasant scenes [t(119) = -0.77, p = .441], confirming a balanced level of activation between 
these two emotion conditions. 
 
Each neutral, unpleasant and pleasant scene was arbitrarily paired with another one from 
the same emotion category based on low-level visual similarities, assessed by systematic 
visual inspection. More specifically, for each emotion category separately, pictures with a 
clear distinction between a central figure and a homogeneous background were paired 
together (e.g., a coffee mug on a table vs. a pocket watch on a dark background), and the 
same strategy was applied for more complex scenes (e.g., a traffic jam vs. a woman in the 
crowd). These pairs were used during the main task to minimize the use of purely perceptual, 
pixel-to-pixel matching strategies (see here below). All the pairs created with this procedure 
are reported in Table 2. 
The selected IAPS scenes were resized to 922 x 691 pixels (90% of the original size) and 
pre-processed similarly to our previous study (Schettino, et al., 2011): after grayscale 
conversion, six bandpass spatial frequency filters were applied on every picture (using 
ImageJ v1.44 software; http://rsb.info.nih.gov/ij/) (Delplanque, et al., 2007). As a result, six 
distinct levels of filtering were obtained for every IAPS scene, each containing a different 
amount of low and high spatial frequency information (Schettino, et al., 2011). All these 
modified pictures were finally resized to 768 x 576 pixels (75% of the original IAPS 
pictures). 
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Table 2. Stimulus pairs created for the progressive unfolding task. 
Pair 
number 
Stimulus pairs 
Neutral Unpleasant Pleasant 
First 
element 
Second 
element 
First 
element 
Second 
element 
First 
element 
Second 
element 
1 2191 7513 2455 9180 1640 7286 
2 2272 7500 2525 9635.2 1660 4641 
3 2308 4250 3300 2752 2158 2156 
4 2357 8311 5970 2694 2274 8208 
5 2382 7242 5973 9912 2605 7291 
6 2390 5535 6000 2115 2616 2300 
7 2514 7061 6241 6832 4530 4500 
8 2575 2273 6610 6800 4600 2398 
9 2579 2595 7013 9926 4616 4610 
10 2606 7037 7079 9041 4619 7260 
11 2880 7493 7136 9186 4624 7410 
12 4090 7003 7137 7092 5260 7440 
13 5040 7161 8231 9440 5622 8620 
14 5900 6570.2 9080 2715 5831 2056 
15 7009 7190 9102 6314 5849 5628 
16 7011 4320 9171 2718 5990 7496 
17 7014 2377 9182 2456 5994 8120 
18 7021 7248 9265 9031 6250.2 8032 
19 7038 5532 9290 9320 7200 8510 
20 7042 2034 9291 9342 7279 7489 
21 7044 7130 9330 9832 7430 7352 
22 7045 2396 9395 3181 7460 5480 
23 7062 7186 9415 9471 7477 8465 
24 7207 7032 9417 6561 7482 8540 
25 7287 2026 9421 2900.1 7501 7505 
26 7484 7096 9435 7520 7508 5199 
27 7503 1350 9584 9469 7570 5814 
28 7590 2850 9592 9270 8460 8497 
29 7830 7546 9596 2205 8461 2352 
30 9260 4275 9831 9402 8503 7470 
31 1616 2445 1270 1275 1340 8420 
32 1675 2593 1230 2799 1463 8280 
33 1903 7255 1240 1617 1540 1595 
34 1947 5531 1280 9830 1590 1720 
35 2025 7506 1390 2745 1721 8340 
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Pair 
number 
Stimulus pairs 
Neutral Unpleasant Pleasant 
First 
element 
Second 
element 
First 
element 
Second 
element 
First 
element 
Second 
element 
36 2446 2383 1505 9002 2224 4606 
37 2489 1935 1945 9419 2331 8350 
38 2495 2702 2130 9045 2344 1811 
39 2720 7033 2141 9090 3005.2 4571 
40 2749 4325 2276 2681 4536 2346 
41 4150 2597 2682 2795 4559 2055.2 
42 4274 7160 2695 9404 4601 7282 
43 4750 4255 2716 2700 4603 8162 
44 5534 7547 2810 9913 4612 2151 
45 7018 9210 3061 6311 4614 7488 
46 7019 7300 3160 9005 4617 2092 
47 7043 7016 3190 7521 4623 7481 
48 7081 7001 3210 6240 5301 8531 
49 7170 7002 3216 4770 5600 7350 
50 7180 4605 3280 6562 5660 5215 
51 7184 7236 4635 9008 7230 1999 
52 7188 7820 9445 9927 7250 7461 
53 7247 7249 2278 9295 7281 2655 
54 7354 7058 2400 9145 7390 5700 
55 7487 8325 2770 9341 7492 5829 
56 7512 2279 9390 7023 7515 8467 
57 7550 4220 9922 9561 8050 4534 
58 7595 5395 9046 4621 8118 1659 
59 7710 5500 2750 9411 8220 7289 
60 8241 9700 3301 9331 8371 7400 
Note. These numbers refer to picture codes, as available in the original database (Lang, et al., 2008). 
2.4. Procedure 
Participants were individually tested in a small, dimly lit room, and seated at a viewing 
distance of 75 cm in front of a 19" CRT computer screen (refresh rate: 100 Hz). After filling 
out the informed consent, they were presented with task instructions, followed by a practice 
block containing 16 neutral pictures. Then, they moved on to the experimental session, 
divided into twelve blocks, each containing 33 trials. Each trial had the following structure. A 
colorful, fully detailed picture (922 x 691 pixels, subtending 18.5° x 13.9° of visual angle) 
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was first presented on the screen for 1500 ms, followed by a grayscale mask displayed for 
2000 ms. Then, the actual unfolding sequence (Schettino, et al., 2011) began. A fixation cross 
appeared in the center of the screen for 250 ms. The first grayscale, blurred image level of a 
given picture (768 x 576 pixels, 15.4° x 11.6°) was then presented for 500 ms, followed by a 
250ms blank screen. Next, the second image level of the same picture (identical pixel size, 
but containing slightly more HSF and LSF information) was displayed for 500 ms, plus the 
250ms blank screen, and the same procedure was repeated until the presentation of the sixth, 
non-filtered image level. The inter-trial interval was constant and set at 1000 ms (Figure 1A). 
This experimental manipulation was used to promote a gradual and predictive accumulation 
of perceptual evidence by progressively adding, in a stepwise fashion, high and low spatial 
frequency information to the first undistinguishable picture (Schettino, et al., 2011). 
Importantly, the grayscale and resize conversions relative to the original colorful scene 
(presented at the beginning of each trial) were applied to discourage participants to use a 
pixel-to-pixel matching strategy to perform the task. Two separate and consecutive responses 
were required. First, participants were asked to press a button on a response box (Cedrus RB-
730; http://www.cedrus.com/responsepads/rb730.htm) with their right index finger as soon as 
they felt they gathered enough perceptual evidence to decide, with sufficient confidence, 
whether the content of the unfolded scene was either the same as the one displayed at the 
beginning of the trial, a new one, or a new scrambled picture (Response1). These scrambled 
pictures, for which a separate response was required (see below), were used as “catch” trials 
to ensure that participants reliably attended to the content of the scenes. Pressing the button 
immediately interrupted the presentation of the stimulus sequence. After 500 ms, participants 
were required to perform a three-alternative forced choice delayed matching task, in order to 
validate their first response (Response1). Specifically, they had to press, on a standard 
AZERTY keyboard, the “O” key if the unfolded scene was the same as the colorful one 
previously presented (“old” condition), the “N” key if these two scenes were different (“new” 
condition), or the “S” key if the unfolded scene was displaying a meaningless content 
(“scrambled” condition). All these responses, for which no time constraint was established, 
were coded as Response2. The main purpose of this dual response procedure was to 
dissociate early visual detection (Response1) from the overt discrimination of the scene 
requiring a specific stimulus-response mapping (Response2) (Schettino, et al., 2011). 
Participants were asked to focus on accuracy, but at the same time they were encouraged not 
to wait until the end of the unfolding sequence to decide about the content of the visual scene 
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(Response1). Responses1 occurring after the presentation of the last/sixth image level were 
therefore classified as late responses and analyzed separately. 
To promote the use of abstract visual representations during overt scene recognition, 
another experimental manipulation was applied besides the aforementioned inclusion of 
scrambled pictures as “catch” trials. Specifically, half of the ”old” scenes (i.e., unfolded 
pictures that were identical to the previously encountered colorful scenes) were unpredictably 
flipped along the horizontal axis between encoding (colorful picture) and retrieval 
(unfolding). Participants were informed that an “old” response was expected for these 
“flipped” pictures, since the main task required them to focus on the content of each scene to 
perform the matching task. In the subsequent behavioral analyses, “old flipped” and “old 
unflipped” trials were combined into a single “old” condition, to be compared to “new” trials. 
In sum, for each emotion category (neutral, pleasant, unpleasant), two trial types were 
contrasted: “old” (N = 180), in which the identity of the initial colorful picture was identical 
to the scene progressively unfolded, and “new” (N = 180), meaning that the identities of the 
colorful and unfolded scene were different (although matched as far as possible in terms of 
low level visual properties using specific stimulus pairs; see the Stimuli section). Hence, for 
“new” scenes, we used the pairs previously created (see Table 2), with one picture of the pair 
used as colorful image (encoding) and the other used during unfolding (counterbalanced 
across participants). We created several stimulus lists such that, across participants, each 
picture appeared equally often in the “new” and “old” conditions. Importantly, for “new” 
scenes, no change in terms of emotional content ever occurred between the colorful picture 
and the scene gradually revealed during unfolding. Accordingly, a neutral colorful picture 
was always followed by the unfolding of a neutral scene, and the same occurred for emotion-
laden stimuli (pleasant-pleasant; unpleasant-unpleasant; see also Table 2). The order of “old”, 
“new” and “scrambled” trials was randomized. 
Finally, in order to verify whether the emotional content of the selected IAPS pictures was 
actually perceived as such and in line with the normative ratings (Lang, et al., 2008), as well 
as to keep the emotional content task-relevant throughout the experiment, participants were 
occasionally asked, after the registration of Response2, to also rate the emotional valence of 
the colorful scene presented at the beginning of each trial by means of a standard 9-point 
SAM (Bradley & Lang, 1994), with anchor 1 corresponding to “very unpleasant” and anchor 
9 to “very pleasant”. This additional emotion classification task concerned 10% of the total 
number of trials. Such manipulation was also employed to increase the likelihood to detect 
reliable differences between emotional and neutral scenes during accumulation of evidence 
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prior to scene recognition because, with these specific task demands, participants had to 
attend to the emotional content of the scene (Spruyt, et al., 2009; Spruyt, et al., 2007). 
Stimulus presentation and behavioral response recordings were controlled using E-Prime 
2.0. (http://www.pstnet.com/products/e-prime/). 
2.5. Rating experiments 
Participants were tested in pairs in a dimly lit room, seated at a viewing distance of 75 cm 
in front of individual 19" CRT screens. In each pair, one member was assigned to rate 
familiarity while the other was asked to focus on picture complexity of the pre-selected IAPS 
scenes. After completing the informed consent, they were presented with task instructions, 
including examples. Then, they moved on to the experimental session, divided into six blocks 
of 60 trials, separated by short breaks. After an initial fixation cross displayed for 500 ms, 
neutral, pleasant and unpleasant colorful pictures (hence corresponding to the picture 
presented at the beginning of each trial of the main progressive unfolding experiment) were 
presented on the screen in randomized order for 2000 ms. Participants were asked to ignore 
the hedonic valence of the scenes and provide either familiarity or picture complexity ratings 
(depending on the condition they were assigned to) using 9-point Likert scales. In case of 
familiarity judgments, the question was: ”How often have you encountered a scene like the 
one depicted in the picture?”. Scores ranged from 1 (never) to 9 (very often). Raters judging 
picture complexity, on the other hand, were presented with the question: “Do you consider 
this picture as having a homogeneous background and an obvious central figure or do you 
perceive it as more ‘noisy?’”, with “clear figure-ground” anchoring the lower end of the scale 
and “complex scene” anchoring the upper end. The visual stimuli were never displayed on 
the screen during the rating phase. 
E-Prime 2.0 was used for stimulus presentation and response recordings. 
2.6. Analysis of behavioral data 
One-way ANOVAs and post-hoc t-tests were used to verify that the emotional content of 
the scenes was perceived by our participants in agreement with the normative ratings, as well 
as to explore differences between neutral, unpleasant and pleasant pictures in terms of 
familiarity and picture complexity. 
Accuracy on the progressive unfolding task was expressed as percentage of correct 
responses. Moments of recognition (Responses1) across the six image levels were not 
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independent of each other: in fact, perceptual evidence was gradually accumulating based on 
visual input provided by previous image levels. Therefore, cumulative percentages were 
calculated. This procedure resulted in six psychometric curves showing the evolution of 
recognition performance across the six image levels, separately for each memory (old, new) 
and emotion (neutral, unpleasant, pleasant) condition. To characterize effects of emotion and 
memory on recognition performance, we used a proportional odds model with memory and 
emotion as predictors (Agresti, 2007). This complex model provides a regression analysis for 
ordinal dependent variables (recognition from image level 1,..., recognition from image level 
6). This data analysis, performed at the single-trial level, allows to model the cumulative 
probability up to and including recognition from each image level k (k = 1, ..., 5). The derived 
odds ratio expresses how much the odds of recognition from image level k or earlier is 
increased (if larger than 1) or decreased (if smaller than 1) across new, old, neutral and 
emotional (unpleasant and pleasant) contents, and thus provides a single number capturing 
the shift in psychometric curve. To account for dependencies of trials within the same 
subject, a multi-level version of the proportional odds model was used, similarly to our 
previous study (Schettino, et al., 2011). 
Next, we included the mean scores (averaged across raters) of familiarity and picture 
complexity obtained for each individual picture as additional predictors in the proportional 
odds model. We verified whether any effect of emotion and/or memory on recognition 
performance obtained during the main progressive unfolding experiment could be explained 
by a concurrent effect of familiarity and/or picture complexity. 
The level of significance for all these analyses was set at p < 0.05. To control for Type I 
error, a conservative Bonferroni correction was applied to each of the six pairwise 
comparisons of interest (i.e., emotion, 3 levels; memory, 2 levels) evaluated in each statistical 
model for the accuracy. 
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Figure 1. Trial presentation and results of the emotional classification task. (A) Main trial types during the 
progressive unfolding experiment. A colorful neutral, unpleasant or pleasant IAPS scene (not shown here for 
copyright reasons) was first presented for 1500 ms, in random order. Following a 2000 ms uniform mask, the 
same scene (45%), a new one (45%), or a scrambled picture (10%) was progressively revealed in grayscale, 
using six successive steps varying in a monotonic fashion regarding the content of LSF and HSF information. 
Each image level was presented for 500 ms, followed by a 250ms blank screen. Participants had to press a pre-
defined button as soon as they could decide whether the gradually unfolded scene was the one seen at the 
beginning of the trial, a new one, or a scrambled picture (Response1). Five hundred milliseconds after 
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Response1, participants validated their choice and indicated whether the scene was ‘‘old’’, ‘‘new’’ or 
‘‘scrambled’’ by pressing one out of three buttons (Response2). (B) Results of the emotion classification task 
(occurring after Response2 on 10% of the trials) showed higher scores (corresponding to more pleasant pictures) 
for pleasant scenes (white bar), followed by neutral (light grey bar) and unpleasant (dark grey bar) scenes. ***: 
p < .001. Vertical bars correspond to standard errors of the means. 
3. Results 
3.1. Emotion classification task during the progressive 
unfolding experiment 
Results showed higher ratings for pleasant scenes (M = 6.14, SD = 0.81), followed by 
neutral (M = 4.89, SD = 0.58) and unpleasant (M = 3.45, SD = 1.06) pictures. A one-way 
ANOVA on these ratings disclosed a highly significant effect of emotion [F(2, 34) = 39.94, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .701]. Post-hoc t-tests confirmed highly significant differences between neutral 
and unpleasant pictures [t(17) = 4.83, p < .001], as well as between neutral and pleasant 
[t(17) = -7.47, p < .001] and unpleasant and pleasant [t(17) = -6.81, p < .001] scenes (Figure 
1B). These results confirmed that participants perceived and identified the emotional content 
of the pre-selected stimuli in accordance with the published normative ratings (Lang, et al., 
2008). 
3.2. Accuracy for the progressive unfolding experiment 
The percentage of errors remained low in this task (M = 3.66%, SD = 1.85). Likewise, 
very few errors were committed with “catch” trials (M = 1.75%, SD = 1.90). In addition, the 
percentage of late responses (Responses1 occurring after the last/sixth image level) was 
negligible (M = 1.71%, SD = 1.18), providing additional evidence that participants accurately 
performed the matching task during the gradual stimulus revelation and did not wait until the 
presentation of the last, fully detailed image level to stop the stimulus sequence (Response1). 
Table 3 shows the cumulative percentages of correct responses (i.e., Responses1 only 
when Responses2 were correct). 
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Table 3. Mean values and standard deviations (in parenthesis) of cumulative percentages of 
correct responses, separately for each image level, emotion and memory condition. 
 New Old 
Image 
Level 
Neutral Unpleasant Pleasant Neutral Unpleasant Pleasant 
Image1 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
Image2 
0.10 
(0.41) 
0.19 
(0.79) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
1.22 
(2.42) 
0.46 
(0.00) 
0.19 
(0.79) 
Image3 
5.01 
(5.36) 
3.28 
(3.57) 
2.35 
(3.00) 
13.12 
(10.40) 
10.26 
(9.77) 
7.55 
(8.98) 
Image4 
38.88 
(17.72) 
32.07 
(17.19) 
33.40 
(18.24) 
56.93 
(19.28) 
51.62 
(16.48) 
49.61 
(17.68) 
Image5 
85.66 
(14.51) 
77.94 
(15.87) 
81.38 
(14.05) 
90.98 
(8.55) 
87.95 
(8.70) 
87.85 
(9.40) 
Image6 
100.00 
(0.00) 
100.00 
(0.00) 
100.00 
(0.00) 
100.00 
(0.00) 
100.00 
(0.00) 
100.00 
(0.00) 
 
A mixed proportional odds model (Agresti, 2007; Schettino, et al., 2011) with memory 
(old, new) and emotion (neutral, unpleasant, pleasant) as fixed factors, and participant as 
random effect was carried out on these values, to verify whether the obtained psychometric 
curves shifted as a function of memory and/or emotion (Figure 2A and 2B). This analysis 
revealed, as expected, an overall earlier recognition for old compared to new scenes in all 
emotion conditions (all ps < .001). More interestingly, pairwise comparisons revealed a shift 
of the distribution as a function of the emotional content of the scenes. Specifically, an earlier 
recognition (i.e., less accumulation of evidence) was observed when the picture contained a 
neutral as opposed to an emotional content (all ps < .01), with no significant difference 
between pleasant and unpleasant scenes (all ps > .05) (see Table 4). The interaction between 
these two effects (memory and emotion) showed a trend towards significance (p = .064), 
indicating that the observed delay in recognition for emotional compared to neutral scenes 
was slightly more pronounced for old relative to new scenes. 
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Table 4. Results of the mixed proportional odds model. 
Memory condition Comparison Odds ratio (95% CI) p-value 
 
pleasant vs. neutral 0.76 (0.63,0.91) 0.006* 
New pleasant vs. unpleasant 0.76 (0.63,0.92) 0.008 
 
unpleasant vs. neutral 0.99 (0.81,1.20) 0.939 
 
pleasant vs. neutral 0.62 (0.51,0.74) < 0.001* 
Old pleasant vs. unpleasant 0.61 (0.50,0.73) < 0.001* 
 
unpleasant vs. neutral 1.01 (0.84,1.22) 0.901 
Note. An odds ratio larger than 1 (smaller than 1, respectively) implies that the probability of recognition at 
earlier levels is higher (smaller, respectively) for the first vs. the second condition included in the comparison. 
CI indicates confidence interval. * indicates significant difference after Bonferroni correction. 
3.1. Rating experiments 
Familiarity ratings of the pre-selected IAPS pictures revealed lower scores for unpleasant 
scenes (M = 3.48, SD = 0.98), followed by neutral (M = 4.87, SD = 0.89) and pleasant (M = 
4.93, SD = 1.05) scenes. A one-way ANOVA on these values disclosed a highly significant 
effect of emotion [F(2, 40) = 58.64, p < .001, ηp2 = .746]. Post-hoc t-tests showed significant 
differences between unpleasant and neutral [t(20) = -8.51, p < .001], as well as unpleasant 
and pleasant [t(20) = -7.70, p < .001] scenes (Figure 3A). Mean familiarity was similar for 
pleasant and neutral scenes [t(20) = -0.78, p = .445]. 
Results of picture complexity ratings, on the other hand, showed higher scores for 
unpleasant (M = 4.70, SD = 0.81), relative to neutral (M = 4.13, SD = 0.64) and pleasant (M = 
4.16, SD = 0.74) pictures. A one-way ANOVA carried out on these ratings revealed a highly 
significant effect of emotion [F(2, 38) = 16.12, p < .001, ηp2 = .459]. Pairwise comparisons 
confirmed significant differences between unpleasant and neutral [t(19) = 4.19, p < .001] and 
unpleasant and pleasant [t(19) = 5.87, p < .001] scenes (Figure 3B), whereas no difference 
was observed between pleasant and neutral scenes [t(19) = -0.28, p = .779]. Thus, unpleasant 
pictures were characterized by lower familiarity and higher picture complexity compared to 
neutral and pleasant scenes. 
Familiarity and picture complexity were found to be anti-correlated, as confirmed by a 
significant negative correlation [Pearson’s r(360) = -0.40, p < .001]. 
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Figure 2. Accuracy in the main progressive unfolding task. Cumulative percentage of correct Responses1 as a 
function of the six image levels, in the (A) new and (B) old condition, separately for neutral (solid line), 
unpleasant (dashed line) and pleasant (dotted line) scenes. The shape and variation of the psychometric function 
according to the main experimental factors (memory and emotion) confirmed that: (i) participants gathered 
perceptual evidence prior to recognition; (ii) they had a significantly earlier recognition (i.e., less perceptual 
evidence needed) for old compared to new scenes. Moreover, for each of these two memory levels, emotional 
scenes led to a delayed recognition relative to neutral scenes. Vertical bars correspond to standard errors of the 
means. 
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3.2. Accuracy for progressive unfolding experiment when 
controlling for familiarity and picture complexity of the visual 
scenes 
Next, we included the average familiarity and picture complexity ratings, obtained for 
each visual scene separately, as concurrent predictors in the proportional odds model, in order 
to statistically assess whether the significant effects of memory (i.e., prolonged explorations 
for new relative to old scenes) and emotion (i.e., prolonged explorations for emotional 
relative to neutral scenes) might be confounded by trial-to-trial fluctuations along these non-
emotional dimensions. 
Main effects of familiarity and picture complexity were significant (all ps < .001), 
indicating earlier recognition for more familiar and less complex pictures, in line with our 
predictions. However, and crucially, the analysis revealed that, after having modeled the 
potential contribution of these two factors (Table 5), pleasant scenes in the new condition 
were still associated with a delayed recognition relative to neutral pictures (p = .006) (see also 
Figure 4A). Pleasant scenes were also recognized later compared to unpleasant pictures (p = 
.034). However, this difference was no longer considered significant after correction for 
multiple comparisons (see Table 5). Interestingly, the difference between neutral and 
unpleasant scenes was no longer significant in this analysis (p = .621), suggesting that 
familiarity and picture complexity might have accounted for the difference between neutral 
and emotional scenes in our first analysis (see Table 4). A very similar statistical outcome 
was observed for old scenes: pleasant pictures led to a prolonged recognition compared to 
either neutral (p < .001) or unpleasant (p < .001) scenes (see also Figure 4B), whereas the 
difference between neutral and unpleasant pictures was no longer significant (p = .671). 
Importantly, the interaction effect between emotion and memory was not significant (p = 
.102), indicating that the delay in recognition for pleasant scenes was comparable in the new 
and old conditions. The shift found for pleasant relative to neutral scenes before correcting 
for complexity and familiarity (see Figure 2) did not therefore appear to be related 
exclusively to these two specific factors (unlike the case of unpleasant scenes), because the 
refined analysis controlling for variations along these factors still confirmed this shift (Figure 
4). 
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Figure 3. Familiarity and picture complexity ratings. Mean (A) familiarity and (B) picture complexity ratings, 
separately for neutral (dark grey bar), unpleasant (light grey bar) and pleasant (white bar) scenes. On average, 
unpleasant scenes were rated as less familiar and perceptually more complex (i.e., less obvious figure-ground 
segregation) relative to either neutral or pleasant scenes. ***: p < .001. Vertical bars correspond to standard 
errors of the means 
 
In order to assess whether familiarity and picture complexity had different influences on 
accumulation of evidence processes in our experiment, we next modeled recognition 
performance separately for familiarity and picture complexity. Including effects of familiarity 
in the model (Table 5) revealed, in the new condition, a significantly delayed recognition for 
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pleasant relative to neutral scenes (p = .002). The difference between pleasant and unpleasant 
scenes (p = .179), and between unpleasant and neutral scenes (p = .092) were not significant. 
In the old condition, pleasant scenes were also recognized reliably later compared to neutral 
(p < .001) and unpleasant (p = .001) ones, whereas the difference between unpleasant and 
neutral scenes was not significant (p = .228). 
When modeling the specific contribution of picture complexity (Table 5), the analysis 
revealed, in the new condition, a delayed recognition for pleasant relative to neutral scenes (p 
= .006), whereas the unpleasant vs. neutral comparison was not significant (p = .939). The 
difference between recognition of pleasant vs. unpleasant pictures (p = .008) was marginally 
significant after Bonferroni correction. The analysis of recognition performance in the old 
condition revealed that pleasant scenes were recognized significantly later relative to neutral 
(p < .001) and unpleasant (p < .001) scenes, whereas the difference between unpleasant and 
neutral scenes was not significant (p = .901). 
Although these analyses led to the same conclusions, it is interesting to note that -- based 
on the standard Akaike information criterion (AIC) (Akaike, 1974) -- the model including 
both familiarity and picture complexity was providing the best statistical fit. More 
specifically, the AIC was 13488 for the model including only familiarity, 12619 for the 
model with only picture complexity, and 12615 for the model with both factors. Since a 
lower AIC value is considered to fit the data better (Akaike, 1974), these results suggest that 
familiarity explained some of the variability over and beyond picture complexity, the 
inclusion of this latter factor providing a better fit than the former. 
4. Discussion 
The aim of our study was twofold: (i) to investigate whether the emotional valence of 
complex visual scenes could have an impact on the accumulation of perceptual evidence prior 
to their recognition, in line with previous findings showing a delayed recognition (i.e., 
prolonged accumulation of evidence) for emotional compared to neutral stimuli (Schettino, et 
al., 2011); (ii) to verify whether these effects may be explained by trial-to-trial fluctuations 
along other non-emotional variables, with a focus on familiarity and picture complexity. 
We used a progressive unfolding task that proved to be useful to explore accumulation of 
evidence processes prior to scene recognition (Schettino, et al., 2011). After a standard 
picture encoding phase, participants were presented with series of filtered images that were 
progressively unfolding the same picture content, a new one, or a scrambled one relative to 
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encoding, and the task was to decide whether this scene had previously been presented or not 
(delayed match-to-sample task). Of note, the content of either the same scene or a new one 
was progressively revealed by adding up, in a non-linear fashion, LSF and HSF information, 
providing a “coarse-to-fine” temporal decomposition of the visual stimulus (Bullier, 2001; 
Hegdé, 2008; Marr, 1982). We reasoned that the use of impoverished LSF information (and 
HSF information to a lesser extent), largely predominating at the beginning of the unfolding 
sequence, could foster the generation of proactive guesses about the actual identity of the 
scene progressively revealed (Bar, 2003, 2004, 2007). 
Results showed a delayed recognition for new compared to old scenes, as well as for 
emotional relative to neutral pictures, consistent with our previous results (Schettino, et al., 
2011). While the former memory effect confirms that participants used abstract visual 
representations stored in short-term memory to perform the task (Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2004; 
Vogel, Woodman, & Luck, 2001), the latter effect indicates that these predictive coding 
mechanisms during scene recognition were not immune to the rapidly perceived emotional 
content of the input stimulus. Specifically, pleasant and unpleasant scenes were associated 
with a delayed recognition relative to neutral pictures, suggesting an emotion-specific 
modulation of predictive coding effects during scene recognition. Moreover, this systematic 
time lag for recognizing emotional scenes was similar in the new and old conditions, 
suggesting a general effect taking place irrespective of the memory status of the perceived 
scenes. 
 
Table 5. Results of the alternative mixed proportional odds model, once item-specific values 
along familiarity and picture complexity were included in the model. 
Memory 
condition Comparison 
Familiarity and Only Only 
picture complexity familiarity picture complexity 
  
Odds ratio 
(95% CI) p-value 
Odds ratio 
(95% CI) p-value 
Odds ratio 
(95% CI) p-value 
New 
pleasant 
vs. neutral 
0.76 
(0.63,0.91) 0.006* 
0.74 
(0.62,0.88) 0.002* 
0.76 
(0.63,0.91) 0.006* 
pleasant vs. 
unpleasant 
0.80 
(0.65,0.98) 0.034 
0.88 
(0.72,1.07) 0.179 
0.76 
(0.63,0.92) 0.008 
unpleasant 
vs. neutral 
0.95 
(0.78,1.17) 0.621 
0.84 
(0.69,1.03) 0.092 
0.99 
(0.81,1.20) 0.939 
Old 
pleasant 
vs. neutral 
0.62 
(0.51,0.74) < 0.001* 
0.63 
(0.52,0.76) < 0.001* 
0.62 
(0.51,0.74) < 0.001* 
pleasant vs. 
unpleasant 
0.64 
(0.53,0.78) < 0.001* 
0.71 
(0.58,0.86) 0.001* 
0.61 
(0.50,0.73) < 0.001* 
unpleasant 
vs. neutral 
0.96 
(0.79,1.16) 0.671 
0.89 
(0.74,1.08) 0.228 
1.01 
(0.84,1.22) 0.901 
Note. *: significant difference after Bonferroni correction. 
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Figure 4. Accuracy in the main progressive unfolding task, adjusted for non-emotional factors. Cumulative 
percentage of correct Responses1 as a function of the six image levels, in the (A) new and (B) old condition, 
separately for neutral (solid line), unpleasant (dashed line) and pleasant (dotted line) scenes, once these values 
were adjusted for familiarity and picture complexity. A significant shift of the psychometric function 
(corresponding to prolonged accumulation of evidence) was observed for pleasant compared to either neutral or 
unpleasant scenes, regardless of memory (old vs. new). No significant difference was found between neutral and 
unpleasant scenes. 
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However, we also found that familiarity and picture complexity each had a substantial 
influence on accumulation of evidence processes prior to scene recognition. First, results of 
the additional rating experiments showed that the selected unpleasant scenes were rated as 
less familiar than either neutral or pleasant scenes (Figure 3A), consistent with previous work 
(Bradley, et al., 1993; Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001). This result is in line with the well-
known “mere-repeated-exposure” phenomenon (Monahan, et al., 2000; Zajonc, 1968, 2001), 
showing that human beings tend to develop a preference towards objects deemed familiar. 
Therefore, unpleasant objects or events that are typically avoided are considered as less 
familiar, exactly as found in our rating experiment. Second, our results showed that 
unpleasant pictures were also considered to be perceptually more complex compared to either 
neutral or pleasant scenes (Figure 3B). More specifically, unpleasant scenes were 
systematically associated with a less evident figure-ground segregation in the auxiliary rating 
experiment, an effect which might lead to a decreased fluency to process these scenes and 
hence confer them a negative valence (Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001; Winkielman, et al., 
2003). Thus, based on the lower familiarity and higher picture complexity scores obtained for 
the unpleasant relative to the neutral and pleasant scenes selected in our study, one would 
predict a change in the speed of accumulation of perceptual evidence for this specific class of 
emotional stimuli, when compared to the two other conditions. Likewise, given the balanced 
mean ratings for pleasant and neutral scenes, one could anticipate that accumulation of 
perceptual evidence would be similar for these two conditions. Instead, our single-trial 
analysis, in which we included familiarity and complexity ratings -- obtained for each and 
every scene separately -- as concurrent regressors (in addition to emotion and memory), 
revealed that pleasant scenes were associated with a distinctive delayed accumulation of 
evidence relative to the two other conditions, regardless of the memory status (old vs. new) 
and hence presumably ease of recognition of these scenes. Thus, at first sight, familiarity and 
complexity ratings alone could not account for the shift obtained for pleasant relative to 
neutral scenes during the main task. These results provide evidence for the contribution of 
positivity offset during emotion scene recognition (Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999; Cacioppo, et 
al., 1997, 1999; Norris, et al., 2010). This concept refers to the fact that, when inputs to the 
affect system are minimal, positivity outweighs negativity. As a consequence, organisms may 
engage in exploratory behavior under conditions in which no immediate threat is detected, 
with the aim to gain knowledge about novel stimuli in the environment and their potential 
value, an effect that is usually exacerbated for pleasant/positive compared to neutral or 
unpleasant stimuli [53]. Accordingly, the results of our study show that participants were 
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prone to gather additional evidence about pictures carrying intrinsic reinforcing hedonistic 
values (in this case, pleasant pictures), probably because these pictures better matched their 
actual motivational dispositions. This latter observation also suggests that the influence of 
positive emotion on perception in our task was probably operating at an abstract level of 
stimulus representation, before or after specific short-term memory traces came into play. Of 
note, a prolonged exploration for pleasant relative to neutral or unpleasant scenes in our 
experiment may alternatively be explained by the differential motivational relevance of this 
specific emotion stimulus category (Bradley, 2009; Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999; Lang, et al., 
1990; Norris, et al., 2010; Schupp, et al., 2000). This general account appears unlikely 
though, because we did not observe any gain or change during accumulation of evidence for 
unpleasant compared to neutral scenes, despite the obvious motivational and/or evolutionary 
relevance of these negative stimuli (Cacioppo & Ito, 1999; Ito, et al., 1998). 
The prolonged accumulation of evidence for pleasant relative to neutral and unpleasant 
scenes may stem from an increase in the number of actual iterations made between updated 
predictions (initially shaped or constrained by the encoding of the scene in short-term 
memory) and the progressively accumulated degraded sensory evidence during unfolding, 
with the aim to minimize prediction errors and favor the most likely interpretation concerning 
the actual identity of the scene (Friston, 2002, 2005, 2009; Serences, 2008). Alternatively, 
rather than a quantitative change in the ratio between predictions and errors during 
accumulation of perceptual evidence, the processing of pleasant scenes may be associated 
with an overall shift in the decision criterion, relative to neutral or unpleasant scenes. In this 
view, accumulation of sensory evidence would occur equally fast for neutral and unpleasant 
scenes, but the delayed decision-making process for pleasant scenes would primarily stem 
from an enhanced competition between (two or more) choices or alternatives at the decision 
level per se. The use of computational modeling, and more specifically diffusion models, 
might turn out to be valuable in this context to tease apart these two accounts (Gold & 
Shadlen, 2007; Heekeren, et al., 2004; Heekeren, et al., 2008; Philiastides, et al., 2011). 
According to these models, decision making is achieved after having accumulated sufficient 
sensory evidence, and eventually gathered information in favor of one out of two (or more) 
alternatives, hence reaching a decision threshold (Gold & Shadlen, 2007; Ratcliff & 
McKoon, 2008; Smith & Ratcliff, 2004). The speed of accumulation of perceptual evidence 
(also termed drift rate) heavily depends on the strength of the sensory signal, as well as the 
signal-to-noise ratio. Thus, the aforementioned computational models provide useful hints to 
better explain how specific dispositions to engage in exploratory or approach-related 
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behavior in non-threatening environments (i.e., positivity offset) may ultimately influence 
proactive processes leading to perceptual decision making. Further studies are needed to 
assess whether the processing of pleasant scenes is accompanied by a change in the drift rate 
compared to neutral or unpleasant scenes, or whether genuine post-perceptual processes may 
account for this emotion effect. Likewise, additional neuroimaging and/or neurophysiological 
studies might help clarify whether accumulation of evidence processes are actually generic 
but vary in speed -- depending on the emotional content of the input stimulus -- or, instead, 
several non-overlapping accumulation of evidence brain process may co-exist and can be 
activated predominantly depending on the valence of this input stimulus. 
We have to acknowledge some limitations related to our experimental design and specific 
data analysis. Familiarity and visual complexity ratings of the pre-selected scenes were 
collected from two independent samples of participants, while another sample of participants 
completed the unfolding experiment. It would probably have been more optimal, from a 
statistical point of view, to use a full within-subject design. However, we did not want to 
create any bias or expectation regarding the content of the pictures that were progressively 
revealed during the main experiment. Therefore, we could not ask the same participants to 
rate the pre-selected visual scenes along the familiarity and picture complexity dimensions 
before the unfolding experiment. Conversely, ratings obtained for these stimuli would 
probably be influenced by prior exposure and unbalanced explorations during the unfolding 
experiment, as revealed for pleasant relative to neutral and unpleasant scenes in our study. 
Another limitation lies in the possible specificity of these effects for women, because we 
included mainly female participants and a differential processing of the emotional content of 
visual stimuli for men and women has previously been reported (Bradley, Codispoti, 
Sabatinelli, & Lang, 2001; Hamann & Canli, 2004; Wager, Phan, Liberzon, & Taylor, 2003). 
However, the pictures were carefully selected according to the normative ratings published in 
the manual for this specific gender (Lang, et al., 2008). Moreover, we purposefully decided 
not to include highly arousing pictures (e.g., mutilations or erotica) in our stimulus set, 
because these extreme pictures were found to elicit the largest differences between male and 
female participants in previous research (Schupp, et al., 2006, 2007). 
To sum up, the results of our study show that accumulation of evidence prior to scene 
recognition is substantially influenced by the perceived emotional content of the visual 
stimulus. More specifically, emotional scenes were associated with a prolonged accumulation 
of evidence relative to neutral scenes. Controlling for non-emotional dimensions (i.e., 
familiarity and picture complexity) further revealed a delayed recognition for pleasant 
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compared to unpleasant and neutral scenes, suggesting a valence-specific influence on the 
speed of proactive guesses prior to perceptual decision-making. More generally, these 
findings are consistent with a positivity offset during complex scene recognition. The 
propensity to dwell longer on pleasant compared to neutral or unpleasant scenes may be 
explained by a change in the ratio between predictions and errors during accumulation of 
evidence, while participants actively make guesses and computed online the most probable 
interpretation regarding the identity of the incoming and progressively unfolded visual scene. 
Finally, given the evidence showing a strong positivity offset during emotional scene 
recognition (that cannot easily be accounted for by systematic trial-to-trial fluctuations along 
familiarity or picture complexity), we believe that this specific experimental paradigm and 
stimulus set may eventually turn out to be valuable to shed light on possible qualitative 
alterations during visual emotion perception typically observed in specific 
psychopathological conditions. For example, this task appears useful to explore possible 
changes between the expression of positivity offset vs. negativity bias during scene or object 
recognition, a modification that might characterize exploration strategies preferentially used 
by depressed or high anxious individuals (Conklin, Strunk, & Fazio, 2009; Shook, Fazio, & 
Vasey, 2007). 
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CHAPTER 
CHAPTER 6: General Discussion 
 
General Discussion 
 
The main goal of this dissertation was to characterize the influence of emotion (here 
mainly operationalized as changes in valence and arousal values of pre-selected faces or 
complex visual scene) on visual perception. In particular, I sought to investigate the extent to 
which emotional factors influence perceptual processing during (either face or scene) 
recognition in a bottom-up, “reactive” as opposed to a top-down, “proactive” way. To answer 
these questions, I first looked at bottom-up effects of emotion on the temporal perception of 
competing events by means of dedicated emotional attention mechanisms that are thought to 
prioritize the early detection (and hence onset discrimination) of motivationally salient 
stimuli (here angry or fearful faces), relative to neutral stimuli. Next, I explored how emotion 
could bias visual perception via top-down mechanisms, operating here as proactive guesses 
or expectations generated “online” by the participants about the most probable identity of the 
visual stimulus under conditions of impoverished retinal input (see Chapters 3-5). Two 
distinct experimental paradigms have been devised and used to address these complementing 
questions: a standard Temporal Order Judgment (TOJ) task (Chapter 2) and a progressive 
unfolding paradigm (Chapters 3-5). Regarding the first question, the results obtained reveal 
that motivationally significant stimuli do not “magically” capture attention and in turn bias 
temporal perception, but other factors (e.g., distinctive low-level perceptual cues such as 
motion or, alternatively, the actual task set) may compete for bottom-up attention selection 
with (higher-level) emotional cues, and eventually prevent the latter to exert a systematic 
influence on the “automatic” guidance of attention (Chapter 2). With regard to the second 
question, results show that the generation and use of specific predictions regarding the most 
probable content of complex visual scenes -- progressively revealed across several successive 
steps -- are not immune to emotional factors, lending support to the assumption that emotion, 
6 
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besides other components (e.g., attention or memory), can proactively influence the selection 
of diagnostic perceptual cues eventually used by the visual system to extract the meaning of 
the visual input (Chapters 3-5). 
1. “Reactive” influences of emotion on perception: No 
prior entry for threat-related faces 
In Chapter 2 I tested, across five experiments, the hypothesis of an early attentional 
capture by motivationally relevant (i.e., threat-related) face stimuli by means of a TOJ task: 
participants were presented with a pair of faces, one on the left and one on the right side of 
fixation, with variable SOAs between their respective occurrences. Critically, one of the faces 
was either angry or fearful, whereas the other one was neutral. Participants were asked to 
judge which face stimulus appeared first (Experiments 1-2), or whether the emotional face 
was presented first (Experiments 3-5). I surmised that, due to their enhanced motivational 
relevance (Anderson, et al., 2003; Whalen, et al., 1998), emotional faces would reflexively 
attract attention and in turn bias the perception of the two competing onsets in favor of the 
location where the negative emotional face was presented. More specifically, I predicted that 
the angry or fearful face in the pair would systematically be perceived as appearing first 
relative to the neutral face, particularly in conditions of uncertainty (namely when the SOA 
was short). I opted for the use of the TOJ task because it has previously been shown to 
selectively measure the early orienting of (spatial) attention, with little confound or 
contribution of other attentional components, e.g., disengagement or re-orienting (Jaskowski, 
1993; Stelmach & Herdman, 1991). 
However, the results of five experiments (Chapter 2) clearly failed to provide evidence for 
this hypothesis. Importantly, these null findings could not easily be accounted for by 
participants’ inability to make use of the information about the onset of the two faces, 
because higher accuracy and faster reaction times for long (e.g., 100 ms) relative to short 
(e.g., 10 ms) SOAs were observed, meaning that they made active use of this temporal cue in 
order to resolve the TOJ task. In addition, by asking participants to rate the emotional content 
of the face stimuli at the end of each experimental session, I could rule out the possibility that 
fearful or angry expressions were not correctly recognized as such by the participants, 
because these ratings unambiguously showed strong asymmetries in the amount of perceived 
fear or anger across the different face conditions in the expected direction. Furthermore, 
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suboptimal task parameters such as inappropriate stimulus size and/or distance from fixation 
appeared equally unlikely to account for these null findings, given that I used a standard 
experimental set-up previously used in the literature (e.g., West, et al., 2009). Moreover, the 
use of different task instructions across different experiments did not alter the pattern of 
results, namely no significant prior entry effect was observed for threat-related faces despite 
task demands becoming more specific across the five experiments: no reliable attentional bias 
for emotional vs. neutral faces was found, either when participants had to perform a simple 
left-right discrimination task (hence irrespective of the emotional content of the faces), or 
when they were requested to base their decisions on the perceived emotional content of the 
faces (thereby making the emotional facial expression directly task-relevant). In addition, I 
devised a variant of the TOJ paradigm and asked participants to focus on the offsets of the 
two competing faces rather than their onsets, to assess whether the null findings obtained 
with the original TOJ task could be explained by possible confounds related to 
disengagement effects (i.e., attention was held, rather than captured, on the spatial location 
where the threatening face stimulus was presented; Fox, et al., 2001; Koster, et al., 2004). 
However, I still failed to find evidence for a differential effect triggered by the negative 
emotional facial expressions. Hence, obvious uncontrolled confounds (such as the inability to 
identify the emotional content conveyed by the face stimuli), inappropriate task demands, or 
other methodological issues (e.g., lack of statistical power) did not provide plausible 
alternative explanations to account for these null results. 
1.1. Abrupt stimulus onset is prioritized over emotional 
information during attention selection 
Even though some caution is needed when trying to interpret null findings, given the 
(carefully controlled) five different experiments conducted in large samples of participants 
(ranging from 36 to 40) it appears reasonable to conclude that these results do not support the 
assumption of an “automatic” or “magical” attentional capture by motivationally significant 
stimuli (i.e,. conveying either a direct or indirect threat). An intriguing possibility to account 
for these results is that participants probably (implicitly) used a specific strategy that implied 
an active filtering of the emotional content of the faces, even when, surprisingly, task 
instructions required them to selectively attend to this specific feature in order to perform the 
TOJ task (see Experiments 3-5 in Chapter 2). Even in these conditions, participants 
presumably relied on non-emotional cues to guide their behavior and eventually resolve the 
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task, particularly in conditions of uncertainty (i.e., short, as opposed to long SOAs). More 
specifically, one could hypothesize that the systematic variation in the SOA between the two 
competing face onsets created a compelling impression of apparent motion on the screen 
(Goebel, et al., 1998), compatible with the “illusory line motion” phenomenon (a line is 
perceived as dynamically stretched away from a visual focal point, although in reality it is 
quickly presented at full length; Hikosaka, et al., 1993; Schmidt, 2000). This conjecture, 
albeit speculative, is also consistent with a large body of studies in the literature showing that 
abrupt onset/offset effects provide compelling cues that somehow reflexively capture 
attention (Jonides & Yantis, 1988; Schreij, Owens, & Theeuwes, 2008; Theeuwes, 1995; 
Yantis & Jonides, 1984). For example, abrupt, unattended, and unexpected onsets of 
distracter stimuli in the visual array reliably slow down target detection during visual search 
tasks, lending support to the notion that onset is an important stimulus feature because its 
occurrence may be associated with important changes in the environment that need to be 
readily detected by the organism (Jonides & Yantis, 1988; Theeuwes, 1995; Todd & Gelder, 
1979), e.g., the appearance of a new object in the environment (Davoli, Suszko, & Abrams, 
2007; Yantis & Hillstrom, 1994). Similarly, it could be argued that, in the TOJ task, 
participants’ attention was first reflexively drawn to the direction (either leftward or 
rightward) of this apparent motion artificially created by the two asynchronous onsets, rather 
than the emotional content of the faces. Only during a second (and perhaps post-perceptual) 
stage, participants “retrospectively” processed the emotional content of the faces based on 
this apparent motion cue. Of note, the lack of prior entry effect for faces conveying either a 
direct or indirect threat (i.e., anger or fear, respectively) suggests that changes in the actual 
motivational significance of the faces (e.g., Adams, Gordon, Baird, Ambady, & Kleck, 2003; 
Anderson, et al., 2003; Sander, et al., 2007) were not accompanied by systematic variations in 
early attention selection processes. As my results suggest, attentional capture towards both 
direct and indirect threat seems to be only concomitant to the prioritization of another low-
level perceptual cue, of which (apparent) motion appears to be the most plausible candidate at 
this stage. 
1.2. Capture by perceptual dissimilarity rather than emotion 
per se? 
At first sight, the results of the five experiments reported in Chapter 2 appear at odds with 
two earlier studies published in the literature that already used the TOJ task and showed prior 
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entry effects for emotional faces . However, a careful consideration of several methodological 
elements casts doubt on the robustness of these effects (see Chapter 2 for details). Among 
them, a brief analysis of the stimuli used in these two studies may potentially provide an 
alternative explanation as to why prior entry effects were observed for emotional relative to 
neutral faces in these earlier studies, in contrast to my results. 
In the study by Fecica & Stolz (2008), as well as in Experiments 1-4 in West, et al. 
(2009)’s study, schematic neutral and emotional faces were used to explore whether emotion 
could lead to a genuine prior entry effect during early attention selection or orienting. Many 
studies in the literature, mainly using visual search tasks, have investigated attentional biases 
towards emotional (in particular threat-related) stimuli by employing schematic faces, in 
order to be able to better control for perceptual differences between emotional expressions 
(e.g., Fox, et al., 2000; Fox, et al., 2001; Öhman, Lundqvist, et al., 2001); for a recent review, 
see Horstmann, 2007). However, these schematic face stimuli have been extensively 
criticized for lacking ecological validity (e.g., Horstmann & Bauland, 2006). In addition, an 
alternative interpretation stipulates that specific low-level features embedded in these 
schematic face stimuli may be sufficient to promote differences in detection speed, rather 
than a processing of their emotional content (Becker, et al., 2011; Mak-Fan, et al., 2011; 
VanRullen, et al., 2004; Wolfe & Horowitz, 2004). More specifically, the orientation of the 
internal features (e.g., the curvature of the mouth or eyebrows) relative to the external 
circular edge delimiting the stimulus would be the crucial element that allows the visual 
system to identify an emotional face target among neutral distracters, without the need to 
postulate any mediation by specific emotion brain mechanisms (Coelho, Cloete, & Wallis, 
2010; Purcell & Stewart, 2010). Therefore, TOJ tasks using schematic faces (i.e., Fecica & 
Stolz, 2008, and Experiments 1-4 in West, et al., 2009) should be treated carefully with 
regards to the potential generalizability of their results, as well as interpretations postulating a 
direct mediation by emotional attention brain mechanisms. 
Interestingly, Experiments 5 and 6 in West, et al. (2009) confirmed prior entry effects for 
motivationally relevant stimuli when using realistic emotional and neutral faces, selected 
from the same standardized database (Ekman & Friesen, 1976) as used in Chapter 2. 
Importantly, West, et al. (2009) reported PSS values for these realistic faces which were even 
larger than the ones obtained with schematic faces, suggesting that the use of more 
ecologically valid stimuli further enhanced attentional capture for emotion-laden objects. 
However, in the Methods section of Experiments 5 (which extends to Experiment 6) it is 
reported that only four face identities (two men and two women) were used as stimulus set 
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and, as a consequence, a limited number of face pairs (between 12 and 16, depending on the 
inclusion of trials with neutral and emotional faces of the same identity) were used in this 
earlier study. Although this strategy perhaps eases the burden of having to control for 
perceptual confounds, on the other hand it likely compromised the normal (ecologically 
valid) variability across the different encounters of the face stimuli (Pinkham, Griffin, Baron, 
Sasson, & Gur, 2010). More importantly, however, these experimental conditions may have 
favored the use of a perceptual strategy based on the detection of the degree of similarity 
between the faces in the pair (rather than any difference between the two faces along a 
genuine emotion dimension), this factor generally being known to influence performance 
during visual search tasks (Duncan & Humphreys, 1989). Specifically, neutral and emotional 
faces may have remarkably differed not only in terms of emotional expression, but with 
regards to other factors, such as first order configuration (e.g., the contrast ratio between the 
sclera and pupil) or second order configuration elements (e.g., the distance of the eyes from 
the nose). These differences may ultimately have guided attention allocation and, in turn, 
artificially created a bias towards emotional faces, without corresponding to a true capture of 
attention by emotion. To avoid these confounds and provide sufficient variability across the 
different pairs, I opted for the use of ten different identities (four women) taken from the 
same database (Ekman & Friesen, 1976), which allowed me to create a large number of face 
pairs (90 per condition, excluding pairs with neutral and emotional faces expressed by the 
same identity). The added value of this alternative procedure is that, in every trial, the degree 
of perceptual dissimilarity between the two faces in the pair was always uninformative, thus 
preventing participants to use this cue to perform the TOJ task. However, in these conditions, 
the results reported in Chapter 2 revealed no reliable attentional capture for threat-related 
compared to neutral faces. Thus, I surmise that West, et al. (2009)’s results could be 
explained (at least partly) by a systematic imbalance in terms of perceptual (dis)similarity 
between emotional and neutral faces (Duncan & Humphreys, 1989). At any rate, future 
studies are needed in order to assess whether the degree of visual (dis)similarity, rather than 
the emotional expression, is eventually the critical feature accounting for a prior entry effect 
for threat-related faces when they compete with neutral faces for attention selection and 
access to awareness. 
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1.3. Task set 
In addition, it should be noted that task instructions (despite being adapted across different 
experiments; see Chapter 2) always emphasized the processing of the respective onsets in the 
pair in order to resolve the task. More specifically, participants were required either to 
indicate whether the face on the left or right relative to central fixation appeared first 
(Experiments 1-2), or whether the emotional or neutral face appeared first (Experiments 3-5). 
This procedure (which is, notably, identical to the one employed in previous studies; Fecica 
& Stolz, 2008; West, et al., 2009), likely imposed a strong top-down attentional set towards 
the detection and processing of the face onsets, perhaps at the cost of the reflexive processing 
of the emotional content of the faces (Banich, et al., 2000). Hence, even when the negative 
emotional content of the face became task-relevant (Experiments 3-5) as opposed to the mere 
spatial location of the two onsets (Experiments 1-2), still in these conditions the perceptual 
system was probably prioritizing the onset information (corresponding to the most 
compelling and useful cue immediately available), and only integrating at a later stage of 
processing (possibly when iconic or short-term memory processes were active) the emotional 
information in order to eventually resolve the task. 
1.4. The possible contribution of inter-individual differences 
Another potential reason as to why threat-related faces were not prioritized over neutral 
faces during the TOJ tasks could be related to “flattened” personality traits, more specifically 
the fact that I primarily tested non-anxious or non-dysphoric participants (as verified using 
standard personality questionnaires). Earlier studies based on other experimental paradigms 
(usually cueing or dot probe tasks) already showed stronger attentional capture for negative 
emotional (face) stimuli in participants having specific negative affect traits or states (Bar-
Haim, et al., 2007; Bishop, 2007, 2008; Cisler & Koster, 2010; Fox, 1993; Mogg & Bradley, 
1998). Accordingly, future studies are needed in order to assess whether a prior entry effect 
for threat-related faces could be found in high anxious or depressed participants, who usually 
show generalized attentional biases towards this specific category of visual stimuli. 
1.5. Implications for models of emotional attention 
The results obtained in Chapter 2 suggest that motivationally relevant stimuli (i.e., angry 
and fearful faces) do not “automatically” capture attention when competing with neutral 
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stimuli for early attention selection. Instead, as proposed above, participants perhaps 
prioritized non-emotional cues to successfully perform the task (particularly in conditions of 
uncertainty, i.e., at short SOAs), given the enhanced perceptual salience of these non-
emotional cues. Although speculative, apparent motion, as well as the perceptual 
(dis)similarity of the two face stimuli in the pair, appear to offer plausible (and useful) 
explanations for the lack of prior entry effect for threat-related faces. In this model, there is 
therefore no “reflexive” capture of attention by negative emotion during TOJs because 
compelling perceptual cues may guide initial attention selection processes and in turn 
override a genuine emotional effect. 
Recent models emphasize the pivotal role of emotional factors in guiding attention and in 
turn influencing visual perception, via brain mechanisms that do not overlap with those 
involved in the exogenous or endogenous control of attention (Brosch, et al., 2011; Keil, et 
al., 2005; Pourtois, et al., 2012; Todd, et al., 2012; Vuilleumier, 2005). Given this 
architecture, effects of emotion on attention are thought to occur in parallel to other 
attentional effects mediated by dorsal frontoparietal networks involved in the endogenous and 
exogenous control of attention (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002). The results of Chapter 2 seem, at 
first glance, to disconfirm this model: the use of low-level perceptual cues (e.g., apparent 
motion) appears to be sufficient to reflexively capture attention, with the analysis of the 
emotional content of the face stimuli presumably occurring at a later (post-perceptual) stage 
of processing, after the rapid initial orienting of attention. However, I believe it is still 
possible, despite these null findings, to accommodate the results of Chapter 2 to the 
framework of emotional attention outlined here above, namely by considering the distinctive 
temporal characteristics of exogenous, endogenous, and emotional effects during the 
guidance of attention. 
In a recent study, Brosch, et al. (2011) recorded EEG during a modified version of the dot-
probe task (for a description of the paradigm, see paragraph 2.6 of Chapter 1) devised to 
orthogonally test the influence of emotional, exogenous, and endogenous factors during 
attention selection. In a typical dot-probe task, attention is quickly oriented towards the 
location where the non-informative cue appears, thereby facilitating the subsequent 
processing of a target stimulus if it appears at the same cued location (MacLeod, et al., 1986; 
see also Pourtois, et al., 2004). For example, contrast sensitivity is augmented for Gabor 
patches appearing at the location previously occupied by emotional (i.e., fearful) faces 
(Phelps, et al., 2006; see also Bocanegra & Zeelenberg, 2009, 2011b). Brosch, et al. (2011) 
found selective effects of exogenous attention (here changes in luminance) at the level of the 
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cue-locked N2pc, a lateralized component sensitive to fast shifts of spatial attention towards 
stimuli appearing in the left or right visual field (Woodman & Luck, 1999). Conversely, 
larger amplitudes of the target-locked P1 component were found for targets following an 
emotional compared to a neutral cue, indicating an increase of sensory gain for stimuli 
presented in the location previously occupied by an emotional object (Luck, et al., 2000). To 
interpret these results, these authors proposed a “cascade” of attention mechanisms, in which 
the effects of exogenous attention are thought to quickly influence early stages of stimulus 
processing, with effects of emotional attention occurring slightly later and presumably 
“tuning” the visual system to specific features of the target depending on the emotional 
information conveyed by the preceding cue (Brosch, et al., 2011). Similarly, during the TOJ 
task (Chapter 2) it could be hypothesized that the abrupt onset of the first face stimulus would 
swiftly capture attention towards its location, but the “late” effects of emotional attention 
would be disrupted by the onset of the second face in the pair. Only after the second stimulus 
has disappeared, the visual system would process the emotional features of the two stimuli, 
and this analysis would necessarily occur at a post-perceptual stage (presumably in short-term 
visual memory). It should also be mentioned that endogenous factors such as task 
instructions, i.e., requesting participants to judge which face in the pair appeared first, would 
bias participants to specifically focus on the stimulus onset, thereby working in synergy with 
the exogenous attentional effects described above and likely overshadowing or tempering a 
guidance of early attention processes by the emotional features of the face stimuli (see Figure 
1). 
 
 
Figure 1. Tentative model accounting for the results reported in Chapter 2. Five experiments (based on the use 
of a stringent TOJ task) failed to confirm the assumption that threat-related faces reflexively capture attention. 
Instead, other non-emotional, exogenous cues, among which apparent motion and the degree of visual 
(dis)similarity seem to be plausible candidates, are likely used by the visual system in order to resolve the task. 
In addition, task instructions (i.e., requesting participants to judge which stimulus appeared first) might 
contribute to endogenously bias attention to the preferential processing of the onset of the faces. The synergic 
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interplay of exogenous and endogenous effects would eventually prevent emotion to exert a strong and specific 
influence on the early guidance of attention following stimulus onset. (Adapted from Pourtois, et al., 2012). 
 
In this view, specific characteristics of the task set could also play a role and eventually 
explain why attention selection was not based on the distinctive emotional content of the face 
stimuli. The most important difference between the dot-probe task used in Brosch, et al. 
(2011) and the TOJ task used in Chapter 2 lies on the fact that, in the latter, there is no 
emotional cue preceding the target. The cue thought to guide early attention selection (i.e., a 
threat-related facial expression) is the target. It follows that the visual system probably tunes 
to specific features that would enhance the processing of a target appearing in the same 
location (Bocanegra & Zeelenberg, 2009, 2011b; Brosch, et al., 2011; Phelps, et al., 2006), 
although the following stimulus would always appear on the opposite side. 
Alternatively, it could be hypothesized that performing TOJs based on the fast 
presentation of the face stimuli -- ranging from 110 to 200 ms depending on the SOA (10 and 
100 ms, respectively; see Chapter 2 for details) -- would leave little resources available for 
the processing of their emotional expression. Previous studies have already proposed that 
cognitive load can have a profound impact on the processing of the emotional content of the 
stimuli (Eimer, Holmes, & McGlone, 2003; Holmes, Vuilleumier, & Eimer, 2003; Pessoa, 
Kastner, et al., 2002; Pessoa, McKenna, Gutierrez, & Ungerleider, 2002), in that the 
processing of unattended stimulus features would be possible only when attention is not fully 
depleted (Lavie, 1995; Treisman, 1969). In this case, the unattended stimulus feature would 
be the emotional connotation of the faces in the pair, given that the task required participants 
to primarily focus on the onset of the stimuli. However, this explanation seems unlikely, 
given that no prior entry was found even when the instructions explicitly requested 
participants to detect whether the emotional or neutral face appeared first. 
Hopefully, these interpretations might provide valuable avenues for future research, and at 
this stage they could help test specific predictions regarding the specificity or overlap 
between different components of attention selection (particularly regarding their temporal 
dynamic), when they concern emotional or non-emotional factors. 
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2. ”Proactive” influences of emotion on perception: the 
generation of prediction during emotional scene 
recognition 
In the second part of this thesis (Chapters 3-5), I investigated whether emotion could 
influence visual scene recognition in a proactive (as opposed to reactive) way. To tackle this 
issue, I validated and used a new experimental paradigm (progressive unfolding task) in 
which the content of natural visual scenes was progressively revealed to participants by 
gradually adding LSF and HSF information to an initial blurred and undistinguishable image. 
Participants had to report whether the scene contained a living object or not (Chapter 3), or 
whether the content of the scene matched the one briefly presented at the beginning of the 
trial or not (Chapters 4-5). The main purpose of this procedure was to simulate a “coarse-to-
fine” decomposition of the retinal input eventually fostering the online generation of guesses 
about its content, keeping in mind that LSF and HSF cues differentially contribute to these 
proactive processes during object and scene recognition (Bar, 2003; Bullier, 2001; Hegdé, 
2008; Navon, 1977; Schyns & Oliva, 1994). Moreover, in Chapters 3-4, high density EEG 
was simultaneously recorded in order to characterize the exact spatio-temporal dynamics 
associated with these complex perceptual processes. Overall, results suggest that the 
motivational relevance of the scenes reliably influenced recognition speed, emotional scenes 
being recognized later compared to neutral scenes. Distinct neural networks were found to 
underlie different proactive perceptual processes, with ventral occipito-temporal regions 
gradually accumulating perceptual evidence while medial frontal areas subtended categorical, 
decision-related processes (Chapter 3). Furthermore, the reconstructed neural activity in these 
networks was modulated by the emotional content of the scenes as well as the extent of 
previous experience with these stimuli, presumably influencing the generation of predictions 
regarding the most likely content of the scene (Chapter 4). Importantly, I also ascertained that 
the delayed recognition for emotional compared to neutral scenes observed at the behavioral 
level could not be solely ascribed to other non-emotional factors, such as familiarity and 
picture complexity (Chapter 5). 
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2.1. Chapter 3: Behavioral effects and electrophysiological 
correlates of proactive processes during scene recognition 
The aim of this Chapter was twofold: (i) to identify, using high-density EEG, the 
electrophysiological correlates of accumulation of evidence processes likely operating prior 
to overt recognition, keeping in mind that earlier (fMRI) studies (employing neutral objects 
or scenes) already found out that these processes involved non-overlapping brain networks 
showing different tuning functions (Ploran, et al., 2007; Ploran, et al., 2011); (ii) to explore 
whether the emotional content of the scenes might influence these upstream perceptual 
processes leading to visual scene recognition, given the strong reciprocal interaction effects 
seen between regions involved in emotion processing (such as the amygdala and OFC) and 
visual areas in the occipital and infero-temporal cortex implicated in visual object or scene 
recognition (Pourtois, et al., 2012; Rauss, Schwartz, & Pourtois, 2011; Vuilleumier, 2005). 
Behavioral results confirmed the validity of this paradigm to titrate generative effects of 
predictions or guesses occurring prior to overt scene recognition: participants did not respond 
randomly on a trial-by-trial basis, but instead they systematically accumulated sufficient 
perceptual evidence (i.e., they waited, on average, until the third out of six image levels) 
before accurately deciding whether the content of the scene was living or not. Interestingly, 
this process was systematically modulated by the emotional content of the scenes. 
Specifically, visual information was accumulated less rapidly for unpleasant compared to 
neutral scenes, while the slowest accumulation of evidence was found for pleasant scenes. 
These results were interpreted under the framework of the Evaluative Space Model 
(Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994, 1999; Norris, et al., 2010). A faster accumulation of evidence 
for unpleasant relative to pleasant scenes could reflect a negativity bias effect, i.e., stronger 
responses for aversive compared to appetitive stimuli in the environment (Cacioppo & Ito, 
1999; Ito, et al., 1998). On the other hand, a prolonged exploration for pleasant compared to 
neutral scenes could be explained by a positivity offset effect (Ito, et al., 1998; Norris, et al., 
2010). Based on the assumption that engaging in exploratory behavior is promoted in non-
threatening situations, pleasant scenes could be associated with a delayed recognition 
compared to neutral or unpleasant scenes, given their intrinsic hedonic (and approach-related) 
value. Functionally, this effect could also reflect a change in the rate of accumulation of 
perceptual evidence made by the participants prior to overt recognition. At any rate, these 
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behavioral results shed light on the modulatory role of emotional factors during the 
accumulation of perceptual evidence prior to scene recognition. 
Source localization analyses performed with sLORETA (Pascual-Marqui, 2002) identified 
several brain structures that differed regarding their actual response profile: (i) a monotonic 
accumulation of evidence, involving regions of the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) and 
parahippocampal gyrus (PHG); (ii) categorical recognition effects in medial frontal regions, 
including the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC). I proposed that the PCC/PHG complex 
could be involved in updating contextual information about the scene in which the main 
objects were embedded, presumably by rapidly extracting and analyzing LSF information 
(Bar, 2004, 2009b; Bar & Aminoff, 2003). On the other hand, the dACC could contribute to 
scene recognition mechanisms by monitoring the ongoing decision’s outcome (Anderson, et 
al., 2009; Fincham & Anderson, 2006; Sohn, et al., 2007), serving therefore as a key structure 
integrating the accumulation of perceptual evidence with the implementation and execution 
of a (motor) response. 
The pattern of recognition behavior was congruent with accumulator models of perceptual 
decision making (Gold & Shadlen, 2007; Heekeren, et al., 2008; Wang, 2008). It can be 
hypothesized that accumulation of perceptual evidence in favor of one out of two alternative 
responses (i.e., “living” vs. “non-living”) would mainly take place when the ambiguity of the 
visual input is (at least partially) resolved, that is when distinctive features belonging to one 
of the two categories emerged after the processing of diagnostic LSF and HSF information 
(Bar, 2003; Hegdé, 2008). Complementary source localization analyses showed that the 
accumulation of visual information was primarily subserved by inferior temporal regions 
such as the PCC and PHG, presumably reflecting the analysis of the contextual cues 
surrounding the main object embedded in the scene (Bar, 2004; Bar, et al., 2008; Fenske, 
Aminoff, Gronau, & Bar, 2006). After the perceptual evidence accumulated in favor of one 
alternative surpassed a recognition threshold, medial frontal areas such as the dACC 
monitored the response and provided online adjustments based on feedback loops (Kable & 
Glimcher, 2009; Sohn, et al., 2007). 
The progressive unfolding task used in Chapter 3 contributed to characterize the 
electrophysiological correlates of perceptual and decision-related processes occurring prior to 
scene recognition. However, I had only very little grasp on the number and content of 
expectations and guesses generated online by the participants on a trial-by-trial basis. 
Because each scene was new and complex, and no cue was given to participants regarding the 
most probable scene content progressively unfolded, no control on the number and content of 
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the proactive guesses (presumably generated by participants during unfolding) could be 
achieved. This is an important limitation, because recent research found that the number and 
selectivity of guesses associated with a particular object reliably influenced visual recognition 
processes: a stimulus associated with a low number of guesses belonging to the same 
semantic category was recognized more easily than a stimulus generating many 
heterogeneous guesses (Torfs, Panis, Bartlema, & Wagemans, submitted; see also Bar, 
2009a). To overcome this problem, in Chapter 4 I modified the progressive unfolding task 
and introduced a standard memory manipulation with the aim to standardize the actual 
content of the proactive guesses generated by the participants on a trial-by-trial basis during 
emotional scene recognition. 
2.2. Chapter 4: Multiple synergistic effects of emotion and 
memory during proactive visual scene recognition 
In Chapter 4 I attempted to better control the content and specificity of prior expectations 
generated by participants during the gradual unfolding of complex scenes. This was achieved 
by introducing a standard memory manipulation: for each trial I primed participants with a 
specific stimulus content, and I subsequently asked them, during the unfolding phase, to 
perform a matching task based on the processing of this initial cue (see also Goldman-Rakic, 
1990; Rugg, et al., 1998). The purpose of this manipulation was to constrain the predictions 
proactively made by participants during unfolding, an effect that should augment the 
specificity of these generative processes and in turn their expression at the 
electrophysiological level. Each trial began with the presentation of a colorful (pleasant, 
unpleasant, or neutral) IAPS scene (Lang, et al., 2008), and participants were required to 
encode and remember it for the duration of the trial. After a constant time interval, the 
content of either the same or a novel visual scene was gradually revealed, similarly to 
Chapter 3. Participants were required to judge whether the progressively unfolded scene had 
the same content than the one presented at the beginning of the trial or, instead, a new scene 
was gradually unfolded (delayed match-to-sample task). With this experimental 
manipulation, I promoted the likely generation of a restricted number of guesses regarding 
the most probable content of the unfolded scenes. Moreover, participants were occasionally 
asked to rate the emotional valence of the colorful scenes (besides the delayed match-to-
sample task), thereby making the emotional content task-relevant. Further, the differential 
processing of emotional vs. neutral scenes was also verified at the electrophysiological level 
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by recording and analyzing amplitude changes of the late positive potential (LPP; Foti, et al., 
2009; Schupp, Cuthbert, et al., 2004; Schupp, Stockburger, et al., 2003) in response to the 
initial intact scene. 
Behavioral results showed faster accumulation of evidence for old relative to new scenes, 
confirming that participants were actively using the colorful scene as a cue to guide their 
recognition processes later on during unfolding. In addition, replicating the behavioral results 
of Chapter 3, I found that emotional scenes were on average associated with a slower 
accumulation of evidence compared to neutral scenes. However, this effect was similar for 
old and new scenes; thus, it did not interact with the differential memory status of the stimuli. 
Both negativity bias (Cacioppo & Ito, 1999) and positivity offset (Ito, et al., 1998) were still 
assumed to mediate these behavioral effects: motivationally relevant scenes were apparently 
explored more thoroughly compared to neutral scenes, suggesting that proactive guesses were 
somehow delayed for the former compared to the latter. Moreover, the fact that this strong 
motivational effect on visual scene recognition was similar for old and new scenes suggested 
that memory and emotion likely exerted independent effects on these perceptual mechanisms. 
The estimated neural generators of the dominant voltage maps recorded on the scalp (see 
Chapter 4 for details) supported the assumption of distinct brain networks active during the 
processing of old vs. new scenes. More specifically, recognition of old scenes was primarily 
subtended by ventral occipito-temporal regions, including the parahippocampal gyrus (PHG) 
and the fusiform gyrus (FG). Activity in these areas increased linearly as a function of 
accumulation of evidence, likely reflecting the processing of contextual cues in the PHG 
(presumably based on LSF input; Bar, 2004; Bar & Aminoff, 2003; Bar, et al., 2008) as well 
as invariant object features or maybe viewpoint information in the FG (Epstein, et al., 1999; 
Malach, et al., 1995; Pourtois, et al., 2010a). Importantly, activity in these two ventral 
occipito-temporal regions was reliably modulated by the emotional content of the (old) 
scenes. Emotion primarily interfered with the normal accumulation of contextual information 
in these brain areas, whereas it speeded up this process when additional perceptual evidence 
was aggregated. These results are consistent with an increasingly larger literature pointing at 
the pivotal role of contextual factors (broadly defined) in emotion perception and recognition 
(Aviezer, et al., 2008; Barrett, et al., 2011; Carroll & Russell, 1996), such as stimulus-based 
(e.g., body posture, voice), perceiver-based (subjects’ intact access to conceptual knowledge 
about emotion), and culture-based contextual effects (e.g., cultural differences in the 
encoding or the understanding of facial expressions) (Barrett, et al., 2011). 
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The processing of new scenes, on the other hand, was mainly subtended by more 
dorsomedial regions, including the dACC and the insula. With regards to the dACC, activity 
in this region was at baseline until one image before recognition, when it substantially 
increased. However, no difference was observed between emotional and neutral scenes. This 
pattern of activity during accumulation of evidence, consistent with the involvement of this 
region in higher-order decision making processes (Bush, et al., 2002; Ridderinkhof, et al., 
2004; Seo & Lee, 2007), not only corroborated previous (fMRI) results (Carlson, et al., 2006; 
Ploran, et al., 2007; Ploran, et al., 2011; Wheeler, et al., 2008), but also replicated the 
findings reported in Chapter 3. Noteworthy, in the dACC, roughly the same pattern of 
activation during unfolding was observed regardless of the specific task demands, i.e., a 
delayed match-to-sample task (Chapter 4) vs. an animacy judgment task (Chapter 3). 
Altogether, these findings provide further evidence for the task-aspecificity of this perceptual 
decision making mechanism within the dACC (Ridderinkhof, et al., 2004; Ullsperger, et al., 
2004). Specifically, the dACC likely monitors the response outcome that allows the selection 
of the best response at a given moment in time and in light of the current (un)certainty and/or 
volatility (Behrens, Woolrich, Walton, & Rushworth, 2007), regardless of the specific task at 
hand (i.e., either perception-based or memory-based). As already pointed out in Chapter 3, 
this categorical increase in dACC activity close to the actual moment of recognition might 
reflect perceptual decision making processes based on uncertainty and/or conflict. Because 
participants were encouraged to perform the task before the end of the six-step unfolding 
sequence (and they apparently did so, as confirmed by the behavioral results), these 
conditions might foster the experience of a mild conflict at the time of (overt) decision 
making, namely the urge to take a decision despite insufficient or incomplete perceptual 
evidence (Anderson, et al., 2009; Sohn, et al., 2007). The results showed, however, that this 
effect was not enhanced when the scenes had a clear emotional content (but see Kanske & 
Kotz, 2011a, 2011b). Complementary source localization analyses also revealed categorical 
effects in the insula in response to new scenes. Interestingly, the emotional content of the 
scenes modulated the reconstructed activity in this region: increased amplitude was observed 
between one image before and actual recognition for neutral scenes, a categorical effect 
which was shifted earlier in time (i.e., between two and one image before recognition) during 
the processing of emotional scenes. The insula has consistently been found active in response 
to salient exogenous sensory stimuli (Craig, 2009; Seeley, et al., 2007) as well as challenging 
and uncertain perceptual tasks (Grinband, et al., 2006; Philiastides & Sajda, 2007). As 
proposed above for the dACC, during the progressive unfolding task the level of uncertainty 
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(and the resulting conflict among multiple interpretations for the visual percept) abruptly 
increased close to recognition, when a response selection (old vs. new scene) had to be made. 
Alternatively, the emotional scenes, given their enhanced motivational salience, could trigger 
a specific activation in the insula early on during unfolding, with the aim to monitor whether 
the impoverished content was potentially threatening and, in turn, may have led to a change 
in homeostasis (Sterzer & Kleinschmidt, 2010). 
More generally, the results of Chapter 4 shed new light on the impact and relative 
contribution of memory and emotion factors on proactive processes during visual scene 
recognition. However, the question arose as to whether some of these effects (in particular at 
the behavioral level) may not be explained by uncontrolled non-emotional factors that would 
eventually create asymmetries between the different experimental conditions (neutral, 
pleasant or unpleasant). Among them, picture complexity and familiarity appeared especially 
important to consider, given earlier studies showing a strong modulation of these variables on 
electrical brain activity recorded in response to emotional stimuli (see Chapter 1 for details). 
Therefore, it seemed critical to rule out the possibility that the effects observed in Chapters 3-
4 between the three stimulus categories were (at least partly) explained by uncontrolled 
variations along these specific non-emotional dimensions. 
2.3. Chapter 5: Emotion-specific influences on proactive visual 
scene recognition 
In Chapter 5 I asked two independent samples of participants to rate either the familiarity 
or picture complexity of each and every scene used in Chapter 4. Results of the rating study 
showed: (i) lower familiarity scores for unpleasant relative to neutral and pleasant scenes, in 
line with the “mere-repeated-exposure” effect (i.e., participants usually tend to develop a 
preference for objects deemed familiar and, as a consequence, unpleasant objects are 
typically considered as less familiar; Monahan, et al., 2000; Zajonc, 1968, 2001); (ii) higher 
picture complexity scores for unpleasant compared to neutral and pleasant scenes, consistent 
with the observation that objects more difficult to process (i.e., having a lower “fluency”) are 
more likely seen as unpleasant and thus are somehow devaluated (Winkielman & Cacioppo, 
2001; Winkielman, et al., 2003). 
Afterwards, I used the behavioral data collected during the progressive unfolding task 
described in Chapter 4 and I included these familiarity and picture complexity ratings as 
predictors (besides the factors memory and emotion) in a proportional odds model (see 
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Chapter 5 for details), to verify whether the effects of memory and emotion during proactive 
scene recognition found in Chapter 4 were somehow confounded by trial-to-trial fluctuations 
along these non-emotional dimensions. Results revealed that the previously seen shift in the 
accumulation of perceptual evidence for unpleasant compared to neutral scenes was partly 
confounded by changes in picture complexity and familiarity: when controlling for these two 
factors, in fact, this shift was no longer significant. Hence, familiarity and picture complexity 
could in part explain the pattern of behavioral results for unpleasant scenes reported in 
Chapter 4. Conversely, a delayed accumulation of evidence for pleasant compared to neutral 
scenes was still evident in this control analysis, with no differences between old and new 
scenes. These findings corroborated the assumption that positive information (and not 
familiarity or picture complexity exclusively) truly promotes exploratory behavior in non-
threatening situations, leading to a slower or delayed accumulation of evidence process 
relative to neutral or unpleasant scenes. More generally, these results fit nicely with many 
earlier studies in the literature showing an independent contribution of emotion (besides other 
non-emotional factors) on visual recognition processes (Bradley, et al., 2007; Cano, Class, & 
Polich, 2009; Carretié, et al., 2007; Carretié, et al., 2004; De Cesarei & Codispoti, 2006; 
Delplanque, et al., 2007; Junghöfer, et al., 2001; Müller, Andersen, & Keil, 2008; Wiens, et 
al., 2011). 
3. Emotion influences proactive processes leading to 
visual scene recognition at multiple levels: an 
integrative account 
3.1. Positivity offset effects during visual scene perception 
The main behavioral outcome of Chapters 3 and 4 is the prolonged accumulation of 
evidence for emotional compared to neutral scenes, with pleasant scenes recognized even 
later than unpleasant ones. These results were initially interpreted as reflecting both 
negativity bias (Cacioppo & Ito, 1999) and positivity offset (Ito, et al., 1998) effects, since it 
was not possible to disambiguate between these two concurrent phenomena. However, results 
of Chapter 5 additionally showed that this general shift in the accumulation of perceptual 
evidence for pleasant scenes could not be explained by uncontrolled variations along the 
familiarity and/or picture complexity dimensions. Interestingly, lower familiarity and higher 
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picture complexity scores were obtained for unpleasant scenes, with pleasant and neutral 
scenes showing comparable ratings. Therefore, one would expect changes in the 
accumulation of perceptual evidence for unpleasant scenes. Instead, when controlling for 
non-emotional factors, pleasant scenes were still associated with a distinctive delayed 
accumulation of evidence relative to the two other conditions, clearly demonstrating a 
valence-specific effect of emotion operating during proactive processes prior to visual scene 
recognition1. Therefore, based on the findings reported in Chapter 5, I argued that a positivity 
offset effect appeared to be the most plausible explanation to account for the pattern of 
behavioral results obtained in Chapters 3-5 using the progressive unfolding task. The general 
tendency of healthy adult individuals to engage in exploratory behavior in non-threatening 
events or situations can easily explain the specific delayed recognition observed for pleasant 
scenes: participants in Chapters 3-5, tested in a quiet room and with the perspective of a 
monetary reward, were undergraduates with no history of neurologic or psychiatric disorders 
and with anxiety levels in the normal range (as confirmed by the scores of the STAI-Trait 
scale; Van der Ploeg, et al., 1979). This situation likely promoted a careful analysis of the 
visual scenes gradually revealed during the task, and this process was arguably even more 
thorough during the unfolding of scenes with a clear hedonic content (e.g., babies, food, 
romance) likely matching the goals and needs of these participants. 
As a next step, one could for example assess the magnitude of positivity offset and 
negativity bias effects at a single-subject level prior to testing, with the aim to verify (and 
even predict), during a second step, whether these parameters can influence recognition speed 
of neutral, pleasant, and unpleasant scenes gradually revealed during a progressive unfolding 
task (similar to the task used in Chapter 4). A valuable way to model these concurrent 
activation functions is provided by regression parameters, with the positivity offset 
representing a higher intercept value for the positive activation function and the negativity 
bias representing a steeper slope for the negative activation function (Cacioppo, et al., 1997; 
Ito & Cacioppo, 2005; see also Figure 2). Using this framework, previous studies (e.g., Ito, et 
al., 1998) already assessed the strength of participants’ reactions to positive and negative 
IAPS scenes by including normative ratings of arousal, valence, and dominance as predictors 
in separate regression analyses, and found higher intercept value predicting positivity 
(positivity offset) and a steeper slope predicting negativity (negativity bias). Translated to the 
                                                 
1
 Interestingly, this specific delay in recognition for pleasant scenes seems to be independent from the ease or 
difficulty to generate likely candidates regarding the scene content. This delay was in fact observed for new and 
old scenes alike, meaning that the failure to confirm a given set of predictions (i.e., new scene) did not interfere 
with the propensity to dwell longer on these positive scenes. 
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progressive unfolding task, it could be hypothesized that higher intercept values would 
predict slower recognition times for pleasant scenes, whereas higher slope values would 
predict faster recognition times for unpleasant scenes, hence revealing a latency shift during 
proactive scene recognition depending on the actual underlying psychological or motivational 
process. 
 
 
Figure 2. Visual representation of positivity offset and negativity bias activation functions. At far distances 
from threat (or, more generally, goals), positivity (solid line) is stronger than negativity (dotted line), as 
reflected by higher intercept values. As a result, under such conditions the tendency to approach novel situations 
or stimuli is stronger than avoidance. Conversely, when the motivation to pursue a goal is pressing or threat is 
imminent, negativity is stronger (as represented by a steeper slope) than positivity, leading in turn to avoidance. 
(Adapted from Cacioppo, et al., 1997). 
 
3.2. Emotion as a top-down predictive coding mechanism 
during visual scene perception 
As described above, the main behavioral outcome of Chapters 3-4 is the prolonged 
accumulation of evidence for emotional compared to neutral scenes, especially for pleasant 
ones. Results of Chapter 5 additionally showed that this general shift in the accumulation of 
perceptual evidence for pleasant scenes could not be explained by uncontrolled variations 
along the familiarity and/or picture complexity dimensions. This effect is in line with a 
positivity offset, namely the general predisposition or motivation of healthy adult participants 
to engage in the exploration of non-threatening events or situations, because the long-term 
benefits to explore might turn out to be higher for the organism (e.g., mapping environments, 
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learning new contingencies, satisfying current goals and needs) than the gain associated with 
safety when fleeing (Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999; Norris, et al., 2010). Functionally, I 
proposed that this prolonged accumulation of evidence for pleasant compared to neutral 
scenes may result from an increased number of iterations made by the perceptual system 
between predictions and the bottom-up sensory input (see Chapter 5). These recursive loops 
are meant to eventually minimize prediction errors and identify the most likely interpretation 
of the stimulus content, as subsumed by modern models of predictive coding of human 
cognition (Friston, 2002, 2005; Rao & Ballard, 1999; Serences, 2008; see also Figure 3). But 
what may be a plausible mechanistic account at the base of this theoretical framework? 
 
 
Figure 3. Graphical representation of the critical components involved in proactive processes during visual 
scene recognition, as well as their sensitivity to emotional factors. The results of Chapter 3-5 revealed that 
emotion (particularly pleasant) scenes were recognized later compared to neutral scenes, presumably due to 
prolonged exploration originated by the highly reinforcing hedonic value of this class of stimuli. At the 
functional level, this delayed recognition for emotional scenes might result from a slower or increased number 
of iterations between predictions and the parametric increase of visual input as a function of image level during 
the unfolding procedure, with the final aim to eventually minimize prediction error and to identify the most 
likely interpretation of the stimulus content. 
 
As argued in Chapter 1, the rapid extraction of LSF information via dedicated 
magnocellular pathways may serve to quickly generate coarse predictions regarding the most 
probable object in the visual scene (Bar, 2003), as well as diagnostic contextual cues (Bar, 
2004). This process would later be refined by the (slower) extraction of HSF information 
conveyed by parvocellular pathways (Bar, 2007). A recent update of the original framework 
has been proposed, in which emotion is included as a relevant modulatory factor (Barrett & 
Bar, 2009). Here, affective properties are thought to be intrinsically embedded in the 
prediction originated by the processing of the gist of the scene, given that specific medial 
frontal brain areas (including the ACC and the insula) active during recognition processes 
directly project to autonomic and endocrine output centers in the hypothalamus, midbrain, 
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and brainstem (Barrett & Bar, 2009). Therefore, this model implies that internal affective 
states of the organism might potentially be one feature of the set of predictions used to 
facilitate recognition (Bar, 2004; Bar & Aminoff, 2003; Barrett & Bar, 2009). 
Based on the new results obtained in Chapters 3-5, I propose a revision of this model that 
enables to better account for modulations of visual scene recognition by emotion and 
motivation (Bar, 2003, 2004, 2007, 2009; see also Figure 3). The electrophysiological 
findings reported in Chapters 3-4 show that activity in occipito-temporal regions, such as the 
PCC/PHG and FG, was modulated by the emotional content of the stimulus. Given the 
involvement of the PCC/PHG complex in the processing of contextual information (Bar, 
2004; Bar, et al., 2008; Fenske, et al., 2006), the results of Chapters 3-4 show that the 
extraction of diagnostic contextual cues during early stages of recognition is influenced by 
the motivational significance of these cues, hence the processing of contextual cues during 
proactive vision is shaped by emotion (Barrett & Kensinger, 2010; Barrett, et al., 2011; 
Righart & de Gelder, 2006, 2008a, 2008b). Interestingly, such modulation occurred early in 
the unfolding process relative to the moment of recognition, suggesting that emotional factors 
influenced the processing of contextual cues in conditions of impoverished visual perception, 
when presumably guesses or predictions were still not specific yet. However, this hypothesis 
requires further empirical validation, for example by crossing fMRI and EEG data (Kanske & 
Kotz, 2011a; Peyrin, et al., 2010). FG activation, on the other hand, presumably reflected the 
processing of invariant object features or viewpoint information (Epstein, et al., 1999; James, 
et al., 2000; Malach, et al., 1995; Pourtois, et al., 2010a) or, alternatively, subordinate level 
judgments (as compared to basic-level decisions) required to shape and refine online the early 
guesses or predictions regarding the most probable stimulus content progressively revealed to 
participants (Gauthier, Anderson, Tarr, Skudlarski, & Gore, 1997; Palmeri & Gauthier, 2004; 
Tarr & Gauthier, 2000). It could be hypothesized that, in Chapter 4, the gradual accumulation 
of perceptual evidence served to perform a coarse or categorical judgment (i.e., old-new), 
thereby modulating activity in FG (Kosslyn, Thompson, Gitelman, & Alpert, 1998). These 
hypotheses alike, however, need further empirical support. 
Activity in medial frontal brain areas and the insula was also reliably modulated as a 
function of the emotional content of the scenes. Importantly, this categorical modulation in 
the insula occurred close to the time of overt recognition of new scecnes, as opposed to 
earlier effects in the PHG and FG for old scenes. Therefore, it could be hypothesized that 
activity in this brain region might reflect verification processes aiming at assessing whether 
the stimulus content, or more specifically the most plausible candidate (presumably based on 
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a selective and earlier effect occurring in the OFC via magnocellular vision), is potentially 
threatening (or, more generally, motivationally significant) and, in turn, may lead to a change 
in homeostasis (Sterzer & Kleinschmidt, 2010). Alternatively, this region might work in 
concert with the dACC to resolve the conflict arising because a response needed to be 
produced in conditions of impoverished visual perception (Ploran, et al., 2007; Ploran, et al., 
2011; Sterzer & Kleinschmidt, 2010). Future studies are needed to elucidate whether conflict 
detection per se or performance monitoring account for the observed categorical effects 
found in these regions during proactive vision (Ito, et al., 2003; Ridderinkhof, et al., 2004; 
Wheeler, et al., 2008). 
It should be pointed out that source localization analyses of the electrical brain activity 
recorded on the scalp during the progressive unfolding task (Chapters 3-4) did not show any 
differential activation in the OFC, an area thought to be involved (as early as 130 ms after 
stimulus onset, 50 ms before any activity recorded from object-selective regions; Bar, et al., 
2006) in the generation of the most likely interpretations of the main object or scene (Bar, 
2007). However, as a matter of fact, this OFC activation was observed in tasks where the 
visual stimuli depicted scenes providing a clear segregation between the main object in the 
foreground and the background (see, for example, the stimuli used in Bar, et al., 2006), 
whereas more complex (neutral and emotional) IAPS scenes were employed in Chapters 3-5. 
Alternatively, the main time window of interest selected in Chapters 3-4 for the analysis of 
the ERP data may have overlooked a selective contribution from the OFC, bearing in mind 
that ventral or lateral prefrontal regions are notoriously hard to identify with EEG source 
localization methods (Kringelbach, 2005; but see Dhar, et al., 2011), unlike MEG (Bar, et al., 
2006; Gamond, et al., 2011). However, the selection of this time interval was based, 
following standard practice, on the main outcome of the spatiotemporal clustering analysis 
showing different topographical maps (denoting reliable changes in the underlying neural 
networks) 280-360 ms (Chapter 3) and 402-522 ms (Chapter 4) post stimulus onset. 
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Figure 4. Adaptation of Moshe Bar (2009b)’s neuroanatomical model of visual object and scene recognition, 
taking into account the new EEG results reported in Chapters 3-4. In parallel to the bottom-up transfer of the 
image details conveyed by high spatial frequency information (HSF) along the visual pathways (undulated 
arrow in the centre), low spatial frequency (LSF) information is quickly projected from early visual areas to 
ventral occipito-temporal and medial prefrontal regions, possibly via magnocellular pathways. This coarse but 
rapid information is sufficient to generate “early guesses” about the most likely identity of the main objects in 
the scene and diagnostic contextual cues useful for recognition. These predictions are validated and refined in 
infero-temporal regions with the gradual arrival of HSF input. The EEG results of Chapters 3-4 further specify 
that the motivational relevance of complex visual scenes has an impact on recognition at different latencies in 
different regions (circled in blue). Specifically, early modulation by emotion was found in ventral areas such as 
the PHG and FG, involved in the analysis of contextual and object (or viewpoint)-dependent features, 
respectively. On the other hand, categorical changes in neural activity in the insula and dACC were found close 
to the moment of overt recognition, likely indicating the involvement of these areas in conflict and uncertainty 
resolution, as well as response monitoring. The red and blue background indicate the differential patterns of 
activation observed at the electrophysiological level, namely a linear accumulation of evidence prior to 
recognition and a categorical increase close to overt recognition, respectively. MPFC: medial prefrontal cortex; 
OFC: orbitofrontal cortex; FG: fusiform gyrus; RSC: retrosplenial complex; PCC: posterior cingulate cortex; 
PHG: parahippocampal gyrus; IT: infero-temporal cortex; dACC: dorsal anterior cingulate cortex. The arrows 
are unidirectional in the figure to emphasize the proposed flow of visual information, although all these 
connections are bidirectional in nature. (Adapted from Bar, 2009b). 
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3.3. Modeling the contribution of emotional factors during 
perceptual decision making 
Neurobiological accounts and computational models of perceptual decision making 
postulate that the brain is in essence a proactive machine (i.e., constructivist view), in the 
sense that it progressively gathers perceptual evidence in favor of one out of two (or more) 
alternatives until a certain threshold is surpassed, thereby resulting in a decision and 
producing a (motor) response (Gold & Shadlen, 2007; Heekeren, et al., 2004; Heekeren, et 
al., 2008). As described in Chapter 1, start points (the initial amount of evidence in favor of 
each response, presumably influenced by prior knowledge) and drift rates (the different 
average speed of evidence accumulation for each response) are important parameters to 
model and explain differences in speed of recognition (Brown & Heathcote, 2008; Usher & 
McClelland, 2001). These models, however, do not explicitly include emotion as a potential 
source of variability. It could be hypothesized, in fact, that emotional factors would modulate 
the rate of accumulation of information, in that smaller drift rates would lead to slower 
responses (Philiastides, et al., 2011). Alternatively, decision-related processes may be slowed 
down when diagnostic emotional features are detected and, as a consequence, it would take 
longer for the system to reach the decision threshold (Philiastides, et al., 2011; Ratcliff, 1978; 
Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008). At this stage, the new results reported in Chapters 3-4 do not 
fully disambiguate whether emotion influences accumulation of evidence processes (i.e., the 
number of iterations between predictions and errors), decision-related processes, or both. 
However, the electrophysiological results reported in Chapter 4 provide first hints on the 
response profile of different brain systems performing complex visual computations during 
proactive emotional scene recognition. Whereas the response profile of some of these brain 
regions is consistent with a genuine accumulation of evidence (PHG and FG), others (dACC 
and insula) appear compatible with subsequent decision-related processes (see also Ho, et al., 
2012; Ho, Brown, & Serences, 2009). Hence, the new findings reported in Chapter 4 suggest 
that emotion can exert complex modulatory influences at each of these two levels (see Figure 
5). 
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4. Conclusions 
4.1. Future perspectives 
The results of Chapter 2 suggest that motivationally relevant stimuli do not reflexively 
capture attention when competing with neutral stimuli for attention selection. Presumably, 
other non-emotional cues are prioritized by the visual system in order to resolve the TOJ task 
in the most efficient way. Among these, I proposed that the systematic variation in the SOA 
between the two competing face onsets created a compelling impression of apparent motion 
on the screen (Hikosaka, et al., 1993). However, this tentative post hoc explanation needs to 
be put to the test in future studies, given that I did not assess directly whether apparent 
motion was indeed the (non-emotional) cue actively used by participants and able to 
somehow override effects of (negative) emotion during early attention selection. For 
example, stimulus parameters could be altered in such a way that any impression of apparent 
motion would be made impossible or alleviated, e.g., by adding a moving random-dot pattern 
in the background of the display. Given that motion speeds up attentional orienting when 
clearly informative (Hillstrom & Yantis, 1994; Raymond, 2000), disrupting any apparent 
motion cues would normally promote the use of other strategies to perform the task, in this 
case the analysis of the emotional content of the face stimuli. 
Furthermore, the TOJ and progressive unfolding tasks devised and employed in this thesis 
could be used in the context of experimental psychopathology in order to further explore and 
characterize possible biases in early attention and perceptual processes in specific 
populations. More specifically, if prior entry effects for threatening vs. neutral faces would be 
observed when testing high anxious, dysphoric, or even clinically depressed patients with the 
experimental design used in Chapter 2, this would add to the existing literature and provide 
further evidence for early attentional biases towards threat-related material in these 
individuals (Bar-Haim, et al., 2007; Cisler & Koster, 2010; Davidson, et al., 2002; Fox, 1993; 
MacLeod, et al., 1986; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Price & Drevets, 2012). Because the TOJ 
task, unlike other spatial cueing or orienting tasks, provides a “pure” measure of early 
attentional capture (i.e., not confounded by other attention processes, including shifting or 
disengagement), such an outcome would unequivocally show that early attention processes 
are indeed influenced by motivational and situational factors, besides more classical 
structural components or effects (task set or exogenous effects). 
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Figure 5. According to accumulator models of perceptual decision making, perceptual evidence in favor of one 
or more alternative candidate representations of a (visual) stimulus content is accrued over time until a threshold 
is surpassed, thereby leading to a decision and (potentially) eliciting a response. During the progressive 
unfolding task, the accumulation of visual information in favor of either “living” (solid green line) or “non-
living” (solid red line) responses would occur only when the ambiguity of the visual input is (at least partially) 
resolved, i.e., when diagnostic features of the scene (in this example, the detection of two crossed arms below a 
human face) slowly emerged from the picture series as a consequence of the parametric increase of HSF and 
LSF information. Importantly, when participants are presented with emotional scenes, recognition is delayed 
compared to neutral scenes at the behavioral level. Two alternative mechanisms are proposed to mediate this 
effect (blue solid line): (A) slower accumulation of evidence when the scene has an emotional content; (B) a 
lower response threshold for neutral (dashed blue line) compared to emotional (dashed green line) scenes. 
 
The progressive unfolding task, on the other hand, could prove useful in assessing the 
alteration of a positivity offset effect in high anxious or depressed individuals. Whereas an 
increased sensitivity to negativity is shared between these two psychopathological conditions 
(with an exacerbated negativity bias), they could however be partly dissociated regarding the 
residual sensitivity to positive emotions that should normally be absent in depressed (but not 
anxious) individuals (Conklin, et al., 2009; Shook, et al., 2007). More specifically, it has been 
proposed that, with equal levels of (high) negativity bias, anxiety is the more likely outcome 
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if positivity is intact, whereas depression may arise in people with lower positivity (Norris, et 
al., 2010; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988; Watson & Tellegen, 1985). As proposed here 
above (see paragraph 3.1), parameters of positivity and negativity can be calculated for each 
participant separately via linear regressions: intercept values indicate positivity offset, 
whereas slope values refer to negativity bias (Ito, et al., 1998; Ito & Cacioppo, 2005). If this 
hypothesis holds true, a first prediction would be that, with comparable slope values, lower 
intercept values would be observed for depressed relative to anxious individuals. In a second 
phase, intercept and slope values could be included as predictors in separate linear 
regressions to investigate whether they could account for recognition speed during the 
progressive unfolding task (see Chapters 3-5): hypothetically, higher intercept values could in 
fact predict slower recognition times for pleasant scenes. Hence, the use of computational 
modeling in the context of experimental psychopathology might help better tease apart the 
actual distinctive properties vs. shared components of different psychopathological 
conditions, here with a focus on depression and anxiety. 
4.2. Summary and conclusion 
The new results reported in this dissertation show that emotion can bias visual perception 
at multiple levels and through different brain mechanisms. In Chapter 2, I did not find 
evidence for an “automatic” effect of emotion on attention selection during the temporal 
processing of competing onsets. Based on these results, I concluded that (negative) emotional 
stimuli do not “magically” capture attention (Pourtois, et al., 2012), but their early 
preferential processing can somehow be bypassed when the perceptual system can exploit 
other low-level cues in order to guide attention allocation in the environment, or the current 
task set fosters the use of these non-emotional cues (see also Todd, et al., 2012). I proposed a 
new model assuming multiple and separate attentional components (see Figure 1) that seems 
able to account for these new findings without challenging the notion of specific emotional 
attention brain processes, although further empirical validation is needed. By contrast, in 
Chapters 3-5 I found clear evidence for a modulation of visual scene recognition by their 
emotional content, when proactive processes and predictions were promoted and participants 
made active use of them in order to guide their behavior. In this condition, I argued that 
motivational drives (e.g., positivity offset), rather than basic emotional features or dimensions 
(e.g., arousal or valence), actually influenced the rate at which perceptual information was 
accumulated by the visual system and compared with existing representations (stored in 
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memory) before a decision was made regarding the most likely identity of the scene. The new 
findings reported in Chapters 3-5 show that multiple brain systems operate in parallel in order 
to achieve these computations, with several traceable contributions of emotion. Remarkably, 
these effects took place before overt recognition, suggesting that emotion does not only 
“reactively” alter visual perception, but it can proactively exert strong influences on the 
guidance and selection of (diagnostic) perceptual cues eventually used by the visual system to 
take a decision about the content of the visual percept. As such, these results lend support to 
pioneering accounts proposed in the literature (Bruner & Postman, 1949; Niemi & Näätänen, 
1981), as well as more recent models (Bar, 2003; Gosselin & Schyns, 2003) that posit that the 
phenomenology of visual perception is eventually based not only on the efficient processing 
capabilities of encapsulated modules dealing with a bottom-up analysis of the retinal input, 
but prior knowledge, expectations and motivation profoundly shape and influence these 
processes with the aim to construct and constantly update the meaning of our external visual 
world. 
Taken together, these new results provide evidence for the assumption that emotion is not 
a simple by-product of visual perception, but instead it proactively shapes it. More generally, 
these finding lend support to the notion that the human visual system is a remarkable 
proactive machine, which is able to “effortlessly” perform complex computations that 
eventually enable us to make sense of our environment, within a few hundreds of 
milliseconds following light changes captured by the retina. 
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Het belangrijkste doel van dit proefschrift was om de invloed van emotie (wat 
voornamelijk geoperationaliseerd werd als veranderingen in valentie en opwindingswaarden 
van op voorhand geselecteerde gezichten of complexe visuele scenes) op visuele perceptie. Ik 
ging meer bepaald op zoek naar de mate waarin emotionele factoren perceptuele verwerking 
beïnvloedde tijdens (gezichts of scene) herkenning op een ‘bottom-up’, reactieve vs. een ‘top-
down’, proactieve manier. Om deze vragen te beantwoordden, heb ik eerst naar ‘bottom-up’ 
effecten van emotie gekeken op de temporele perceptie van competitieve gebeurtenissen 
d.m.v. specifieke emotionele aandachtsmechanismen. Van deze mechanismen wordt gedacht 
dat ze voorrang geven aan de vroege detectie van motivationeel opvallende stimuli (in dit 
proefschrift kwade of angstige gezichten), vergeleken met neutrale stimuli. Vervolgens heb ik 
onderzocht hoe emotie visuele perceptie kon beïnvloeden via ‘top-down’ mechanismen die 
hier werkzaam zijn als proactieve gokken of verwachtingen die online gegenereerd werden 
over de meest waarschijnlijke identiteit van een visuele stimulus wanneer de retinale input 
verminderd is. Om deze vragen te beantwoorden werden twee verschillende experimentele 
paradigma’s ontwikkeld en gebruikt: Een standaard temporele volgorde beoordelingtaak 
(Hoofdstuk 2) en een progressief ontwikkelingsparadigma (Hoofdstuk 3-5). 
De nieuwe bevindingen die werden gerapporteerd in dit proefschrift tonen dat emotie de 
visuele perceptie kan beïnvloeden op verschillende niveau’s en via verschillende 
hersenmechanismen. De resultaten m.b.t. de eerste vraag tonen dat motivationeel significante 
stimuli de aandacht niet trekken op een “magische” wijze en vervolgend de temporele 
perceptie beïnvloeden, maar andere factoren (vb. aparte lagere niveau perceptuele ‘cues’ 
zoals beweging of de actuele taak set) zouden kunnen wedijveren met emotionele (hogere 
orde) ‘cues’ om geselecteerd te worden via ‘bottom-up’ aandacht, om zo uiteindelijk tegen te 
gaan dat emotionele cues systematisch en automatische de aandacht trekken (Hoofdstuk 2). 
M.b.t. de tweede vraag tonen de resultaten dat de generatie en het gebruik van specifieke 
verwachtingen m.b.t. de meest waarschijnlijke inhoud van complexe visuele scenes – die 
progressief worden getoond op verschillende opeenvolgende stappen – niet immuun zijn voor 
emotionele factoren. Deze resultaten steunen de assumptie dat emotie, naast andere 
componenten (vb. aandacht of geheugen), proactief de selectie van diagnostische perceptuele 
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‘cues’ kan beïnvloeden die uiteindelijk gebruikt worden door het visueel systeem om de 
betekenis van de visuele input af te leiden (Hoofdstuk 3-5). Ik argumenteer dat motivationele 
krachten (vb. positiviteits ‘offset’), meer dan basis emotionele kenmerken of dimensies (vb. 
opwinding of valentie), de snelheid eigenlijk beïnvloedde waarmee perceptuele informatie 
werd opgebouwd door het visuele systeem en werd vergeleken met bestaande voorstellingen 
(opgeslagen in het geheugen), voordat er een beslissing werd gemaakt m.b.t. de eigenlijke 
identiteit van de scene. Elektrofysiologische resultaten toonden verder dat verschillende 
hersensystemen parallel werken om tot deze berekeningen te komen, met verschillende te 
achterhalen contributies van emotie. Opvallend was ook dat deze effecten plaatsvonden voor 
de openlijke herkenning. Dit wekt de suggestie dat emotie niet enkel “reactief” de visuele 
perceptie verandert, maar ook “proactief” een sterke invloed kan uitoefenen op het leiden en 
selectie van (diagnostische) perceptuele cues die uiteindelijk gebruikt worden door het 
visueel systeem om een beslissing te nemen over de inhoud van het visuele percept. 
We kunnen dus zeggen dat deze nieuwe resultaten evidentie geven voor de aanname dat 
emotie niet simpelweg een bijproduct is van visuele perceptie, maar dat het vormgeeft aan de 
visuele perceptie. Meer algemeen kunnen we concluderen dat deze bevindingen de notie 
steunen dat het menselijke visuele systeem een opmerkelijke proactieve machine is, die 
“zonder moeite” complexe berekeningen kan uitvoeren die ons uiteindelijk toestaan om onze 
omgeving zin te geven, en dit binnen enkele honderden milliseconden volgend op 
lichtveranderingen die opgevangen worden door de retina. 
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